Middle East
Hamas Leader's Death Makes Israeli 'Hit List' Shorter But Might Not Alter Gaza War
The death of Yahya Sinwar just months after he was named the top leader of Hamas highlights the difficulties the U.S.- and EU-designated Palestinian terrorist group has in protecting high-value targets from Israel, but it might not have a major effect on the course of the war in the Gaza Strip.
The 62-year-old Sinwar was accused of organizing and directing Hamas's deadly assault on Israel on October 7, 2023, landing him at the top of Israel's hit list.
Israel confirmed on October 17 that Sinwar was killed in a military operation in the southern city of Rafah in Gaza. Hamas has not yet commented.
Sinwar's death highlights the high turnover rate of senior Hamas members as well as Israel's "very deep coverage in terms of intelligence and the ability to strike quickly when high-value targets are detected," said Lucas Webber, senior threat intelligence analyst at Tech Against Terrorism and research fellow at the Soufan Center.
The timing of Sinwar's death is also significant, he said, coming as Israel is renewing its offensive in northern Gaza and expanding operations against Hamas ally Hezbollah, an armed group and political party that controls much of southern Lebanon.
"It's seen as a tactical success, taking out a high-value target at a time when they kind of need this internal support for the expansion of their internal and external military campaign," Webber said.
Webber was doubtful about the impact that Sinwar's death could have toward ending the war in Gaza, however.
"He [Sinwar] was obviously very experienced and had a high status among Hamas and its supporters, but I don't think his killing will change the trajectory of the conflict in any fundamental way," Webber said.
Sinwar became Hamas's top leader soon after Israel's suspected assassination of Ismail Haniyeh, the group's political chief, in Tehran on July 31.
Hamas is still fighting nearly a year after Israel's retaliatory invasion of Gaza and will be difficult to defeat, Webber notes. Sinwar's death might require some "reorientation" by Hamas, he said, but will not "factor too much" into Israel's attempts to win the war.
Thanassis Cambanis, director of the U.S.-based Century Foundation think tank, says it's difficult to gauge the impact Sinwar's death will have on Hamas's viability to remain in power in Gaza.
But he does see two possible outcomes to Sinwar's death.
"One is that Israel becomes emboldened to even more intensely pursue the complete destruction of Hamas and Gaza," he said. "The other option, which would be more positive, is that his death would create an opening for negotiations to actually lead to an end to the conflict."
Neither Hamas nor Israel has to this point been seriously interested in ending the war, Cambanis says.
"Both sides see it in their interest to continue fighting,” he added. “Sinwar's death could change the dynamic for the better by creating an opening for Hamas to either surrender or come to some kind of negotiated settlement that until now, its leadership hasn't really been that interested in pursuing."
As for who would be in line to replace Sinwar, who was seen as a "ruthless" replacement for his predecessor Haniyeh, Cambanis said that can go two ways as well.
"We've seen more pragmatic people follow after periods of really intense extremism, and then we've also seen factions or parties where people really double down and with each leader who gets killed the successor is even more hard-line," he said.
Trita Parsi, co-founder of the Washington-based Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, warned that the "idea behind Hamas -- that Palestinian statehood only can come through armed resistance against Israel -- has not only not been killed, but it has also likely flourished."
"Israel's indiscriminate bombing of Gaza and massive killings of civilians, including forced starvation, has likely radicalized the Palestinian people and provided more ground for recruitment for Hamas," he added.
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Trump-Xi Summit Reveals China's Careful Balancing Act On Iran
WASHINGTON -- The Trump-Xi summit offered fresh clues about how Beijing is positioning itself on Iran amid growing tensions over sanctions, regional security, and the future of energy flows through the Strait of Hormuz.
While US President Donald Trump said both sides agreed Iran should never obtain a nuclear weapon and supported reopening the Strait of Hormuz, analysts noted that China avoided making concrete public commitments on sanctions enforcement, reducing Iranian oil purchases, or pressuring Tehran directly.
Instead, experts say, Beijing appears focused on protecting its strategic and economic interests while avoiding deeper entanglement in the conflict.
Support For Stability, Without Pressure
Publicly, China has committed itself to the broad principles of de-descalation, freedom of navigation, and opposition to Iranian nuclear weapons.
But analysts noted Beijing stopped short of endorsing tougher measures against Tehran.
Jason Brodsky, policy director at United Against Nuclear Iran, said the gap between China's rhetoric and actions remains significant.
"While readouts from the summit suggested China wants the Strait of Hormuz to be open and for there to be no tolling, China's ambassador is criticizing the US-Bahraini draft UN Security Council resolution demanding Iran reopen the Strait of Hormuz," Brodsky told RFE/RL on May 15.
"China also says it does not want the conflict to continue but is supplying Iran with dual-use components for its missile and drone program," he added.
That dual-track approach -- supporting regional stability while maintaining ties with Tehran -- was a recurring theme in expert assessments following the summit.
At Washington's Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), analysts noted that Beijing emphasized keeping the strait open and ensuring oil continued flowing through the Persian Gulf but avoided publicly committing to sanctions enforcement or cuts in Iranian oil imports.
Zongyuan Zoe Liu, Maurice R. Greenberg senior fellow for China studies at CFR, told RFE/RL China's language remained "vague but useful with regard to de-escalation," adding Beijing wanted to show support for stability without assuming responsibility for enforcing it.
"China wanted to show that the message is clear: Keep the oil flowing, keep the strait open," Liu said. "But they haven't really made any commitment to police stability or provide stability."
Oil Flows And Strategic Interests
Much of China's posture appears tied to energy security.
China remains Iran's main oil customer and depends heavily on Gulf shipping routes. Analysts say Beijing's overriding objective is likely to preserve stable access to energy supplies while avoiding a direct confrontation with Washington.
That calculation was also reflected in comments from Brian Mast, a Republican from Florida and chairman of the US House Foreign Affairs Committee.
"They have a substantial relationship with Iran, have bought a significant amount of oil from Iran, and would love to continue to do so, or not have other Gulf oil bottled up from them," Mast told an audience at CFR.
At the same time, in response to an RFE/RL question, Mast argued that China has avoided fully backing Iran militarily.
"They are not coming to Iran's defense," he said. "Did China participate in targeting assistance for the Iranians? Absolutely, yes. Would I say that they dove into this? No, they didn't."
Mast said Beijing appears to be balancing competing strategic interests: whether prolonged instability benefits China by drawing US attention and resources deeper into the region, or whether restoring secure navigation and oil flows better serves Chinese economic priorities.
"They're absolutely trying to balance which one of those is better for them," he said.
The summit also fueled speculation about possible behind-the-scenes discussions involving sanctions relief.
Trump suggested sanctions on Chinese "teapot" refineries processing Iranian crude may have been discussed during talks with Xi. Analysts in Washington say such comments could indicate the US is exploring ways to encourage Chinese cooperation through incentives rather than relying solely on pressure.
Rush Doshi, former deputy senior director for China and Taiwan at the National Security Council during the Biden administration, said Trump's comments raised the possibility of a broader arrangement involving Chinese purchases of US crude oil and flexibility on sanctions enforcement for some refiners handling Iranian crude.
No agreement was publicly announced, however, and Beijing has not confirmed such discussions.
Questions Remain
Another issue hanging over the summit involved reports that Chinese companies may have considered providing weapons or additional support to Iran.
Chris McGuire, a senior fellow for China and emerging technologies at CFR, noted that concerns already exist regarding Chinese transfers of dual-use technologies supporting Iran's military capabilities.
Trump said Xi committed not to sell weapons to Iran, though analysts cautioned such assurances would likely be closely scrutinized over time.
Meanwhile, China has continued pushing back against US sanctions targeting firms linked to the Iranian oil trade.
Liu noted that before the summit, China's Commerce Ministry issued an injunction opposing US sanctions on several Chinese refineries accused of purchasing Iranian crude.
The move highlighted Beijing's broader resistance to what it views as extraterritorial sanctions enforcement and suggested China is unlikely to publicly align itself with Washington's pressure campaign against Tehran.
Luke Coffey On How Tehran Has Adapted Kremlin Negotiation Tactics
WASHINGTON -- As Washington weighs its next steps with Tehran, some analysts see familiar patterns emerging -- not from the Middle East, but from the Kremlin's playbook.
In an interview with RFE/RL, Luke Coffey, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute focusing on national security and transatlantic relations, said Iran appears to be borrowing directly from Russia's negotiation strategy: Prolong talks, seek concessions incrementally, and avoid making meaningful commitments while maintaining the appearance of diplomacy.
RFE/RL: When you look at Iran's response to recent peace proposals, do you see parallels with Russia's approach to negotiations over Ukraine -- publicly embracing diplomacy while privately hardening its demands?
Luke Coffey: There are a lot of similarities, because Iran has watched the [US special envoy Steve] Witkoff playbook over the past year or so with Russia. The Iranians know what they can get away with. They know how to drag the discussions out, make it look like Trump is achieving something, when in reality, he'll achieve nothing. And they have learned this from the Russians.
