Michael Clarke: If Ukraine Can Survive The Year, 'Pendulum Could Shift' Against Russia

Michael Clarke is a defense and security expert as well as a former director-general of the Royal United Services Institute, a London-based defense and security think tank.

In an interview with RFE/RL Georgian Service's Vazha Taberidze, Clarke says Russia may have the upper hand in Ukraine but predicts "the pendulum might start to swing against Russia in 2025, when Kyiv's arms industry should be in better shape."

Clarke cautions, however, that the outcome of the U.S. presidential election later this year looms large as well.

RFE/RL: Let's start with the March 6 Russian missile strike on Odesa during a visit to the Ukrainian Black Sea port city by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy and Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis. Kyiv claimed the Russians were deliberately targeting the two leaders. Do you agree? Will it deter foreign diplomats from visiting Ukraine?

Michael Clarke: I'm not sure that the missile strike was [the] deliberate targeting of the leadership, because there were a lot of targets in Odesa. The Russians have not been able to prevent the Ukrainians getting the normal level of shipping out of Odesa and Chornomorsk (another Ukrainian Black Sea port, south of Odesa) into the Mediterranean [Sea], [so] they are therefore attacking Odesa quite intensively. So, it seems to be just as likely that this was a missile that was targeting warehouses and dock facilities.

The Tavberidze Interviews

Since the beginning of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Vazha Tavberidze of RFE/RL's Georgian Service has been interviewing diplomats, military experts, and academics who hold a wide spectrum of opinions about the war's course, causes, and effects. To read all of his interviews, click here.

However, it's certainly possible that the Russians would have tried to kill Zelenskiy. They certainly have tried it several times before. And they wouldn't have been deterred from the idea of killing Mitsotakis, the Greek prime minister as well. Since, as far as the Russians are concerned, they're doing all they can to create a war, not just against Ukraine but against Europe more generally. So, they would have lived with the outrage that that would have caused if they'd have got Zelenskiy.

So, on balance, I think it was probably an accident, but equally, the Russians would have been prepared to do it if they thought they had a chance…. Although I don't think it was Russian policy in the past to target heads of state and heads of government, I don't think the Russians will be deterred enough in the future if they thought they could justify it somehow by an attack on Zelenskiy or an attack on some key military objective in Ukraine that other leaders might happen to have been visiting.

RFE/RL: How reckless would that be of Russia and of Russian President Vladimir Putin?

Clarke: If the Russians were to do that -- either accidentally or deliberately -- it would be very, very reckless, because it would indicate that the Russians have no scruples about assassinating senior foreign leaders.

Again, I wouldn't be surprised if they would think that they could live with the opprobrium that that would create. But it would be extremely reckless, and it would convince the world more -- if they did need any more convincing -- that the Russians are under a militaristic regime that will do anything to achieve its objectives.

Until Russia is somehow defeated in Ukraine -- not defeated as the country, but defeated in Ukraine -- it will continue to be a militarily aggressive actor, to everybody else involved in Europe.

RFE/RL: Grisly as it may be, what would, or could be, the likely, or possible response, if a senior NATO official were to perish in Ukraine?

Clarke: I think if any NATO head of state were killed in Ukraine, the effect would not be immediate military retaliation. But I think that a lot of thresholds in terms of helping Ukraine would then be crossed out. And I suspect that Germany would cross some thresholds, which presently loom quite large in the German domestic environment, and other countries would as well.

And so I think, ultimately, it would be a benefit to Ukraine. And of course, if it were to happen, the Russians would immediately claim that Ukraine did this as a false flag operation to create exactly that sort of boost. So, you can just imagine if a head of state were killed visiting Ukraine, the Russians would immediately say it was a conspiracy.

The West would react with horror, and the ultimate result would be an increase in aid for Ukraine. But that needs to happen anyway, with or without the assassination of a major head of a NATO state.

RFE/RL: Before we delve into the matter of increasing aid to Ukraine, let me ask you a sweeping question about the war itself. We are now two years since the start of the war -- how crucial is this third year that we have just entered?

Clarke: This third year of the war is extremely important because Putin thinks he's on a roll. He thinks that the war in Gaza, and the softening of Western practical support to Ukraine, particularly in the United States, is giving him the advantage, and he's pushing all round. And so the Russians believe that they can gain more territory, perhaps the whole of the Donbas by the end of this year.

