Accessibility links

Breaking News

Wider Europe

Sorry! No content for 7 November. See content from before

Wednesday 6 November 2024

Calendar
November 2024
Sun Mon Tue Wed Thu Fri Sat
27 28 29 30 31 1 2
3 4 5 6 7 8 9
10 11 12 13 14 15 16
17 18 19 20 21 22 23
24 25 26 27 28 29 30
For NATO, the defense alliance that Donald Trump threatened to leave in 2018 during his first term, official point out the vast majority of members now spend the required 2 percent of GDP on defense.
For NATO, the defense alliance that Donald Trump threatened to leave in 2018 during his first term, official point out the vast majority of members now spend the required 2 percent of GDP on defense.

BRUSSELS -- EU officials are bracing themselves for Donald Trump's return to the White House.

They are preparing for the possibility of increased tensions in transatlantic trade and the likelihood that the bloc of 27 member states will have to shoulder a bigger burden of political and financial support for Ukraine.

Plus there's the fact that, in the past, Trump has preferred to deal with regional allies, such as Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, rather than the European Union as a whole.

Speaking to EU officials as Trump was projected to win the U.S. presidential vote early on November 6, the mood was as somber as the Brussels weather was grim.

But there was also some bullishness -- and even optimism. They already have experience dealing with Trump and, in some ways, the EU has moved closer to some of the Republican candidate's policies. The bloc is much tougher on migration these days, and while Brussels is still hoping to strike free-trade deals around the world, the EU has become increasingly protectionist.

Some European diplomats think that the EU taking a more hawkish approach on China could get the transatlantic relationship off to a good start -- if, that is, the EU's export-oriented economies can afford the possible loss of trade from potential Chinese trade measures.

For NATO, the defense alliance that Trump threatened to leave in 2018 during his first term, the mood appears to be slightly less panicky.

While Trump has continued to cast doubt on NATO's mutual defense clause, Article 5, many officials in the alliance believe he is more focused on the EU. Besides, they say, the vast majority of members now spend the required 2 percent of GDP on defense, something they are happy to credit to Trump's past pressure. Not to mention, the optimists say, new NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte is one of a select few Europeans who have the new president's ear.

There are two things that strike me when speaking to people from both the EU and NATO. First, Trump's entourage is now more of an unknown quantity. When he was elected in 2016, there were Republicans in his administration that European officials felt they could deal with: for example, Rex Tillerson, Jim Mattis, and John Bolton. This time around, officials seem to be more fearful -- wary, for example, of the isolationism of incoming Vice President J.D. Vance.

Secondly, there is a clear east-west divide. The officials I have spoken to from Western European countries are, at least on the surface, pretty glum about the prospects of a Trump presidency.

But from my conversations with politicians and officials from Central and Eastern Europe there is something else: hope, and maybe even excitement. They seem more comfortable with the transactional nature of Trump's politics and say his supposed unpredictability can be a good thing when dealing with Beijing, Moscow, and Tehran.

Regardless, the United States and Europe have been drifting apart for a while, as successive Washington administrations increasingly pivot toward the Pacific. That gulf is only likely to widen in the future.

Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban delivers a speech at the European Parliament in Strasbourg, eastern France, on October 9.
Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban delivers a speech at the European Parliament in Strasbourg, eastern France, on October 9.

Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods.

I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I'm drilling down on two issues: The upcoming summits in Budapest and last week's EU enlargement report.

Note to Readers: You can now listen to my briefings by clicking on the audio link below. We're actually using an AI version of my voice and would love to know what you think -- and, of course, what we can improve. Happy listening!

please wait

No media source currently available

0:00 0:13:03 0:00

Briefing #1: Will Orban Unveil A Big Surprise?

What You Need To Know: Hungary's turn as the rotating president of the Council of the European Union in the second half of this year was always bound to be interesting, given that Budapest has a habit of clashing with Brussels on a number of things -- not least on Russia and Ukraine.

And it is fair to say that one of the highlights of this controversial presidency will come on November 7 as the Hungarian capital is hosting the summit of the European Political Community (EPC) -- a political forum bringing together the leaders of almost all European states (bar Belarus, Russia, and the Vatican). That evening and the next day, there will be a meeting of the 27 EU heads of government to mainly discuss how to make the bloc more competitive.

There is, however, a risk that both meetings will be overshadowed by other events -- most likely the U.S. elections taking place on November 5. As the presidential race is expected to be a tight affair, it's possible the winner may still not be known by the time the leaders gather on the morning of November 7.

There are also persistent rumors in Brussels that Orban has a "big surprise" in store for his guests, so stay tuned.

Deep Background: Another issue to be discussed at the EPC, and particularly the informal EU summit, will be the October 26 Georgian parliamentary elections. They were won by the ruling Georgian Dream party and marred by irregularities. The EU is divided on how to respond (see next briefing) and whether or not the vote was free and fair.

EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell last week summed up the confusion himself by noting that even OSCE/ODIHR election observers hadn't pronounced whether or not the elections were free and fair.