RFE/RL: Both Moscow and Tehran want sanctions relief before making major concessions. Is that diplomacy or leverage politics dressed up as diplomacy?
Coffey: From their point of view, it makes sense to sequence it this way. They're going to ask for this whether or not the Trump administration will lift sanctions beforehand remains to be seen.
In the case of Russia, you could argue that maybe the lifting of the oil sanctions on Russian crude oil -- while many observers thought it was linked to global markets and Iran -- was in fact a concession given to Russia by the Trump administration.
If I was Iran or Russia, I would want international sanctions lifted. I would want frozen assets released. But it would be a mistake to do so at this point because Russia is the aggressor here. In the case of Iran, Iran has a 47-year track record of conducting terrorism across the region, especially targeting US interests. It should be up to them to make the first move, not the United States.
RFE/RL: Russia wants frozen assets returned, while Iran wants access to frozen funds and economic normalization. How dangerous is it when negotiations become less about peace and more about financial recovery for authoritarian regimes?
Coffey: It's a slippery slope, and this is one of the reasons why nothing should be agreed until everything is agreed when it comes to these peace talks, whether it's with Russia or with Iran. Both will try to take whatever they can get while giving back the least amount required.
RFE/RL: Iran wants negotiations tied to Israel's actions in Lebanon. Russia talks about addressing the "root causes" of its war in Ukraine. Is this the same tactic, expanding the conflict to avoid accountability?
Coffey: The situation is a bit different, because there are different motivating factors.
For Russia, this is about rebuilding an empire, and for Iran, it's about spreading a revolution. If we were dealing with the Soviet Union, maybe there would be more similarity. But because we're dealing with imperial Russia, the Russia we're dealing with today is like it was during the time of the czar. We have a 21st-century Russia with 19th-century ambitions.
A similarity is this sense of almost ethnic superiority. Ethnic Russians think they are superior to the other constituent ethnic groups, whether inside the Russian Federation or those that used to be part of the Soviet empire, almost to a level of snobbery.
The same is the case with Iran and the Arabs, in particular the Gulf states, where the Persians see themselves as this established power -- kind of like old money -- and the Gulf states are these nouveau riche Arabs who don't know how to behave or handle their newfound resources.
RFE/RL: You've spent years studying NATO and Russian strategy. Do you think Tehran concluded from the Ukraine war that persistence eventually exhausts the West politically?
Coffey: I think they do watch what's happening in Ukraine. But I think they draw even more lessons from America's experience in Iraq and Afghanistan, and from the unwillingness -- or lack of political appetite -- to deploy US military forces on the ground in Iran.
They know that it's very unlikely President Trump would agree to this, so they know they can probably ride out this war. They can absorb and withstand the bombardment, the bombings, and the air strikes and come out the other end surviving.
And for Iran, all they need to do is survive. They don't necessarily need to win. If the US is unwilling to put boots on the ground, then achieving some of the objectives outlined by Trump seems really difficult, if not impossible.
RFE/RL: Trump recently called Iran's latest response "totally unacceptable." How much of this is Iran testing Washington -- or testing Trump personally -- because it believes the White House still wants a deal badly enough to stay at the table?
Coffey: Trump wants a deal, and Iran knows this. These Iranians are not stupid. These are very sophisticated, savvy people. They may be extremists, they may be Islamists, but they are not dumb, and they understand the political dynamics at play in America.
They understand midterm elections are coming up. They understand the summer holidays are coming up and that gasoline prices impact Americans.
They saw the latest inflation figures that were released -- 3.8 percent, the highest rate of inflation in more than three years. So they are quite happy to remain in the status quo.
Yes, it's difficult for them. Yes, they're not generating much revenue. Yes, the Strait of Hormuz is effectively closed for them, although you do hear stories of ships passing through the US blockade. But they're willing to withstand this because, in their society, the way the state structures oppress and suppress the people means they can endure a terrible economic situation. They can withstand inflation in a way that elected leaders in the US cannot, because American politicians will be punished at the ballot box.
Trump talks about regime change. There are new people in Iran -- and he says similar things about Maduro in Venezuela -- but this isn't really regime change. It is a leadership change while the regime itself remains fully intact. Maduro's internal security apparatus, intelligence services, and armed forces remain intact, as if he were still there. The same is true with Iran. The tools used for internal oppression -- the IRGC [Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps], for example -- remain fully intact.
Yes, they have fewer missiles. They have fewer drones. They have fewer airplanes. They effectively have no navy. But the internal security structures remain. Until these are degraded, the people of Iran will not feel safe or comfortable taking to the streets. And this is the dilemma Trump will face going forward.
RFE/RL: At what point does diplomacy become performative? Critics argue that both Iran and Russia use negotiations as strategic delay mechanisms while continuing military pressure.
Coffey: You always run the risk that it becomes performative. Symbolism matters in international affairs, so perhaps negotiations are at least partly inherently performative, as both sides posture to try to get into a stronger negotiating position.
That's why you need wise and experienced statesmen and stateswomen to determine when a deal can be made. When a deal cannot be made, you have to walk away from the table and start pursuing other policy options. But you have to know when you're at that point, and you have to be realistic about it. And I'm not so sure this is exactly the case right now with the administration.
This interview has been edited for length and clarity.
Lego, Hip-Hop, And Deepfakes: How Iran Uses AI To Shape Western Opinion
WASHINGTON -- From viral Lego-style videos and AI-generated hip-hop tracks to fabricated battlefield imagery, the war in Iran is revealing how artificial intelligence (AI) is being weaponized in modern warfare and statecraft.
To discuss this rapid shift, RFE/RL spoke with Max Lesser, senior analyst on emerging threats at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) Center on Cyber and Technology Innovation.
RFE/RL: You have tracked Iranian influence operations closely. How sophisticated has Iran become online? Are we watching the world's first real AI war unfolding around Iran right now?
Max Lesser: Iran has become increasingly sophisticated in its online influence operations. There's definitely been a big shift. The AI Lego videos are probably one of the most successful propaganda efforts that I've ever seen come out of Iran targeting foreign audiences.
But that's just one type of Iranian influence operation. They've conducted successful hack-and-leak operations, for example against the [US President Donald] Trump campaign leading up to the 2024 elections, and they've had a long history of aggressive influence operations targeting foreign audiences.
Whether this is the first AI war, I wouldn't say that personally. In previous conflicts, for example during the 12-day war [in June 2025], Iran was creating deepfakes and spreading deepfakes on state media and things like that. But a lot of that was more focused on their domestic audience and trying to convince their own domestic audience that they were having military successes.
What distinguishes this moment is that there is a long history of Iran using AI in influence operations targeting foreign audiences, but I don't think they had done that particularly successfully until now. They're doing it more successfully now because they're figuring out how to use AI to communicate to Americans in ways that resonate with Americans -- using hip-hop music, using Lego videos. Apparently, sympathetic Americans are even telling them what they should put in their next video.
So it's not the first time that Iran has used AI in propaganda and influence operations. It's not the first time they've done it during wartime. But I think it's the first time where we've seen their use of AI in influence operations make such a splash.
'Psychological Warfare Is Crucial'
RFE/RL: To understand the scope of this, when people in the West scroll through social media during this conflict, how much of what they are seeing could actually be fake?
Lesser: It's hard to put a number on it because everybody's feed is different, based on preferences and algorithms. But in terms of fakes and deepfakes specifically, whenever people see videos claiming to show strikes or battlefield footage, they should verify them before believing them. Sometimes there is real footage of successful strikes, but there are also many techniques being used to fabricate or manipulate imagery.
It's not just Iran doing this. I actually started tracking this type of behavior years ago when the Houthis -- an Iranian proxy -- were using AI-generated imagery of ships going up in flames during attacks in the Red Sea.
There's definitely a precedent for this type of behavior. It's been happening for years. Whenever people encounter those sorts of images, they should exercise caution and look for verification outside social media.
RFE/RL: Is Iran using AI mainly to spread propaganda or to deliberately create confusion and panic inside the West? What exactly are they trying to communicate through these campaigns?
Lesser: A huge part of it is telling their story and spreading narratives like the US being imperialist and Iran portraying itself as resisting that oppression. A lot of the messaging tries to align the Iranian government and its struggle against America with progressive causes in the US.
In one of their recent Lego videos, they showed an Iranian man speaking with an anti-Trump liberal in Portland. They also referenced Black Lives Matter protests and anti-Trump demonstrations.
There's a lot of messaging designed to appeal to specific audiences in America: people who are anti-war, anti-Trump. Surprisingly, you even saw rainbow imagery, even though Iran is an extremely anti-gay country. They are strategically using imagery and narratives they believe will resonate with Western audiences.
Another major theme is [American financier and convicted child sex offender Jeffrey] Epstein. They frequently refer to American and Israeli elites as the "Epstein class" and try to portray themselves as part of a global resistance movement against corrupt elites. Again, the most powerful thing is storytelling. That's what gets clicks.
RFE/RL: Do we know who inside the Iranian system is running these campaigns? And how much of it is automated, involving bots, synthetic influencers, AI-generated accounts, etc.?