In 2025, the pendulum might start to swing against Russia -- may or may not. But by 2025, Ukraine, if it can survive this year, will have its own arms industry in better shape, [and] it may well have received more long-term military aid from the West. And the Russians can't mount a major or strategic offensive against Ukraine until the spring of 2025. And so they'll gain all they can in 2024 if they can keep pushing. They hope that they can create a political crisis in Ukraine, which would lead to a change of government and a negotiated peace on their terms. That's what Putin must now feel is somehow within his grasp.

And it's a danger that Ukraine may fall into that scenario. As long as Zelenskiy is president, there won't be any negotiations on Russian terms. But if Zelenskiy is removed as president, then that is a possibility. So, 2024 is a very critical year.

This will be a long war. This is industrial-age warfare. And that means it will last for a few years. It won't be endless, but it will last for a few years. And the pendulum swings backwards and forwards during an industrial-age war. And at the moment, the pendulum is swinging back to Russia. If it continues to swing back to Russia, it is possible that Ukraine will, in effect, be defeated. But if it doesn't swing all the way back, then it should begin to swing back toward Ukraine, if it survives this year, into 2025-2026.

RFE/RL: What exactly makes you think that Western aid might be increased in 2025? If what's happening in Europe -- in the U.S. Congress and the looming U.S. election -- are anything to go by, where does your optimism come from?

Clarke: If the Europeans step up to supply Ukraine with what Ukraine needs during this and next year, it probably won't be as the united Europe, it won't be united within the 27 [members] of the EU or united within the 32 [members] of NATO. Because that unity is softening at the edges, and we can see it in the politics of various countries in southern Europe and, of course, in the United States. But there is a core of European countries, which are, as it were, prepared to do what is necessary.

And one of the big key questions is: Will Germany join that core of countries or will it continue to be ambiguous about the whole thing. But you can see in the initiatives that the Czech Republic is now taking that there are ways of trying to ramp up artillery supply to Ukraine. The EU has a plan to send 1 million shells, but as usual, the EU only delivered part of its planning. Standard EU stuff. You've got to expect that the EU constantly underachieves and promises more than it can ever deliver. It delivers something but never as much as it says.

And so the initiative comes back to individual countries and groups of countries who see the Ukraine crisis for what it is. That will actually keep Ukraine well enough supplied to get them through this year. But America is critical. If America comes back on board, then Ukraine will be reasonably safe. If America doesn't come back on board, then it really matters what Germany does.

RFE/RL: If the United States does not come back on board, with or without Germany, will this core of European countries be able to shoulder the burden and see the day through?

Clarke: With Germany, European countries can certainly do it. Without Germany, it will be very difficult. But I suspect that Germany will come back into more full participation because the pressure is building up on the chancellor from his own coalition; he faces the possibility of a government collapse if he doesn't go along with the stronger line, and, of course, he worries he faces collapse if he does.

So, he's got that dilemma to deal with. But if I had to guess -- and it is only a guess at the moment -- I think Germany will cross more thresholds and come on board more strongly [along with] the European response as the year goes on. But if they don't, then it really will be difficult for the Europeans to replace American funding and the hard steel and weapons that America can provide. The political support is important, money is important. But ultimately, wars are won by shells and tanks and heavy metal.

RFE/RL: You mentioned that Western unity is softening around the edges. And let me ask you, what's the West's game plan, its modus operandi, when it comes to this war? What does it want to achieve, and how does it want to achieve it?

Clarke: Western strategy in general terms is very clear. We want to make sure that this imperialist adventure of Russia fails and that Ukraine somehow prevails. Now, what that means can vary according to whether we're talking about Ukraine regaining control of all of its borders since 1991 or all of its borders since the invasion of 2022. We can talk about that. But the idea is that Russia must fail. I mean, that's the point. That's the first principle.

The second principle is that this war should be contained. So, we do not want to start a general war of Europe against Russia. That's not what this is about. We have no quarrel with Russia as a country. And certainly we don't intend to reduce the size of Russia or invade Russia or anything like that. So, the second requirement is containment.

But after that, Western strategy has become very confused, because some Western countries are deterred by Putin's wild statements…. [And Dmitry] Medvedev (deputy chairman of Russia's Security Council and an ally of Putin) makes ridiculous statements. And we see on state-controlled media, on a nightly basis, all these crazy statements being made about nuking the West and destroying Britain with a nuclear torpedo and all the rest of it. Some European leaders are deterred by this. They are frightened of Putin.