It will also be interesting to see who will represent Tbilisi at the EPC summit. At the last one, at Blenheim Palace in the United Kingdom in July, it was Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze, whose government has been accused of becoming increasingly authoritarian.

As it is Budapest that handles the invitations, don't be surprised if Orban wants his ally from Georgian Dream present, which could lead to plenty of uncomfortable encounters with other European leaders.

Drilling Down:

  • And then there is Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy, who is poised to make his first visit to Hungary since the full-scale Russian invasion of his country in early 2022. Zelenskiy and Orban have sparred on numerous occasions, notably on Hungary's reluctance to channel more EU funds to Kyiv and skepticism toward Ukraine's EU and NATO membership. So it could be a very tense affair indeed.
  • The formal part of the EPC will last just a few hours, with a short plenary dealing with security challenges. That will be followed by breakout sessions focusing on migration and economic security before concluding with a second plenary.
  • What really matters at the summit is the chance for some diplomatic speed dating in an informal setting -- something the leaders reportedly love about the EPC format. Will, for example, the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan meet, either with or without outgoing European Council President Charles Michel?
  • The migration debate could also be interesting, as the EU is becoming much more restrictive in this area. A discussion paper on migration ahead of the EPC meeting, seen by RFE/RL, notes that the priority in this area will mainly be the fight against human smuggling and trafficking. The paper also notes that "we need to be extremely vigilant not to allow people in conflict areas to become tools in the hands of hostile regimes in a hybrid war. We must be equally determined to counter the phenomenon where nonstate actors willingly or not willingly become collaborators of criminal organizations." And the controversial idea of sending people who didn't get asylum in the EU to so-called "return hubs" outside the EU will be discussed, with the document underlining that "we should ensure solid mechanisms for effective returns, especially for the removal of those who pose a serious threat to public order or internal security. We should also continue to explore innovative solutions as possible ways forward, including the idea of developing return hubs outside Europe."
  • The issue that is proving to be the most controversial ahead of the summit, however, has been a document, devised by Michel, called the Budapest Declaration On The New European Competitiveness Deal. The draft, seen by RFE/RL and which Michel is hoping the leaders will endorse, notes that the EU's share of world gross domestic product (GDP) has halved over the last two decades, that retail prices for industrial electricity in the EU are three times higher than for the other major world economies, and that "as a share of GDP, the EU spends one-third less on research and development than other major economies in the OECD." It's controversial, as some EU member states think the 10-page document is too long; some are furious that it mentions the next long-term EU budget (always a fraught discussion, as it concerns who pays how much); and others are peeved that it mentions convergence on taxation, another sensitive topic. Others are not happy about what the document has left out: for example, support for nuclear energy or more European defense spending.
  • There is a long list of complaints and it neatly illustrates the age-old Brussels problem: agreeing on a way forward on anything. As one diplomat, who wished to remain anonymous, told me, "We are in a hostile, global environment in which we rightly have identified that we need to become more competitive on every level, yet we get stuck arguing about commas and bullet points in a document few [people] will read."

Briefing #2: Georgia Is The Big Loser In The Latest EU Enlargement Report

What You Need To Know: The European Commission presented its annual enlargement report on October 30, with a distinctly different tone from last year's release. Then, the EU executive made historic recommendations: It proposed opening accession talks with Moldova, Ukraine, and conditionally for Bosnia-Herzegovina, and proposed granting candidate status for Georgia.

This year, the report did not contain any such big news or significant recommendations.

The very fact that it was issued on a school holiday week in Brussels, with many EU officials far away from the office, and that the European Commission prioritized a report on improving civilian and defense preparedness tells you quite a lot about how much importance the bloc gives to further enlargement at this point.

Deep Background: In fact, the most interesting aspect of the entire package was how hard the European Commission would be on Georgia, just fresh out of parliamentary elections with reported irregularities that gave the ruling Georgian Dream party an improbable majority.

And it was damning on Georgia, by EU standards.

Citing the recent adoption of the controversial "foreign influence" law, similar to Russia's "foreign agent" law, and anti-LGBT laws, as well as "strong anti-EU narratives from Georgian officials," the document concluded that "unless Georgia reverts the current course of action, which jeopardizes its EU path, and demonstrates tangible efforts to address outstanding concerns and key reforms, the [European] Commission will not be in a position to consider recommending opening negotiations with Georgia."

Last time around, the European Commission gave Tbilisi nine conditions in various policy fields to complete in order to start accession talks. Here, Brussels simply concluded that the South Caucasus republic had made "insignificant progress" and noted a lack of "sufficient political commitment of the authorities" to undergo necessary reforms.

Yet, apart from halting Georgia's EU accession, something that de facto was concluded by EU leaders already in June, there's not much else happening now. The truth is that the bloc is unsure of how to read the Georgian elections on October 26.

The report refers to the OSCE's preliminary findings issued after the vote, noting "several shortcomings that occurred in a tense and highly polarized environment," such as intimidation and compromises on vote secrecy. It talks of "comprehensive electoral reform" and "constructive and inclusive dialogue across the political spectrum."