Lesser: One important actor is the Basij, Iran's voluntary paramilitary force. The Basij has units focused specifically on propaganda and psychological operations. A lot of that is domestic. The Basij uses influence operations as a tool of domestic control against the Iranian population.
They flood Iranian social media platforms and Western platforms like X with Persian-language propaganda targeting Iranians and the diaspora. We've documented hundreds of these accounts at FDD, though we believe there are probably thousands engaging in this activity.
Then there are different units inside the [Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps], as well as Iran's Intelligence Ministry, known as MOIS. These groups have all been involved in influence operations, cyberattacks, and information warfare.
Iran's state broadcaster, IRIB, also plays a role by seeding propaganda domestically that later spreads abroad. But there's also a gray zone where pro-regime civilians participate independently or semi-independently.
For example, the creators of the Lego videos initially denied ties to the Iranian government but later admitted the Iranian government was one of their customers. What remains unclear is whether they are taking direct orders from Tehran or simply producing content the government later distributes.
RFE/RL: Beyond X and TikTok, are there particular platforms Iran is weaponizing against the West, such as Telegram, Instagram, or others?
Lesser: Definitely. Telegram is widely used for coordination because it's less popular among Americans and offers fewer restrictions. We've seen Iranian influence operations use Telegram to crowdsource and coordinate participants.
Meta also released a report earlier in the conflict explaining that Iranian operatives were posing as Americans on Facebook and Instagram to engage directly with American audiences.
They were also creating fake media outlets and fake news organizations. Platforms like Meta tend to enforce policies more aggressively, which is why Iran often uses more covert tactics there.
RFE/RL: You've warned about authoritarian influence ecosystems. How closely are Iran, Russia, and China now working together online?
Lesser: It's very difficult to prove direct operational coordination. Personally, I haven't seen concrete evidence of them messaging each other behind the scenes and coordinating propaganda campaigns directly. But they absolutely use each other's content, mirror each other's narratives, and copy each other's tactics.
Russia was really one of the pioneers in this space with fake accounts, hack-and-leak operations, and covert influence campaigns. Iran and China learned from those models and developed their own versions.
For example, Russia carried out the hack-and-leak [operation] against the [Hillary] Clinton [presidential] campaign in 2016, while Iran conducted a high-profile hack-and-leak operation targeting the Trump campaign in 2024.
While I can't say there's confirmed coordination, they are clearly learning from one another, echoing one another, and sometimes directly copying each other.
RFE/RL: Is the United States prepared for this kind of AI-powered psychological warfare?
Lesser: No, I don't think so. You can look at what happened with the Lego videos. There really wasn't a meaningful response from the United States. But it's also hard to know what the response should be. We can't simply take these videos down. We have a free and open Internet and protections for free speech.
Even if you remove them from one platform, they'll reappear elsewhere -- Telegram or other platforms with less moderation. So this isn't just about takedowns. America has to educate its own people about who the Iranian regime is, how it oppresses its population, and how it uses propaganda strategically. That's what will ultimately make people less susceptible to these campaigns.
RFE/RL: Are Iranian influence networks targeting American and European audiences differently in order to exploit political polarization inside Western democracies?
Lesser: They definitely tailor messaging. For example, they've promoted Scottish independence narratives through covert accounts targeting audiences in Scotland. They've also created fake French media outlets and localized campaigns in Europe.
But many of the narratives they use in America also resonate in Europe: anti-Trump messaging, anti-war messaging, anti-establishment narratives. Essentially, they're saying: “You're anti-Trump? We're anti-Trump too. You're against this war? We're against this war, too.” Then they package those narratives into emotionally engaging Lego videos with catchy music, and people begin feeling emotionally aligned with them.
The American government needs to do a better job informing the public about how brutal the Iranian regime actually is, how it treats its own people, and how long it has supported terrorism and repression.
Iran is telling a story. The United States needs to tell a stronger and more truthful story in response.
This interview has been edited for length and clarity.
The Islamic Republic 3.0: Who Holds Power In Iran?
For decades, power in Iran was centralized in the hands of a single man: Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. But since his killing at the onset of the US-Israeli war with Iran on February 28, decision-making in Tehran has become increasingly decentralized, experts say.
Mojtaba Khamenei has not been seen in public since he succeeded his father in early March. In his absence, a cohort of senior Iranian officials have been effectively running the country.
The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), a dominant political player, has now become the decisive force in Iran, experts say. Reformists and moderates have been relegated to the political fringes, leading to a more hard-line and ideologically rigid system.
Key power centers and figures have emerged in what some observers call the Islamic republic 3.0. While many of these figures are aligned on major policies, some fissures have surfaced.
Mojtaba Khamenei: New Supreme Leader
As supreme leader, the 56-year-old has the ultimate say on all state matters. But his authority has been undermined from the outset.
Khamenei was a controversial pick as supreme leader. The cleric had never held public office, and some argued a move toward "hereditary rule" would betray the very anti-monarchist roots of the Islamic Revolution in 1979.
Seriously wounded in the same Israeli air strike that killed his father, Khamenei has also been absent from public view since his appointment on March 8. He suffered injuries to his head, lower back, and foot but was now "in complete health," Mazahar Hosseini, head of protocol in the supreme leader's office, said on May 8.
US intelligence has said it believes Khamenei plays a prominent role in war strategy and managing peace talks with the United States. But in a system where the supreme leader is omnipresent -- issuing audio messages, making video addresses, and appearing in public to display his authority -- his absence is striking.
"Iran has entered a period of transition after the death of Ali Khamenei and the end of his 36-year leadership," Ali Afshari, an Iranian political analyst based in Washington, told RFE/RL's Radio Farda. [It's] a challenging period in which the postwar alignment of forces will be decisive."
Hossein Taeb: Behind-The-Scenes Operator
A hard-line cleric, Taeb led the IRGC's intelligence branch for 13 years until 2022, when he was dismissed as part of a major security shakeup.
Taeb, who is blacklisted by the United States and European Union for his alleged role in state repression, worked in the supreme leader's office before he was appointed as the IRGC's intelligence chief in 2009.
A longtime confidant of the younger Khamenei, Taeb is considered a key figure behind the scenes. Experts say he could play an important role in managing Khamenei's relationships with key players inside the system.
Ahmad Vahidi: IRGC Chief
The IRGC, the elite branch of Iran's armed forces, has always played a key role in politics. But it is now the dominant political force in the Islamic republic after the killing of Ali Khamenei.
That's despite Israel and the United decimating the leadership of the IRGC, including killing its commander in chief, Mohammad Pakpour.
Pakpour's deputy, Ahmad Vahidi, a former interior and defense minister, took over the IRGC in early March. But experts say it is unclear if Vahidi has the clout and credibility to unite the competing factions within the IRGC.
Experts say the war and the securitization of Iran following Ali Khamenei's death has allowed the IRGC to play a central role in the domestic and foreign affairs of the country.
"The era after Ali Khamenei remains ambiguous. However, one key fact is visible: the increasing role and power of the IRGC in the administration of the Islamic republic," Mojtaba Najafi, a France-based Iranian political commentator, told RFE/RL's Radio Farda.
"Today, a significant part of the country's administration is in the hands of the IRGC," he added. "Militarization in the economy, politics, culture, and society has also now reached a stage of maturity."
Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf: The Intermediator
Qalibaf is a conservative politician and former military commander who spent decades cultivating ties to Iran's supreme leadership and the IRGC.
After a career overshadowed by corruption scandals and failed presidential bids, he arguably finds himself as the most powerful figure left standing in the Islamic republic.
Experts describe the role of Qalibaf, the parliament speaker who is also Iran's top negotiator with the United States, as a mediator between the different centers of power in Iran. He is considered close to the new supreme leader.
This was the role played by Iran's powerful security chief Ali Larijani before his assassination in March. Larijani was a unifying figure who brought together competing political factions and maintained strong ties with the IRGC, intelligence apparatus, and clerical establishment.
"Qalibaf has always been a pawn" used by the leadership, Hossein Razzaq, a political analyst based in Germany, told Radio Farda.
"Today, with the elimination of other key pawns, the role he plays for the system has become more prominent."
Mohammad Baqer Zolqadr: Security Chief
A former commander in the IRGC, Zolqadr succeeded Larijani as the head of Iran's Supreme National Security Council, the country's key policymaking body.
While Larijani was known as a shrewd and pragmatic politician, Zolqadr is a hard-line security and military official.
Razzaq considers the general's appointment as an attempt by Khamenei to divide power among his loyalists. His selection, he said, also underscored the dominance of the IRGC in the different centers of power in Iran.
Masud Pezeshkian: The Powerless President
The reformist president is not a major political player and not considered a threat by the hard-liners who dominate the system.
Pezeshkian's role is administrative, running the day-to-day affairs of the government. But the final decision on major issues, including war and diplomacy, is made elsewhere.
He and Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi are the only members of the reformist and moderate political camps to play a visible role in the new power structure. Like Pezeshkian, Araqchi does not have decision-making power but follows orders from above.
