Wider Europe

Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's new newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods. To subscribe, please click here.

I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I'm drilling down on two major issues: the fallout at NATO after a rocket hit Poland last week, and how Ukraine stands with the EU ahead of a long winter.

Brief #1: NATO Fallout After A Rocket Hits Poland

What You Need To Know: Late on November 15, there was a nervous buzz around Brussels as news was coming in that a rocket had killed two Polish citizens in a village not far from the Ukrainian border. At the time, many people supposed the presumed "attack" was part of an ongoing Russian barrage of Ukraine, missiles that had been taking out the country's electricity grid.

Was this an "Article 5 moment?" -- perhaps the most famous provision of the NATO treaty in which an attack on one of the 30 alliance members is considered an attack on all. It has only been invoked once in the military alliance's history: after the 9/11 attacks in 2001.

As the dust settled, there was more clarity, and then calm. It seemed more likely that it was a stray rocket not intended to hit Poland. Still, everyone expected Warsaw to trigger Article 4 the next day -- a less dramatic option than Article 5, in which alliance members that feel threatened ask for formal consultations, normally in order to strengthen military defenses. This article was last triggered by eight Eastern NATO countries directly after the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February.

Through the morning of November 16, it became more and more probable that it was a Soviet-era S-300 antiaircraft rocket that had been accidentally fired by Ukrainian forces defending against Russian attacks. Article 4 was not invoked, but a regular -- and much anticipated -- North Atlantic Council (NAC) was held in Brussels among NATO ambassadors. After the meeting, in which Poland briefed the council, a seemingly relieved NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg told the press that there was no indication of a deliberate attack, nor was Russia preparing offensive military action against NATO. He also added that "this is not Ukraine's fault. Russia bears ultimate responsibility," a sentiment later echoed by the EU as well.

Deep Background: After a sleepless night, a Western official I spoke to on the condition of anonymity referred to the whole incident as "a storm in a teacup, but a big teacup."

Poland was widely praised for having acted in a restrained and measured way throughout, defying some stereotypes of gung-ho hawkishness. Everyone now awaits the investigation that the United States is assisting Warsaw with.

There are certainly some uncomfortable questions, most notably why the rocket wasn't detected by NATO air defenses. Stoltenberg insisted that "we have air-defense systems in place that are active 24/7." He also hinted that NATO is set up to counter missiles that have special characteristics and that the one that hit Poland didn't share those characteristics.

The Polish ambassador to NATO, Tomasz Szatkowski, also noted afterward that the accidental nature of the incident made it harder for the systems to spot the rockets, emphasizing that Warsaw would have to do some fine-tuning.

Drilling Down:

• During the meeting at NATO headquarters in Brussels, Poland did ask NATO's supreme allied commander for Europe, General Christopher G. Cavoli, not only to increase vigilance but also to assess the need for more air-defense capabilities and, perhaps more importantly, ascertain whether there are weaknesses on NATO's Eastern front. There was, however, no formal tasking and no deadlines as to when this assessment can be expected. Earlier this year, a high-ranking NATO official told me that if Russia were to attack a NATO member, it would most likely be Poland, due to the country acting as a hub for Western arms deliveries into Ukraine. Poland received two U.S. Patriot surface-to-air missile batteries in the early stages of the war that, combined with other air defenses, have so far allayed any fears about vulnerabilities.
• Another fear that some NATO allies expressed was how Russian propaganda can use this latest incident and to what effect. One strand of thought is that the Kremlin can attempt to convince Western audiences that now is the time for their governments to cease arms deliveries to Kyiv, as the Ukrainian military is careless, if not downright incompetent. Moscow will also claim that the reason Russia was blamed first, instead of Ukraine, was due to anti-Russian hysteria in the West. Comments from Ukrainian officials -- including President Volodymyr Zelenskiy -- that questioned whether the rocket was fired by Ukrainian forces were met with disbelief by some European officials. They were worried that Ukraine -- and NATO -- might end up with egg on their faces, but also that Zelenskiy's statements could be easily exploited by Russia.

Brief #2: A Tough Winter For EU-Ukraine Relations

What You Need To Know: This week might have seen an EU-Ukraine summit taking place in the western Ukrainian city of Lviv. The meeting, originally slated for November 25, would have brought together the European Commission and Council presidents with the Kyiv leadership. The precarious situation in Ukraine, however, has forced a postponement.