And that's exactly the issue now with Germany's [long-range] Taurus missile. We know that the Taurus missile would make a big difference to Ukraine's ability to take the war to Russia. And Chancellor [Olaf] Scholz is frightened by what Putin has said, in case it provokes [the situation] into something worse. And so Chancellor Scholz is deterred by Putin's statements in a way that [Prime Minister] Kaja Kallas of Estonia is certainly not deterred. And even [Prime Minister] Rishi Sunak in Britain is not deterred.

If we had Tauruses, we would certainly give them to Ukraine, but our Storm Shadow missiles -- which we have given them, we will give more -- are not as heavy as Taurus, they're not as good as Taurus. So, you know, when you get below the level of the main principles that Ukraine must survive, but we must contain the war -- once you get below that level, then there's a lot of disagreement, and there is not a coherent Western strategy at the operational level of warfare.

RFE/RL: To use a football analogy, and I will admit it might not be very subtle, but the objective is to win the match, but what's the tactic? So how does the West go about its game plan to achieve those objectives that you just outlined?

Clarke: Well, it requires leadership within the West, and that leadership began in the United States. But that leadership cannot now be taken for granted. And in the absence of the United States, you're looking at leadership between France, Germany, and Britain -- those are the three countries that between them can create the environment for leadership in Europe.

Now, if the leaders of those three countries all agree and if they're strong enough at home to be able to fend off domestic opposition, then things can happen. But that isn't the case. At the moment, they don't all agree. They're not all strong enough at home; all three leaders are weak at home. The British prime minister is very weak [and] facing an election; it looks as if he's going to lose. Chancellor Scholz is weak, facing a coalition that is split. [French] President [Emmanuel] Macron is weak, because he's facing domestic opposition, which is undermining his authority all the time.

So…the three big leaders are all domestically weak, and they don't agree. And that's the problem that the source of real leadership is not there. When the Americans take leadership roles, those three don't matter so much, and they tend to line up behind the United States. But the U.S. is not there. It throws the burden back on those three, and they're not able to offer anything at the moment, or they're not able to offer enough to create the momentum in Europe to go forward as a united continent.

RFE/RL: Speaking of Macron, his proposal, or rather [his] ambiguous hints that the West should not rule out sending troops to Ukraine. How big is the gap from talking the talk to walking the walk, and is Europe prepared to go that distance?

Clarke: It's a huge gap between his rhetoric and reality. You know what he was trying to do in that speech. I'm not unsympathetic to what he meant, which is that we cannot afford to lose, we cannot afford to let Russia win. This war is much more important than Ukraine itself, even though it's very, very important to Ukraine. And he was expressing that.

And what he was saying is: Because we cannot afford to lose, we must be prepared to mobilize whatever it takes. That's what he meant to say. But in just mentioning the idea of ground troops being somehow involved in the background, or in some way in Ukraine, that immediately created the ambiguity and other allies said, no, no, we're not talking about that, because it brings in exactly that fear that we'll get ourselves involved in a European war against Russia directly.

RFE/RL: The three main European leaders, all three of them are domestically weak, and they can't agree among themselves. And let's look now at their adversary, Putin. Would it be fair to say that with former Wagner mercenary boss Yevgeny Prigozhin dead, [Russian opposition figure Aleksei] Navalny dead, Ukraine on the back foot, and elections practically in his pocket, Putin is at his strongest since the war started?

Clarke: Yes. I mean, he had a very shaky time during the summer over the Prigozhin rebellion. But he weathered that storm…. So Putin is stronger now because he has got control over what was Wagner; he has complete control over Rosgvardia (Russian National Guard); and he has quite a lot of influence over Redut, the other PMC (private military contractor).

So, the ultimate output is that he has more control over his forces now. They're not necessarily better at fighting, but they're more coherently structured than they were a year ago, which is why he thinks that this may be his opportunity just to keep pushing the Ukrainians back, even though he must know that they're not fighting very well. And he has more chance of gaining some more territory, while Ukraine is off balance in the next three or four months.

Domestically, he's continuing to intimidate any of the opposition. He must be aware that there's a lot of disquiet in Russia about the war, about what's happening to their own economy. He's increased defense spending by 300 percent since 2022. The domestic economy is beginning to suffer. He's still cash rich; he's still got energy money. But for the first time since he took power in 1999, he is now having to reduce welfare spending in favor of military spending.

So, the public this year are starting to feel the effects of the war on their own economic circumstances. And he knows that there's disquiet. And so what he's done is to make clear that nobody will survive if they attack him. So Prigozhin won't survive. Navalny won't survive. Anybody else will not survive. He's just like a mafia boss.