Still, differences have emerged that pit figures like Pezeshkian and Araqchi who are pushing for diplomacy against generals who oppose making concessions to the United States in negotiations to end the war.
As Iran Talks Stall, Markets Bet On Diplomacy, Experts Say
WASHINGTON -- The latest exchange between Washington and Tehran over a proposed path toward de-escalation has raised new questions about what comes next in the growing crisis around the Strait of Hormuz.
US President Donald Trump described Iran's latest response to a US-backed proposal as "totally unacceptable," even as both sides continue to signal interest in negotiations over sanctions relief, nuclear restrictions, and the future of shipping through the strategic waterway.
Analysts in Washington say the standoff is increasingly testing assumptions that diplomacy can move quickly enough to prevent wider economic fallout from the conflict.
So far, financial markets have remained relatively calm despite some choppy moments.
But experts say the relative market stability reflects expectations that negotiations will eventually produce some form of agreement.
"There's pressure on both sides to make some sort of deal," Mark Cancian said during a discussion hosted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) on May 11.
Cancian, a retired US Marine Corps colonel and senior adviser at CSIS who served more than three decades in the military, including during Operation Desert Storm, and Iraq, said the military situation has settled into "a stalemate."
Tehran has attempted to restrict movement through the strait, the waterway for one-fifth of the world's oil and gas, while the United States has maintained pressure from outside the waterway.
Although clashes have remained largely confined to the strait, neither side appears positioned for a decisive breakthrough.
According to Cancian, both Washington and Tehran appear to be exploring possible compromises involving Iran's enriched uranium stockpile, future enrichment activity, and phased sanctions relief.
He noted that the United States seems willing to forgo inspectors on the ground in exchange for physical constraints on enriched uranium.
In the meantime, Cancian said the longer the confrontation continues, the greater the military and economic pressure will become for both sides.
Asia Watching Closely
Although global markets have remained relatively stable, analysts said the economic impact could become more pronounced if disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz continue.
While some cargo traffic does get through, the crisis has already contributed to higher fuel prices -- up roughly 40 percent -- and growing supply concerns in parts of Asia and Europe.
The crisis is being followed particularly closely in East Asia, where several economies remain heavily dependent on Middle Eastern energy imports -- 70 percent for South Korea and 95 percent for Japan.
Victor Cha, who serves as president of the geopolitics and foreign policy department at CSIS and a professor at Georgetown University, said Japan and South Korea are already looking for ways to diversify energy supplies and reduce long-term dependence on Gulf shipping routes, eyeing investments in Central Asia and Africa.
"Both of them, as a result of this, no matter what happens, are going to want to lower their dependence on crude coming out of the strait," Cha said.
He further noted that this shift creates a "geostrategic imperative" for Korea and Japan to improve relationships with Russia, as alternative routes from Central Asia would likely transit the Russian Black Sea coast.
Additionally, both the Japanese yen and South Korean won have hit multi-year lows against the dollar, further straining their economies.
The Iran issue is also expected to loom over Trump's upcoming summit with Chinese President Xi Jinping on May 14-15.
Beijing has remained Iran's primary oil customer, taking roughly 90 percent of its exports last year. US officials may press Beijing to use this leverage to encourage Iranian concessions.
Still, analysts say the immediate issue remains whether diplomacy can move faster than the economic pressures and munitions depletions now building across global markets and military theaters.
- By Kian Sharifi
Could Iran Start Charging Global Tech Firms For Undersea Cables In The Strait Of Hormuz?
Iran has insisted for weeks that it has the right to charge international ships to transit the Strait of Hormuz, a key global shipping route off the coast of the Islamic republic.
Now, two news agencies affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) have issued proposals urging Tehran to go further by imposing fees on the global tech firms that operate undersea fiberoptic cables running through the narrow waterway connecting the Persian Gulf to the open sea.
The reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, which Tehran has effectively closed since the United States and Israel launched a bombing campaign on February 28, remains a key sticking point in ending the war. Tehran has claimed sovereignty over the strategic waterway, which is rejected by the international community.
Experts say the proposals calling for Iran to demand payment for undersea cables under the strait are more of a threat than a viable plan.
"The risk of adversarial subsea cable cuts has always been there, but an open threat from a nation-state like Iran adds urgency," Isik Mater, director of research at the London-based Internet monitoring group NetBlocks, told RFE/RL.
Undersea cables are mostly owned and operated by international tech companies like Google, Meta, Microsoft, and Amazon. The cables carry SWIFT transactions, cloud traffic, and general Internet data between Asia, Europe, and the Persian Gulf.
If the submarine cables running through Hormuz were severed, the impact on ordinary people across Asia, the Middle East, and Europe would be immediate and wide-ranging
.
Streaming services would buffer or fail entirely. Messaging apps would slow or go dark. Video calls would drop. Online banking and card payments could be disrupted. Cloud-dependent services -- from e-mail to workplace tools -- would degrade.
Internet providers could reroute traffic through surviving cables or satellites, but capacity is limited, meaning slower speeds for everyone even where connectivity survives. Repairs typically take weeks, sometimes months.
What's The Pitch?
The Tasnim and Fars news agencies argued that Iran should both monetize and assert sovereignty over the web of undersea cables that crisscross the strait.
The legal foundation for the proposals draws on the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which Iran has signed but never ratified.
Citing Article 34, Tasnim argued that transit passage rights granted to shipping do not eclipse Iran's sovereign rights over the seabed. At the strait's narrowest point, the territorial sea claims of Iran and Oman overlap entirely, meaning the cables physically sit in Iranian-claimed territory.
Building cables there without authorization, Tasnim claimed, amounts to "occupying Iranian soil underwater" and requires both licensing and fees.
The revenue model is borrowed loosely from Egypt, which Tasnim claims earns hundreds of millions of dollars annually from undersea cables that run through the Suez Canal.
Tasnim and Fars also argued that Iran should compel tech giants to formally operate under Iranian law and partner with Iranian technology companies. Fars described the goal explicitly as turning Iran's control over the Strait of Hormuz into a "digital power lever," with Iranian firms controlling the maintenance and repairs of the cables.
Does It Hold Up?
Experts say the legal arguments provided by the Iranian news agencies have significant weaknesses.
While coastal states do retain sovereignty over their territorial seabed, Tasnim ignores UNCLOS Article 79, which explicitly protects the right for global Internet providers to build and maintain undersea cables.
Mater of NetBlocks said the Egypt comparison has "limited weight" because Cairo "licenses transit and landing points on its own territory, and these agreements have been entered willingly."
"By contrast Iran's position is more tenuous, and though it has control of its territorial waters it doesn't own a significant stretch of the routes," she added.
Mater said the proposals' "biggest red flag" is the call for international tech firms to be forced to formally operate under Iranian law and partner with Iranian technology companies.
Under Iranian law, "communications are typically controlled and monitored, before even considering sanctions and geopolitical barriers," she said.
"This makes Iran's demand come off as more of a 'protection' fee, similar to what they've been doing with tankers, distant from any kind of conventional transit licensing agreement we usually see in the industry," Mater said.
Before a US sea blockade of the Strait of Hormuz was imposed in mid-April, Iran was charging commercial ships up to $2 million to transit the strait, although few vessels were making the passage. Maritime traffic in the strait has come to a standstill since the American barricade.
Iran has a history of imposing severe restrictions on Internet usage. The authorities have enforced an Internet blackout since February 28 and refused to restore access since a cease-fire came into effect on April 8.
"Iranian authorities haven't hesitated to cut off their own citizens' connectivity and may well seek to sever external links if demands are unmet," said Mater. "Although international cables aren't under Iran's direct control, sabotage via ships' anchors or diving teams would be within their capabilities in the strait."
Former Senior US Diplomat Gordon Gray: Iran Talks Likely To Continue Despite Trump's Latest Rejection
WASHINGTON -- Former senior US diplomat Gordon Gray, who served as deputy assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern affairs under President George W. Bush, says indirect negotiations between Washington and Tehran are likely to continue despite what he described as significant pain and pressure on both sides.
The latest exchange comes after Tehran reportedly sent a proposal via Pakistan seeking an end to military operations across the region, sanctions relief, and guarantees for maritime security, including the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz.
President Donald Trump responded on May 10 by rejecting the Iranian position, while signaling continued frustration with the slow pace of diplomacy.
RFE/RL spoke with Gray, who also served as US ambassador to Tunisia and deputy chief of mission in Egypt and now is a professor of Gulf and Arabian Peninsula affairs at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, about the latest state of Iran peace talks.
RFE/RL: Iran has now responded to the US proposal. Does this feel like a breakthrough moment?
Gordon Gray: I don't believe it is as much a breakthrough as it is a continuation of the process that began in Islamabad when [US] Vice President [JD] Vance met with the speaker of the Iranian parliament. Even though those talks did not result in a breakthrough, as many had hoped they would, what is important was that the two sides kept speaking indirectly through Pakistani mediators, but also, perhaps more recently, through the Qataris as well.