The working assumption is that the meeting will now take place in December or even January and that it might have to be moved to Brussels, in the end, for security reasons. Another reason for the postponement is that few concrete "deliverables" were expected, and the draft summit declaration, which I saw a working version of, was pretty meager.

An EU official told me on background that while no "real Ukraine fatigue" has set in in Brussels, the "impending winter months will be about hunkering down before we can start delivering on promises again come spring." Despite that, there will be four main strands of the EU's relationship with Ukraine: financial aid, military support, sanctions, and Kyiv's EU membership bid.

Deep Background: While the financial aid strand looks complicated, it is expected to be solved soon. The European Commission has proposed a package of macro-financial support for Ukraine next year worth 18 billion euros ($18.6 billion), with 1.5 billion euros to be disbursed each month starting in January.

For that package to be approved, unanimity among the 27 member states is needed. And Hungary has indicated that it will veto the aid package, as Budapest is angling to secure 7.5 billion euros of EU funds for itself that the European Commission suspended earlier this year due to rule-of-law concerns. Most officials expect that impasse to be solved when the bloc's finance ministers convene in Brussels on December 6. Most likely, they will reluctantly agree to release the Hungarian funds after the European Commission, at the end of November, pronounces itself sufficiently satisfied with the right-wing Fidesz government's recent judicial reforms. And then Hungary will quietly remove its Ukrainian veto.

With military aid, however, it might be trickier. Last week, Brussels officially launched its military assistance mission for Ukraine, with the first Ukrainian soldiers arriving in various member states for training. Altogether, the bloc has provided at least 8 billion euros of military aid to Ukraine (roughly 45 percent of what the United States has provided so far), out of which 3.1 billion euros comes directly from the EU's own financial body, the European Peace Facility (EPF).

One issue is that there is only a little more than 2 billion euros left in the EPF, and those funds are supposed to last until 2027. So, Brussels must either resort to "budgetary creativity" to somehow find more cash, or coax member states to step up their bilateral aid contributions in the coming months.

Drilling Down:

• The EU is likely to impose its ninth round of sanctions on Russia in the coming weeks, but just like its last round of restrictive measures imposed on Moscow in early October, it will be a weak package. EU officials I have spoken to expect the European Commission to present the proposed sanctions at the end of November, with a view to them being adopted in early December. The package will likely include more sanction listings on Russian officials; a ban on more dual-use goods, which can be used for both civilian and military purposes; and updating sanctions on Belarus so they are in line with the Russian ones. Ideally, there will also be a Russian oil-price cap for third countries that will complement the EU's import ban on most Russian oil that enters into force on December 5. A third country oil-price cap will partly depend on continued discussions at the G7 and G20. But don't expect any more extensive sanction proposals after a stormy EU foreign affairs council meeting on November 14 in which Hungarian Foreign Minister Peter Szijjarto reportedly clashed with some of his counterparts and questioned the effectiveness of the restrictive measures.
• On the enlargement bid, the official line is that Ukraine (along with fellow EU candidate Moldova and potential candidate Georgia) will have to wait for the European Commission to present its EU enlargement package in October 2023. But there is already a push from some EU member states for Brussels to publish some sort of "interim assessment" as soon as March to encourage Ukraine to make speedy reforms. In early December, the European Commission will issue a report assessing how prepared the Eastern trio is to implement the full body of EU legislation. The report is still being worked on, but I have heard from Brussels sources that one conclusion that the commission might draw is that Georgia has the best "absorption capacity" of the trio. That's EU speak for having a bureaucracy that works effectively in adopting EU legislation in many different policy fields -- for example, the judiciary, agriculture, or economics.

Looking Ahead

On November 23, the European Parliament will vote on a resolution declaring Russia "a state sponsor of terrorism." Like all foreign policy resolutions the parliament passes, it is nonbinding for EU member states, and the designation isn't formal EU policy. But it is worth remembering that the European Parliament tends to be a bit of a bellwether on these issues, with the content of its resolutions adopted by member states further down the road.

The following day, November 24, will see the bloc's energy ministers once again meeting to agree on measures to reduce consumption and lower electricity prices. Some electricity prices have gone down recently after skyrocketing earlier this fall, a rise partly triggered by the war in Ukraine. Expect ministers to agree on joint gas purchases, solidarity between EU countries in emergency situations, and measures to limit gas price spikes. But an agreement on some sort of temporary gas price cap will probably remain elusive for now.