RFE/RL: The tsar is untouchable.

Clarke: Exactly, yeah. Now you can do that for a long time, [but] it collapses, because eventually so many people feel threatened that it's the Julius Caesar outcome that everybody gangs up and stabs you in the back. But when that happens, we just don't know. It might be next month, or it might be in five years' time, might be in 10 years' time.

You can only go so far, in terms of power, by eliminating all of your enemies or your potential enemies even before they become an enemy. It's the paranoid reaction. Stalin did it. You know, some of the tsars did it. It always goes wrong in the end, but there's an awful lot of misery before the end arrives.

RFE/RL: A kind of speculative question: Putin probably thinks about his image and legacy in the history books, but does he ever burden himself thinking about how he is leaving Russia? And what will happen to Russia after him and who will take care of his legacy?

Clarke: I'm sure he feels responsible for history. I don't know how good a historian he is. I mean, from what he says, he's a very bad historian. His essays are ridiculous; they are just confections of bad history. However, he feels the power of history, and the man is 72 now. And so he must realize that when he's 80, 82, 83, if he lives to die of old age, peacefully in his bed, that he's now in the last phase of his life.

And I think that, for that reason, he thinks he's on a mission. He thinks his time is limited and that this is his great moment in history. I'm not sure he intended it to be like this, but having invaded Ukraine and having it go wrong in the first three days, he has no choice but to double down. And I think he's driven both by the failure of his invasion and the sense of historical mission, [and it] is now or never for him to go down in history as one of the great Russian leaders. And I don't think he cares very much about the economic state or the social state of the Russia he leaves behind.

RFE/RL: Does he care about borders?

Clarke: Yes, he cares about having Russia occupy bigger borders. He wants to be in the same tradition of Peter the Great, Catherine the Great, Josef Stalin. He does not want to go down like [Mikhail] Gorbachev (the last leader of the Soviet Union) or [Boris] Yeltsin (the first president of an independent Russia)…. And I'm sure he sees himself with that sense of historical mission, and it's not even only a political mission, it's mystical.

You know, he's very interested in mysticism. I mean, [he] and [Defense Minister Sergei] Shoigu, I believe, have had consultations with shamans, when they go on their hiking trips in Siberia. He is known to be interested in mysticism and that all [contributes] -- as it does to many dictators -- to a sense of somehow divine calling, to do something for your country or your empire. I think that's the mental state that he is in.

RFE/RL: What's the minimum that he will settle for? Where he will say, OK, fate has given this to me, I'll settle for it. What's the minimum he wants out of this war?

Clarke: I think the minimum he wants is something that looks like the Novorossiya of Catherine the Great, which would mean Russian control through to Odesa, and probably Moldova; the creation of a Russian client state, east of the Dnieper River; and a rump state, run from Kyiv, perhaps, but a rump state of Ukraine, which is unviable.

And if he left the scene with that extra territory as part of Russia, and a state that was going to collapse at some point in the future, the rump of Ukraine -- I think he'd love it to collapse while he's still alive and then he would absorb the whole of Ukraine, and it would look very like Novorossiya. But I think if he left a Russia that looked very like Catherine the Great's Russia -- he'd like it to look like Peter the Great's as well -- but if he could get Catherine the Great's Russia together, then I think he would feel a sense of historic mission achieved.

RFE/RL: What does that spell for countries like Georgia and Moldova, which are not under NATO's security umbrella? Are these countries in existential danger now?

Clarke: Yes, Moldova is in great danger because of its geographical proximity and the Transdniester breakaway republic that is asking for unity with Russia. Georgia is in great danger because of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which are frozen conflicts that Putin will use. Russians are now building a new naval base in Abkhazia, in the port of Ochamchira, because they've been kicked out of Sevastopol (the naval port on the occupied Crimean Peninsula) effectively, and Novorossiysk (Russian Black Sea port) is not very secure.

So, I think that Moldova and Georgia are very vulnerable, and so is Kazakhstan. Because this is not just Putin, this is a whole elite around Putin, who've been gripped by 20 years of propaganda about the Russian empire, and the historical justifiability of an imperial Russia. And so north Kazakhstan is also a place of some vulnerability.

And that's why this matters much more than just Ukraine. It matters to other countries in Europe, and it matters to the global community in terms of the ability to maintain a post-World War II international order that is based fundamentally on rules and the power of Western democracies. They don't dominate the world, but they are a force in the world for order and free trade. And it's a good thing that they remain so.