I note that the Qatari prime minister was in Miami two days ago, where he reportedly met with Mr. [Steve] Witkoff and Mr. [Jared] Kushner.
RFE/RL: Trump said earlier that a deal was very possible. What is the real obstacle today -- Washington’s demands or Tehran’s red lines?
Gray: They're both. It's like any negotiation: Both sides have demands, both sides have red lines. In this case, both sides are suffering from the actions of the others, and that gives them motivation to seek some sort of agreement.
RFE/RL: Based on reports from Tehran and mediators that Iran is seeking sanctions relief as a precondition for deeper nuclear negotiations, does this leave the White House facing a choice between compromise or further escalation?
Gray: I don't know that I would put it that way. I think Washington's decision will be based on what the Iranian response is to the US proposal and whether it meets at least minimal US demands.
I don't expect that the Iranian response will completely address all of the issues. The reports I've seen -- and they're very initial since the Iranians just handed over their response -- suggest there may be a short-term cease-fire and reopening of the Strait of Hormuz in exchange for time to allow the other issues to be successfully negotiated.
If those reports are accurate, I wouldn't call that a compromise if Washington decides to accept it. I'd call it part of the negotiation process.
RFE/RL: Do you think Tehran is negotiating because it wants relief, or because the pressure campaign is working?
Gray: I wouldn't say the pressure campaign is working so much as it is creating an incentive for Iran to seek a diplomatic solution. Of course, it wants relief, but it wanted relief from sanctions before February 28, as well.
RFE/RL: Iran's economy has been hit hard by sanctions and isolation. How much strain is the regime really under right now?
Gray: It's under tremendous strain. Infrastructure has been destroyed. Inflation is high. The Iranian currency is virtually worthless. There's tremendous economic mismanagement and tremendous corruption.
Because of the Internet blackout, for example, a lot of unemployment is going up because many businesses are laying off workers. So the regime is under tremendous strain.
But that being said, it's also responded with tremendous brutality when people rose up to protest in January. It's not a democracy, and it has shown that it's willing to use brutal repression to stay in power.
RFE/RL: Some analysts suggest that even if an agreement is reached, the Strait of Hormuz could remain a potential flashpoint for renewed tensions. Do you agree with that assessment?
Gray: It certainly has the potential to be because Iran has shown it has the ability to act in an asymmetric way to close off the Strait of Hormuz.
The issue is not simply the free flow of energy through the strait. It's also the confidence of insurers, shipping companies, and those making medium- and long-term contracts to buy oil. Iran does not have to do much to shake that confidence.
RFE/RL: The proposed framework would reportedly halt uranium enrichment for at least 12 years. Would that fundamentally change the nuclear threat?
Gray: It depends how you assess the nuclear threat to begin with.
Trump has given conflicting statements on whether he wants Iran to turn over the uranium enriched to 60 percent. Sometimes he says it has to be turned over; other times he says it's buried, so it doesn't matter. The US position on that is unclear.
RFE/RL: How significant are the reported concessions involving underground enrichment and long-term restrictions?
Gray: I'd have to see the details. There are too many reports right now, and the devil is in the details. I'd also want to see what impartial nuclear experts conclude after reviewing any agreement carefully.
RFE/RL: Despite the military pressure, have Iran’s core nuclear red lines changed?
Gray: I don't think so. I think they are going to insist on what they perceive to be their right as a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to enrich uranium.
This is not simply the position of the Islamic republic. It was also the position of the shah of Iran, who began the Iranian nuclear program.
RFE/RL: If Trump rejects Iran's conditions, are we looking at diplomacy breaking down or a much wider war?
Gray: No, I don't see diplomacy breaking down. I think there will be a continuation of discussions.
That doesn't mean there won't be military strikes by one side or the other, but at the end of the day both sides have an incentive to get out of the situation they're in because the other side has created sufficient pain and therefore sufficient incentive for some kind of resolution.
RFE/RL: Gulf nations initially appeared united against Iran. What is your assessment of the current state of the regional alliance?
Gray: The regional alignment against Iran is probably stronger than it has been before because Iran made a strategic miscalculation in striking Gulf Arab economic and civilian infrastructure.
That being said, there are reports of a Saudi-Emirati rift, but that rift predated February 28.
RFE/RL: And in terms of the endgame with Iran, do regional allies remain united?
Gray: They all have similar objectives. They want a cessation of Iranian attacks against their countries, and they want the Strait of Hormuz open again so they can export energy and import goods they need, including foodstuffs.
RFE/RL: From the perspective of ordinary Iranians, what would be the best possible outcome right now?
Gray: There would be two best outcomes.
One would be a cessation of military strikes against their country because civilians have lost their lives and infrastructure has been severely damaged. We can all hope for that outcome.
The second would be a transition to democratic governance. But unfortunately, I don't expect that for a very long time.
RFE/RL: Given the current circumstances, how long could it realistically take to bridge the remaining differences and sign an agreement?
Gray: Diplomacy takes time. You can look at other arms-control negotiations outside the Middle East as well.
The United States and the Soviet Union did not reach the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty in 30 or 60 days. These negotiations are complicated. So, it's going to take a long time because there are a lot of complicated issues.
In the short term, I could see an agreement leading to a cessation of hostilities, a reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, and possibly sanctions relief or assets being unfrozen.
But if you're talking about resolving the nuclear issue, that is sufficiently complicated that reaching an agreement there is going to take quite a long time.
This interview has been edited for clarity and length.
- By RFE/RL
US, Iran Clash Over Peace Proposal As Gulf Stalemate Continues
US President Donald Trump described the cease-fire with Iran as being on "life support," adding he is considering restarting naval escorts -- dubbed Operation Enduring Freedom -- through the Strait of Hormuz amid a continuing a deadlock over how to bring the conflict to an end.
Speaking to reporters at the White House on May 11, Trump said the cease-fire, agreed to on April 8, is now "unbelievably weak" and that he's looking to achieve "complete victory" in the war.
"I would say it's one of the weakest right now, it's on life support," he said. "I would say the cease-fire is on massive life support."
Trump's latest comments came after he angrily rejected Tehran's response to a US peace proposal in a social media post, calling it "totally unacceptable." He did not say what part of counterproposal he was opposed to.
Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmail Baqaei said in his weekly press conference on May 11 that Tehran's response included stopping the war, lifting the US blockade on the Strait of Hormuz, freeing Iran's assets, and "establishing security in the region and Lebanon."
Iranian state media said that accepting the US conditions would amount to the country's "surrender" to what it called "excessive demands."
Baqaei said "the only thing we demanded was Iran's legitimate rights."
Many reports have suggested the US plan was set out in a one-page memorandum that called for an end to fighting and the unblocking of the Strait of Hormuz but left other key issues -- including Iran's right to enrich uranium -- until later.
Trump said in a Fox News interview on May 11 that he was considering renewing Operation Enduring Freedom, though a final decision had yet to be made. The operation was launched on May 6 but stopped less than two days later.
"We're going to have a complete victory," he said, adding that Tehran thinks "I'll get tired of this. I'll get bored, or I'll have some pressure. But there's no pressure."
Trump has taken a dual line in public statements, stressing the possibility of a diplomatic solution to the war while alternatively threatening massive new air strikes on Iran's energy and power infrastructure.
In an interview with journalist Sharyl Attkisson broadcast on May 10, Trump said American military operations against Iran may not be over, suggesting the United States could still target additional sites if necessary.
Asked whether combat operations involving Iran had concluded, Trump responded: "No, I didn't say that. I said they were defeated, but that doesn't mean they're done. We could go in for another two weeks and hit every single target."
Trump added that US and Israeli strikes had already hit "probably 70 percent" of the intended targets since launching air strikes on Iran on February 28.
The campaign was halted on April 8 when a two-week cease-fire was agreed via mediation by Pakistan. The strikes have not resumed even though the deadline has passed.
"We have other targets that we could conceivably hit," Trump said. "But even if we don't, it will take years for them to rebuild."
He also addressed Iran's enriched uranium stockpiles, saying the United States was monitoring the sites closely.
"We have it under surveillance," he said, adding that US space-based monitoring capabilities were tracking activity around the facilities.
Iran has repeatedly rejected proposals that would require it to transfer its stockpile of enriched uranium to the United States.
Former senior US diplomat Gordon Gray, who served as deputy assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern affairs under President George W. Bush, told RFE/RL in an interview that indirect negotiations between Washington and Tehran are likely to continue despite what he described as significant pain and pressure on both sides.
"I don't see diplomacy breaking down. I think there will be a continuation of discussions," said Gray, who also served as US ambassador to Tunisia and deputy chief of mission in Egypt and now is a professor of Gulf and Arabian Peninsula affairs at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University.
"That doesn't mean there won't be military strikes by one side or the other, but at the end of the day both sides have an incentive to get out of the situation they're in because the other side has created sufficient pain and therefore sufficient incentive for some kind of resolution."
With reporting by RFE/RL's Radio Farda and Reuters
- By RFE/RL
Iran's Currency Falls To Record Low As War, US Blockade Rattle Economy
Iran's currency has fallen to a record low against the US dollar as the two-month-long conflict rattles the country's sanctions-hit economy.