That's all for this week. Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on Twitter @RikardJozwiak or on e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.

Until next time,

Rikard Jozwiak

If you enjoyed this briefing and don't want to miss the next edition, subscribe here. It will be sent to your inbox every Monday.

And you can always reach us at newsletters@rferl.org.

Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's new newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods. To subscribe, click here.

I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak and this week I'm drilling down on two major issues: whether Bulgaria and Romania could join Croatia in becoming members of the EU's Schengen zone on January 1; and whether Ukraine will be able to join the EU's mobile "roam like home" program.

BRIEF #1: Croatia Is Set For Schengen Entry, But What About Bulgaria And Romania?

What You Need To Know: It is more or less a done deal that Croatia will join the passport-free Schengen Area on January 1, 2023. On December 9, EU interior ministers will give a thumbs-up after noting that Zagreb has fulfilled all of the criteria, or the "Schengen acquis," as it is called in Brussels.

That includes, for example, ensuring the border police are up to scratch and that there is judicial cooperation between Zagreb and other Schengen members.

The last potential holdout, the Netherlands, has indicated in Brussels that it foresees no problems and is satisfied with Croatia's work in preventing "pushbacks" at what will become the EU's new external border. (Pushbacks are when countries force migrants back over a border they have just crossed, normally without considering whether they are genuine asylum seekers or not.)

The Dutch, however, still have a key role to play when it comes to the other potentially big decision that could be taken by the very same ministers on December 9: whether Bulgaria and Romania should also join Croatia in becoming members of Schengen.

The Czech Republic, which currently holds the rotating presidency of the European Council, is keen to see all three countries join together, as are most other member states.

The Hague, though, is still reluctant.

Experts from various EU countries will meet in Brussels on November 16 to try to come up with a compromise ahead of the pre-holiday season crunch talks.

Deep Background: Many thought the Dutch had perhaps mellowed since the last national elections in March 2021, which produced a more EU-friendly government. But its parliament is still leaning right and is active on home affairs and migration issues.

Recently, the parliament adopted a resolution urging the government of Prime Minister Mark Rutte to veto Bulgaria and Romania's Schengen bids until further investigations are conducted -- highlighting the continued prevalence of corruption and organized crime in the two countries.

What The Hague is angling for are new reports by the European Commission under the so-called Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM). Under this procedure, launched in 2007, Brussels has on an annual basis evaluated progress made by Bucharest and Sofia on judicial reforms, anti-corruption measures, and money laundering.

An official with knowledge on the matter but who wished to remain anonymous told me he could "neither confirm nor deny" that a fresh report on Romania was imminent. However, the commission remains adamant that Bulgaria, at least, was finished with the CVM when the last country report was issued back in 2019.

Drilling Down

• The European Commission tried to allay fears by organizing a voluntary fact-finding mission to Bulgaria and Romania in early October, with the participation of experts from 17 EU member states. In the final report, seen by RFE/RL, it stated that the "on-site team did not identify any issues as regards the application of the latest developments of the Schengen acquis," adding that "Bulgaria and Romania continue to meet the conditions necessary to apply all relevant parts of the Schengen acquis in full." The Netherlands, which didn't participate in the expert evaluation, dismissed the findings, claiming the report wasn't broad enough.
• While the Netherlands appears isolated at first glance, France is another moderate skeptic, although not as outspoken as the Dutch. One anonymous EU official I spoke to suggested Paris is more concerned with selling French military equipment to Bulgaria and Romania than pressuring them over Schengen.
• One idea that has been floated as a possible compromise is for Croatia to join on January 1 and then Bulgaria and Romania might come aboard a bit later, possibly on March 1. This would give the Netherlands and the European Commission a bit more time to assess the situation and produce additional reports, if necessary. There are fears, however, especially in Sofia and Bucharest, that if Bulgaria and Romania don't join together with Croatia in a "package deal," the momentum will be gone and they might not join anytime soon.

BRIEF #2: Ukraine And The Free Roaming Dilemma

What You Need To Know: There were a few raised eyebrows when the European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, in her annual state of the European Union speech in September, confidently announced that "we will bring Ukraine into our European free roaming area."

The EU's "roam like home" program -- launched in 2017 and which also covers non-EU states Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway -- meant that mobile phone roaming charges for citizens traveling across member nations were eliminated.