But the truth is that the EU is divided on this. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban raced down to Tbilisi to congratulate his political allies, while Europe ministers from 15 EU member states issued a statement at least questioning the fairness of the vote and underlining that Orban wasn't speaking on behalf of the bloc.

Drilling Down:

  • These divisions will make potential future sanctions on Georgia's current leadership hard to agree on. Hungary, and probably also Slovakia, will be vetoing them. And then there is the issue of actually finding some offense that is sanctionable, pinpointing it on high-enough officials, and then backing it up with evidence. Right now, that seems like a tall order for Brussels.
  • What is left, apart from cutting more funds to Tbilisi, is to suspend visa liberalization, which only requires a qualified majority of member states to back. But is there really an appetite to punish the entire population? The EU will be discussing this at the informal EU summit in Budapest next week and when EU foreign ministers meet in Brussels later in November.
  • So, what about the more positive aspects of the reports? The European Commission hopes that both Moldova and Ukraine will open EU accession chapters "as soon as possible in 2025." Brussels will look to Chisinau to further step up anti-corruption and "de-oligarchization" to proceed further on its membership path, whereas Kyiv needs to keep on fighting organized crime and continue to improve legislation for national minorities.
  • The thing to look out for here is a potential link to Serbia -- and the politicking that can ensue. For the third year running, the European Commission recommends that Belgrade should be allowed to open more EU accession chapters. This is something that Hungary, which currently holds the rotating EU Presidency, is keen on as well.
  • Many other EU member states, however, are not impressed with Belgrade’s close links with Moscow. Don't rule out that Budapest might want to trade a green light for Serbia moving ahead in late 2024 with giving its OK to Ukraine sometime in 2025.
  • There was also happy reading for Albania and Montenegro. Earlier in October, Tirana opened its first cluster of accession chapters, and in December the European Commission hopes that member states will open yet another batch. It also endorses the country's highly ambitious goal to close accession negotiations by the end of 2027.
  • This is really in the hands of member states, but right now Albania is the "feel-good story" of the otherwise rather sorry tale of Western Balkan EU enlargement.
  • For Montenegro, which has already opened all 30+ chapters, the European Commission hopes that some chapters actually can be closed by the end of the year, which should be feasible, and that talks conclude at the end of 2026, as is Podgorica's goal, which may just be a bridge too far. But if any country ends up joining the club this decade, the smart money is on Montenegro.
  • Then there are the seemingly hopeless cases of Kosovo, North Macedonia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Pristina's EU application is languishing in the European Council, where member states still aren't too keen to send it over to the European Commission for an opinion on membership feasibility -- at least not before the February parliamentary elections in the country.
  • North Macedonia remains stuck as long as it doesn't change its constitution according to Bulgaria's wishes, something that doesn't look likely to happen anytime soon.
  • And then there is Bosnia, which could potentially start accession talks in the foreseeable future but that so far has failed with basic conditions such as appointing a chief negotiator to the EU talks, a team to do the heavy lifting during those talks, and a national plan to transpose EU laws to the national legislation -- again reflecting Sarajevo's dysfunctional internal politics in which the country's entities can rarely agree on any way forward.

Looking Ahead

The U.S. election isn't the only interesting news this week. There are also the hearings in the European Parliament for the proposed new European commissioners.

The hearing of the enlargement commissioner-designate, Marta Kos, is taking place on November 7, presumptive defense commissioner Andrius Kubilius a day earlier, and the proposed foreign policy chief, Kaja Kallas, the week after -- on November 12.

That's all for this week! Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on X @RikardJozwiak, or on e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.

Until next time,

Rikard Jozwiak

If you enjoyed this briefing and don't want to miss the next edition subscribe here.

Load more

About The Newsletter

The Wider Europe newsletter briefs you every Tuesday morning on key issues concerning the EU, NATO, and other institutions’ relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe’s Eastern neighborhoods.

For more than a decade as a correspondent in Brussels, Rikard Jozwiak covered all the major events and crises related to the EU’s neighborhood and how various Western institutions reacted to them -- the war in Georgia, the annexation of Crimea, Russia’s support for separatists in eastern Ukraine, the downing of MH17, dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo, the EU and NATO enlargement processes in the Western Balkans, as well as visa liberalizations, free-trade deals, and countless summits.

Now out of the “Brussels bubble,” but still looking in -- this time from the heart of Europe, in Prague -- he continues to focus on the countries where Brussels holds huge sway, but also faces serious competition from other players, such as Russia and, increasingly, China.

To subscribe, click here.

RFE/RL has been declared an "undesirable organization" by the Russian government.

If you are in Russia or the Russia-controlled parts of Ukraine and hold a Russian passport or are a stateless person residing permanently in Russia or the Russia-controlled parts of Ukraine, please note that you could face fines or imprisonment for sharing, liking, commenting on, or saving our content, or for contacting us.

To find out more, click here.

XS
SM
MD
LG