Air strikes by the United States and Israel, launched at Iran on February 28, along with the American naval blockade on Iranian ports and vessels, have disrupted Tehran's vital oil exports, hampered domestic production, and fueled inflation.
Iran's national currency, the rial, dropped to a new low of 1.81 million to the US dollar on April 29 before rebounding the next day. The rial has seen its value fall by nearly 15 percent in recent days, according to Iranian media.
Iran and the United States agreed to a cease-fire on April 8, although Washington increased economic pressure by imposing a blockade on April 13, a move that has made it harder for Tehran to obtain hard currency through exports.
According to Iran's Central Bank, annual inflation, which was above 40 percent before the war, increased to 50 percent as of April 4.
Iranians say the prices of basic goods such as rice, eggs, and chicken have increased significantly since the conflict began.
Rising inflation was the catalyst for nationwide protests that broke out in January and posed one of the biggest threats to the Iran's clerical rulers since the Islamic Revolution in 1979.
The authorities responded to the demonstrations with unprecedented force, killing thousands of people, according to human rights groups.
Iran, too, has sought to impose significant economic pain on the United States and its allies. It responded to US-Israel air strikes by effectively closing the Strait of Hormuz, a key artery for global oil and gas supplies, to international shipping.
The move has rattled international energy markets and upended the global economy.
On April 29, the price of Brent crude rose by almost 7 percent to over $126 a barrel, the highest since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
- By Ray Furlong and
- RFE/RL's Radio Farda
'Endgame' For Iran's Oil Sector? How US Blockade May Impact Tehran's Calculus
Weeks of US and Israeli air strikes, sanctions, and restrictions have hit Iran hard, but it could be geology that eventually pushes it into making concessions in its ongoing standoff with the United States.
As the US naval blockade of Iran approaches the end of its third week, data from shipping and industry monitors suggests that tankers have been unable to move Iranian crude through the Strait of Hormuz toward markets in Asia.
This means that Iranian oil storage capacity is rapidly filling, and the clock is ticking before Iran will need to cease production. That's the problem for Tehran, analysts say, as it tries to withstand US pressure to negotiate a peace agreement.
'Geological Impact'
"That creates more of a geological impact rather than anything else, to do with how oil is extracted," Stephen Innes, managing partner at SPI Asset Management, a foreign exchange and commodity advisory, told RFE/RL.
Once the valves get turned off, "oil tends to settle down at the bottom of the reservoir. And it's quite viscous and it's quite thick and it takes a lot of propulsion to bring that up," he said.
The result, he added, could even be "an endgame" for the sector.
"The whole process to build up pressure again and successfully get [oil] coming up the well again, could possibly take a year…. A lot of people think it's just the end of the production because it's just going to be too costly [to restart]," Innes said.
A research note issued by Goldman Sachs on April 23 stated that "the share of country production with relatively low reservoir pressure is estimated to be higher in Iran and Iraq than elsewhere in the Gulf."
The note, which was considering oil sectors in all Persian Gulf countries, said that recovery of oil production levels "may be only partial after a prolonged closure."
Mehdi Moslehi, a UK-based Iranian risk consultant who worked in the oil sector for a decade, agreed that the timescale of any extraction shutdown would be important.
"If production at a well is stopped for a short period, say between one week up to two or maximum three weeks, then it can be brought back into operation again," he told RFE/RL's Radio Farda.
"But if a well remains shut for a long period -- especially because the oil wells in southern Iran mostly have high sulfur content, and depending on how old the well is -- there will be serious problems. Reservoir pressure may drop."
A Race Against Time?
Of course, Iran may not need to shut down production. But data released this week suggested that it's now a race against time.
A recent report by Kpler, a commodities and shipping analytics company, said "no confirmed tanker has exited the US blockade zone" since Washington began enforcing the blockade on April 13.
"Several tankers passed through the Strait of Hormuz but failed to clear the US blockade, which sits further south between the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea," it said.
This is why Iran's oil stores are filling up. Kpler estimated Iran had about 12 days spare capacity. Some analysts have suggested a time window of 2-3 weeks.
"Before, we could say time was on the side of the Islamic republic. But now we can't really say that anymore," Kpler analyst Homayoun Falakshahi told Radio Farda. "The rules of the game have become somewhat balanced."
Iran's blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, preventing oil exports by other Gulf nations, is also exerting pressure. It has led to a spike in oil prices and sent supply shocks through the world economy, hitting not only oil but also gas and other vital commodities.
As this goes on, the global pain increases.
"Right now this is a game of endurance, of seeing which side gives in more in the short term…. Prices around $100–110, even up to $120 per barrel are still levels the global economy can tolerate. However, if the Strait of Hormuz is closed in the coming days or weeks, prices will probably rise further," Falakshahi said.
On April 29, Brent crude rose sharply to $115 per barrel following a report in The Wall Street Journal that US President Donald Trump had told aides to prepare for an "extended" blockade.
In the meantime, Iran is seeking other ways to ease storage pressures. There's talk of delivering oil by train to China, which is Iran's biggest customer by far. But this would be more expensive and in smaller volumes than by tanker and so have limited impact.
Iran's next step may be further escalation.
Many other Persian Gulf producers have been able to alleviate the storage pressures Iran is facing by using other routes, such as Saudi Arabia's East-West pipeline to the Red Sea. Amid curtailed output this has helped keep the pumpjacks jerking and the trunk lines pressurized.
Iran could mobilize its Houthi proxy forces in Yemen to attack this route, by targeting shipping in the Bab al-Mandab Strait, through which roughly 10 percent of the world's seaborne oil passes.
But this would also entail risk for Tehran. In recent weeks, the United States has added to its massive military presence in the region and indicated the possibility of a return to hostilities.
"The feeling around the market is that something's going to get done on the deal front between now and the next three weeks," Innes said.
- By Kian Sharifi
Iran's Conservative Camp Split Over US Talks To End War
In the face of a devastating US-Israeli bombing campaign, Iran's rival political factions cast aside their differences to unite behind the country's decision-makers.
But since a cease-fire with the United States came into force on April 8, deep-rooted political differences in the Islamic republic have spilled out into the open.
The public rupture over Tehran's attempts to negotiate an end to the two-month-long war has pitted Iran's small but vocal faction of ultraconservatives against more moderate conservatives, a confrontation that has been laid bare in the halls of parliament and on the front pages of state-affiliated media.
But analysts warn the fracture is not ideological. The main differences, they say, are not even over whether to cut a deal with the United States, but when to pursue peace and what concessions to make.
The dispute crystalized in the days following the first round of talks between delegations led by Parliament Speaker Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf and US Vice President JD Vance in Pakistan on April 11-12.
What had largely been friction behind closed doors erupted into an open media war when the Tasnim news agency -- linked to Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) -- published an editorial on April 25 mocking ultraconservatives, comparing their expectations for the talks to a "magic beanstalk."
Ultraconservatives have said Iran should not make any concessions to the United States, including over its nuclear program, a nonstarter for Washington. They also insist any peace deal should extend to Iran's regional proxies and must ensure the lifting of all sanctions against Tehran.
In a separate piece, Tasnim accused Raja News, a website close to the ultraconservatives, of causing "discord" and playing into US President Donald Trump's hand by criticizing the Iranian negotiating team. Days earlier, Trump had said there was "tremendous infighting and confusion" within Iran's leadership.
Ali Afshari, an Iranian political analyst based in Washington who spoke to RFE/RL's Radio Farda, cautioned against reading too much into the public confrontation.
"I don't think we yet have evidence that this dispute represents a large structural fracture," he said.
The US-Israeli bombing campaign launched on February 28 has decapitated much of Iran's political and military leadership. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the longtime supreme leader, was assassinated and succeeded by his son, Mojtaba, who has yet to appear in public since his ascent to power.
The primary target of the ultraconservatives is Qalibaf, the country's top negotiator with the United States. Politicians linked to the Paydari Front, an influential ultraconservative faction aligned with former presidential candidate Saeed Jalili, accused the negotiating team of violating the red lines set by the new supreme leader.
Mahmoud Nabavian, a lawmaker affiliated with Paydari who accompanied the delegation to Pakistan, said talks were "pure damage" and discussing limits to Iran's nuclear program was a "strategic mistake."
Iran's parliament on April 27 voted on a statement expressing support for the negotiating team. Only seven of the 261 lawmakers, all prominent Paydari figures, refused to sign.
"Iran's oil is selling for double the pre-war price," Nabavian wrote on X the next day, calling on "cowards" to join the public whom he suggested did not back the talks. The war has rattled international energy markets and upended the global economy, and hard-liners appear hopeful this will ultimately force Washington to make concessions.
Afshari said the divide among ultraconservatives and more moderate conservatives is over the timing of peace talks.
The ultraconservatives want to continue the war and negotiate from a position of strength, he said. By contrast, Qalibaf and other more moderate conservatives want to end the war now and secure a deal while they still can.