One of the more popular EU decisions, it was recently prolonged by another decade. But it has never been tested with other third countries. A deal, struck with EU mobile operators, currently allows Ukrainian refugees in the EU to benefit from roaming free or at very low costs while using their Ukrainian mobile phones.

This deal, extended in early October for another three months, could be replaced by bringing the entire country under the "roam like home" program. That, though, is easier said than done.

Deep Background: There are essentially two ways of achieving the "roam like home" provision. One is to negotiate directly with operators to lower or remove tariffs altogether. This is what was done among the six non-EU Western Balkan countries when all roaming tariffs were removed last summer. And that is likely to be the way to go when removing tariffs between Kyiv and the EU in the future.

But for Ukraine there is a catch. In the EU-Ukraine association agreement, which fully entered into force in 2017, there is an internal market treatment clause to bring the country into the EU roaming area if Kyiv aligns itself with the relevant EU legislation and does not become an EU member state. This is a unique mechanism not present in similar EU association agreements with Georgia, Moldova, or the countries of the Western Balkans.

Drilling Down

• The truth is the EU hasn't moved much since Von der Leyen's speech. And it is the European Commission that should make that first step by updating an annex within the roaming regulations and by agreeing on what legislative reforms are needed. This sounds very technical and legalistic -- and it's probably exactly why nothing has yet been done. Offering a third party preferential access to the EU's lucrative single market is a sensitive issue, indeed. It's even more sensitive after Brexit, as the United Kingdom is looking closely at other non-EU countries and the deals they strike with Brussels. Generally, London would prefer not to be bound by EU rules or the Luxembourg-based European Court of Justice (ECJ).
• The European Commission must tread carefully to make everything legally sound. That means making sure the ECJ has some jurisprudence in the matter in order to set a legal precedent and make sure EU laws are being followed. No one knows how quickly this can move, but once it does, the ball is in Ukraine's court. Kyiv will have to introduce the EU roaming legislation and, most likely, also pass other bigger EU telecom laws. EU officials estimate this whole process could take up to two years to complete. Considering the broad political and public support among many Ukrainians to move closer to the EU, it might well be a little speedier than that. So it's fairly probable Ukraine will get "roam like home" in the future, though some sort of transition period first is likely. In reality, we're still talking years, at best.
• Ukraine is also currently fighting an all-out war against Russia. Can legislation truly be implemented? And what territory will be covered? Ukrainian mobile operators have complained that they have lost many transmitters due to the fighting. For example, Crimea, annexed by Russia in 2014, is now completely covered by the Russian telecom network. It would take both time and investment to reverse that -- and that's assuming that Russia would even play ball.
• Another thing to consider is that not everyone would be happy. Ukrainian mobile operators will lose out financially, just like EU operators did when "roam like home" was first introduced. And the operators will likely compensate for their losses by raising charges for consumers in other areas. Ultimately, though, Ukraine might calculate that closer ties with Brussels and the benefits to hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians scattered across the EU are worth more than the domestic operators' objections. To get what it wants, the Ukrainian government might have to play hardball and threaten to nationalize the mobile operators if they don't get onboard.

Looking Ahead

EU foreign ministers are meeting on November 14 in Brussels with a packed agenda, although expect no decisions this week. They kick off with a breakfast with Belarusian opposition leader Svyatlana Tsikhanouskaya. The bloc is currently preparing more sanctions on the regime of Alyaksandr Lukashenka, including aligning measures for Minsk with those already imposed on Russia.

The foreign minister of Ukraine, Dmytro Kuleba, will also address his EU counterparts via video link as the bloc takes the formal decision on whether to launch its military mission for Ukraine. Expect the discussion on imposing a Russian oil cap to also feature high on the agenda.

All eyes will be on Hungary this week. On November 18, the bloc's European affairs ministers will discuss Budapest's respect (or lack of it) for EU values in the General Affairs Council. November 19 is the deadline for Budapest to reply to the 17 concerns the European Commission raised about the country's rule of law. Satisfying Brussels would unlock 7.5 billion euros ($7.8 billion) of suspended EU funds.

That's all for this week. Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on Twitter @RikardJozwiak or on e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.

Until next time,

Rikard Jozwiak.

If you enjoyed this briefing and don't want to miss the next edition, subscribe here. It will be sent to your inbox every Monday.

And you can always reach us at newsletters@rferl.org.