"The disagreement exists at this level, but it doesn't go so far that anyone in the [ultraconservative] bloc is advocating for no deal at all," Afshari argued.
Political differences in Iran have been exacerbated by the absence of Mojtaba Khamenei, who is living in hiding and is reportedly gravely wounded. He has minimal contact with Iranian officials, according to reports.
"The lack of a decisive central authority due to Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei's absence has likely allowed these disputes to escalate into the public domain rather than remain contained within regime channels," the Institute for the Study of War, a US-based think tank, wrote in a report on April 28.
Reza Jamali of RFE/RL's Radio Farda contributed to this report.
Iran, US Locked In Strategic 'Staring Contest' Over Hormuz, Says Former CENTCOM Official Joe Buccino
WASHINGTON -- The US Navy's blockade of Iranian ports, now in its third week, has stopped almost all of the country's maritime trade, including key oil exports. But it has also ratcheted up tensions between the two sides as they hold sporadic peace negotiations.
RFE/RL spoke with former US Central Command (CENTCOM) Communications Director and retired US Army Colonel Joe Buccino on April 27 to discuss the escalating situation and the strategic "staring contest" now defining the region.
Colonel Buccino also served as a spokesman for Secretary of Defense James Mattis during US President Donald Trump's first term and is the author of When Every Word Counts: How to Earn Trust, Command Attention, and Communicate Clearly in Any Situation.
RFE/RL: How would you describe the current US naval posture in the Strait of Hormuz, and what does the situation tell us about where this conflict stands right now?
Joe Buccino: It's a bit of a stalemate. Both sides feel like they have leverage, and I think both sides are right to feel that way. It seems the Trump administration does not feel time pressure; they don't feel a need to cave on any of their objectives at the moment. Iran probably feels the same way.
RFE/RL: We're seeing reduced traffic through the strait, with only limited vessel movement. There are also reports that Iran is allowing some ships through under specific conditions, even demanding payment in its own currency. How do you interpret that?
Buccino: Iran feels they have control of this critical body of water and that they can maintain it for the coming months. They will continue to use this as leverage over the Trump administration.
In Tehran's view, they are adding economic, psychological, and economic warfare pressure. They are claiming there are mines in the strait, although we don't really know if they remain, where they are, or what kind they are.
It is an interesting snapshot into how Iran intends to continue adjudicating this war.
RFE/RL: From a strategic standpoint, how central is the strait to Iran's leverage, and how does the United States factor that into its planning?
Buccino: When this conflict began in late February, the strait was open. Now it is effectively closed, and that shift matters globally.
Iran understands this creates economic pressure far beyond the region; oil markets, global trade, and energy security are all affected. At the same time, the US has deployed significant naval power, including three carrier strike groups -- more than at any point in the region since 2003. What you have now is essentially a staring contest: each side waiting to see who yields first.
RFE/RL: Is time working in favor of the United States or Iran?
Buccino: Both parties feel like time is on their side. Iran is looking at US domestic politics: the oil prices in the US and Europe, the polls, and the fact that we are five months away from the midterms. All of that goes into their calculus.
Meanwhile, Trump has been clearer than ever that he doesn't feel this pressure to move quickly. He feels he has the opportunity to deliver a "knockout blow" regarding Iran's nuclear capability. That has always been critical in his mind. Outwardly, at least, he isn't feeling the pressure of the clock.
RFE/RL: How are Iran's low-cost capabilities shaping US naval operations? What are commanders most focused on in protecting forces?
Buccino: The risks in the Strait of Hormuz often come from weapon systems that do not cost very much.
Think about drifting mines; these are WWI-style "dumb" mines. They aren't moored to anything; they just drift on the surface. We don't know where they are, and Iran doesn't either. They blend in with debris, wood, and fishing equipment.
Then you have the "three guys in a truck" scenario: coastal firing points shooting drones that cost only a few thousand dollars. They fly so low to the water that they are hard to pick up on radar. By the time you see them, they are on top of you.
Despite our cutting-edge assets, these are great risks. But we are publicly committed to holding this blockade until Iran opens the strait and agrees to discontinue its uranium enrichment.
RFE/RL: A recent US pilot rescue mission deep inside Iran drew significant attention. What lessons from such operations apply to the current situation?
Buccino: It demonstrates that we can move Special Forces and Marine assets into the actual territory of Iran to provide force protection.
If you think about an operation to remove enriched uranium from the country, that would require massive resources -- ground forces, overhead cover, and earth-moving equipment -- all under fire. That rescue operation proves we have the capacity to do this through the coordination of Central Command and Special Operations.
RFE/RL: Iran is also engaging internationally, including with China, Russia. How much does that relationship matter here?
Buccino: If any country has outside influence, it's probably China, though even that is limited. There is talk of China sending its newest air defense systems to Iran, which could identify an F-15, something Iran currently cannot do.
RFE/RL: Russian President Vladimir Putin met with the Iranian foreign minister on April 27, and reports indicate he "received a message" from the new supreme leader, Ayatollah Mojtaba Khamenei. Does that signal anything important?
Buccino: There is a reason you haven't seen the ayatollah or even heard his voice lately. He is likely two miles underground, under concrete, communicating via slips of paper. It is hard to get information to him, and hard to get decisions out.
The Iranian leadership is fragmented between the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), the parliament, and the mullahs. There is a massive time lag because you have to wait for word back from Mojtaba Khamenei.
I was never under the illusion this would take a few weeks. The regime's priority is protecting the ayatollah, and that complicates any potential negotiations.
RFE/RL: If tensions escalate further, what indicators are you watching for?
Buccino: I'll be looking to see if we move on Kharg Island. To me, that is the natural progression.
We've already "softened" the island by destroying most of its air defense systems. We have the 82nd Airborne Division in theater ready to conduct an aerial assault to seize the oil. If you seize that oil, you hurt the regime's ability to pay and resupply the IRGC.
If the IRGC stops getting paid and runs out of ammunition, they might start putting down their weapons. That is where you deliver the knockout blow. We are a long way from that -- we are still hoping for a negotiated end to the uranium program -- but if we reach that goal, this will all have been worth it.
The interview has been edited for clarity and length.
US To Send Witkoff, Kushner To Pakistan For New Talks, But Iran Participation Uncertain
WASHINGTON -- The United States will send a delegation to Pakistan this weekend for a new round of talks with Iranian officials, the White House said, as Washington tests whether a fragile cease-fire can translate into diplomatic progress.
White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt told reporters on April 24 that the delegation would include President Donald Trump's special envoy Steve Witkoff and son-in-law Jared Kushner, and would depart for Islamabad on April 25.
Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi arrived in Islamabad late on April 24, but there was no immediate confirmation from Tehran that he or other officials would meet with the US delegation.
The spokesman for Iran's Foreign Ministry said Iranian officials did not plan to meet with the US team, although it was unclear if the statement represented the view of the government.
"No meeting is planned to take place between Iran and the US. Iran's observations would be conveyed to Pakistan," spokesman Esmail Baqaei wrote on X.
However, The Washington Post quoted an unnamed US official as saying Witkoff and Kushner had received confirmation from Tehran that Araqchi would meet with them.
US and Iranian teams held peace talks in Islamabad on April 11-12, but they ended without an agreement and a second round that had been expected earlier this week did not materialize.
US Vice President JD Vance, who led the US delegation then, was not traveling with Witkoff and Kushner but would be on "standby" and "will be willing to dispatch to Pakistan if we feel it's a necessary use of his time," Leavitt said.
Trump, Vance, and Secretary of State Marco Rubio "will be waiting here in the United States for updates," she said.
Leavitt said Washington had seen "some progress" from the Iranian side in recent days, adding that it was Tehran that requested the new meeting.
"Iranians want to talk," she said. "We're hopeful that it will be a productive conversation and move the ball forward toward a deal," she said.
Trump later told Reuters that the Iranians were "making an offer" aimed at satisfying U.S. demands and "we'll have to see" how it looks.
Trump has said that in any deal to end hte US-Israeli war with Iran, which began on February 28, Iran must give up its enriched uranium and allow free passage through the Strait of Hormuz, a cruicial oil and gas transit artery that Tehran has effectovely blocked through most of the conflict.
Asked who the United States was negotiating with, Trump said: "I don't want to say that, but we're dealing with the people that are in charge now," Reuters reported.
Tempered Expectations
Vance remaining in Washington unless negotiations reach a breakthrough stage is a decision analysts said reflects tempered expectations.
Ryan Bohl, a senior Middle East analyst at the risk management company RANE, described the move as a sign Washington is “in a reactive diplomatic state.”
“They're waiting for the Iranians to make some sort of first move or gesture,” Bohl told RFE/RL. “Sending a lower-level delegation suggests they want to test whether momentum is real without overcommitting political capital.”
“This is more of a listening session than a negotiation,” Jason Brodsky, policy director at the nonprofit United Against Nuclear Iran, told RFE/RL. “If the two parties were close to inking a deal, then senior leadership on both sides would be in the room.”
Bohl said the United States is unlikely to soften its core demands, including significant Iranian nuclear concessions and unilateral steps to ease tensions before sanctions relief is considered.
For analysts, the White House's statement that Tehran initiated the expected talks raised questions about whether Iran is seeking a genuine diplomatic off-ramp or simply buying time.
Bohl argued that while Iran faces long-term economic pressure, its short-term strategy favors delay.
“There is urgency economically, but not in the immediate sense,” he said. “Iran can afford to drag out talks as long as it avoids renewed military escalation.”
Brodsky offered a slightly different view, pointing to the strain of US pressure following weeks of air strikes on Iran, which ended with a cease-fire that took effect on April 8 and that Trump extended before it was due to expire on April 22.
“The noose is tightening with the US naval blockade,” he said. “That sharpens the choices facing Iran’s leadership.”
The US has maintained that its blockade of Iranian ports remains fully in place, with Trump calling it “100 percent effective.” Iran says the blockade is a violation of the cease-fire and demanded it be lifted.
Lebanon And Beyond
The diplomatic push comes amid a fragile calm in the region, including a cease-fire between Israel and Lebanon, home of Iran-backed Hezbollah -- but Lebanon's Health Ministry said six people were killd in Israeli strikes on southern Lebanon on April 24.
Bohl said that de-escalation on that front is critical to sustaining talks.
“It’s one of the few ways the US can build trust,” he said, noting deep Iranian skepticism about US intentions given continued American military deployments in the region.
At the same time, divisions remain between Washington and Israel over how to handle Hezbollah -- a militant group and political party that controls much of southern Lebanon. It is considered a terrorist organization by the United States, while the European Union has only blacklisted its armed wing.which Tehran backs.
“The Israelis want to press their advantage,” Bohl said. “The US is more willing to preserve the cease-fire to keep diplomacy alive.”
Brodsky predicted Hezbollah will remain a destabilizing force regardless of the talks.
“As long as the current regime is in power in Iran, Hezbollah will continue to be a problem,” he said.
Araqchi is to travel to Oman and Russia following his visit to Pakistan. Bohl described the regional outreach as a mix of damage control and strategic hedging.
“They’re shoring up support,” he said. “Oman is about repairing regional relationships, while Russia is critical for economic and military backing if the confrontation drags on.”
Brodsky said the visits would likely focus on practical concerns, including the Strait of Hormuz and securing political support from Moscow.
Russian, Chinese Lifelines Keeping Tehran's Military Reconstruction Alive, Experts Warn
WASHINGTON -- With tensions high and the prospects for a deal to end the US-Israeli war with Iran uncertain, analysts say a "two-way street" of support from Russia and China is a crucial element of Tehran's ability to weather the effects of weeks of air attacks and keep its military machine running after severe losses.
At a forum hosted by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy on April 23, experts described deepening partnerships that have helped Iran replenish its military, improve targeting, and blunt Western operations during the conflict.
"A decisive factor in the future of this contest will be Iran's ability to resupply and reconstitute its own military capabilities," said Grant Rumley, the institute's senior fellow and director of its program on Great Power Competition and the Middle East.
"Tehran's backers are willing to provide some level of support to keep the regime in power," he added.
Rumley, a former Pentagon official who served in both the first Trump administration and the Biden administration as an adviser for Middle East policy, said the central question now is whether that external support will prove decisive as Iran seeks to rearm and reposition itself in preparation for what's next, whether it's peace or more warfare.
A 'Two-Way Street' With Moscow
While Iranian officials have long emphasized self-reliance, panelists said battlefield evidence points to a far more interconnected war effort, particularly with Russia.
Nicole Grajewski, an assistant professor at Sciences Po and a nonresident scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, said the Russia-Iran relationship has evolved far beyond the simple purchase of hardware.
"The relationship is not only based on components.... It's also based on learning and sharing data between each other," said Grajewski, the author of a recent book on Russian-Iranian ties.
She noted that the "signatures" of Russian drone tactics, refined during the war in Ukraine, have surfaced in Iran's recent operations. "You see some of the signatures of Russian swarm elements...and Iran actually incorporating that in this recent war."
Beyond tactics, Grajewski highlighted the critical role of "offshore" intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) support -- support from abroad.
She noted that Russia has reportedly provided Iran with satellite imagery and "damage assessments," enabling Tehran to constantly improve its strikes against US and regional targets.
China's 'Low-Cost' Strategic Play
If Moscow provides the tactical blueprint, Beijing appears to be providing the industrial and technological backbone.
Hasan Alhasan, a senior fellow for Middle East Policy at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), said Chinese assistance spans so-called dual-use components, such as rocket fuel ingredients, and sophisticated satellite data.
"There are multiple indications that China has been providing Iran with various forms of military support...that support may have had a tangible impact on Iranian military performance," Alhasan said.
He pointed to a Chinese company using AI to analyze satellite imagery of US assets at Prince Sultan Air Base in Riyadh just days before a "devastating" Iranian attack.
For Beijing, the conflict serves a dual purpose. "China does here see a low-cost opportunity to entangle the US militarily on the strategic level in Iran and then, tactically speaking, test some of its capabilities against the United States in a real conflict environment," Alhasan said.
Endurance and Geography
Matthew Tavares, a defense analyst and former Pentagon official with nearly two decades of experience in Russia strategy, said the revitalization of the Russian defense industrial base has directly benefited Iran.
"The Alabuga facility not only is producing equipment based on Iranian designs, but is improving on that equipment," Tavares said of a compound in Russia's Tatarstan region that includes a drone assembly plant, adding that he believes contractual arrangements likely allow for these systems to be sent back to Iran if the regime is attacked.
Tavares warned the conflict has shifted into a "factory versus factory" war and said Iran and its backers are producing inexpensive precision weapons systems that can "wear out" the "expensive, exquisite systems" favored by the United States and its Persian Gulf partners.
Despite the influx of external support, the experts cautioned that Tehran's own strategic posture remains the foundation of its survival.
Alhasan noted that Iran's ability to hold the Strait of Hormuz "hostage" and its high tolerance for "punishment" are indigenous strengths that external powers only augment.
"Iran's biggest assets during this war have been, on the one hand, its endurance...and then, on the other hand, its ability to leverage its systems and geography," Alhasan concluded.
Zelenskyy In Saudi Arabia For Defense Talks As Russia Continues To Pound Ukraine
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy arrived in Saudi Arabia for security talks, marking his second visit to the region since the start of the US-Israeli war with Iran, now under cease-fire, as Russia continued to pound Ukraine with deadly strikes.
"Today, we are advancing our agreements with Saudi Arabia in the areas of security, energy, and infrastructure. It is important that the strengthening is mutual," Zelenskyy wrote on X on April 24.
The Ukrainian president's visit comes almost a month after Kyiv and Riyadh signed a defense cooperation agreement, as waves of relentless retaliatory strikes from Iran targeted civilian and energy infrastructure across the Middle East.
Having previously secured a number of bilateral agreements with European countries -- such as joint drone construction with Germany -- since the first Shahed drones struck the Gulf, Kyiv has sought to bring its battle-proven technologies and military expertise to the region.
Shahed drone technology, which originated in Iran, has long become central to Russia's domestic drone production, as Tehran supplied Moscow with military equipment and know-how during the first years of its full-scale war against Ukraine.
Russia has since often launched around 100 Shahed-type drones at Ukraine at a time. In response, Kyiv has developed cost-effective interceptor drones, saying the technology allows it to cut off about 90 percent of incoming drones.
Both Tehran and Moscow have been publicly skeptical about how useful Kyiv's support to the Gulf countries would be, with Iranian envoy to Ukraine calling it "nothing more than a joke and a showy gesture."
Separately, US President Donald Trump said Zelenskyy was the last person he would ask for help in Washington's military efforts in Iran, despite reports that the United States had held talks with Ukraine on the matter.
Days prior to Zelenskyy's latest visit to the Saudi Arabia, Reuters cited five sources familiar with the matter, saying the United States had introduced Ukrainian drones at its key air base in Saudi Arabia.
Meanwhile, on its own front lines, Ukraine has continued to suffer deadly Russian air attacks, which have occurred almost every day over the past week.
According to regional Governor Serhiy Lysak, a married couple, both 75 years old, were killed in the attack on the Ukraine's major southern port city of Odesa on April 24, adding 17 other people were injured.
A local Odesa resident told RFE/RL's Ukrainian Service that she was covered in blood after an explosion blew out a window and its frame in her apartment.
"The explosion blew a window and a frame right onto me…. Everything was falling. I was frightened," she said at the scene of the aftermath.
Separately, Moscow and Kyiv reported that 193 Russian and Ukrainian prisoners of war were swapped on April 24. Zelenskyy said those who returned to Ukraine included soldiers, border guards, and police who had been injured or faced criminal charges in Russia.
In his comment to RFE/RL's Ukrainian Service, the country's ombudsman, Dmytro Lubinets, said those returned home had been held in Russia's Chechnya region.
Lubinets added that most of them had not been confirmed as prisoners by the International Committee of the Red Cross, and that one of them had been considered missing.