Timothy Snyder, a professor of history at Yale University and the author of books including Bloodlands and The Road To Unfreedom, spoke to Sashko Shevchenko of RFE/RL's Ukrainian Service about possible scenarios for ending Russia's war against Ukraine, what the collapse of Russia as an empire could look like, the current mobilization efforts in Ukraine, and other matters related to the war.
RFE/RL: You have said in one of your lectures that history does not repeat itself, although a widespread saying claims the opposite. Is this a reason for optimism for Ukrainians who think that the Ukrainian nation has repeatedly made the same mistakes in its relations with Russia? Will they learn the lessons of the past?
Ukraine can win if Ukraine controls the north coast to the Black Sea. Ukraine can win if it is able to make it too costly for Russia to continue the war."
Timothy Snyder: If history did repeat, then none of us would be free. If history repeated, [it] would be like a song on the radio that we just listen to and can't change. But it's not like a song on the radio. You can use history to see patterns. You can use history to learn. You can use history even to anticipate things sometimes. But inside history, there are always the people thinking about the moment that they're in [and] doing unpredictable things.
The history of Ukraine is very long, and many interesting things have happened. The episode with Russia is actually a small part of the history of Ukraine. The more I learn about [it], the more the history of Ukraine invites me to think about different human possibilities. It's not that it makes you optimistic; it makes you realize how many open possibilities there are.
RFE/RL: For Ukrainians, what’s stake in this war is the question of preserving the Ukrainian state. Is there a real chance that Ukrainians could lose their statehood? Could the West allow this to happen? Taking into account how history works, is this a real possibility?
Snyder: Anything is possible. From a historical point of view, the side with a larger economy usually wins. Ukraine should be the side because it should be backed by the United States, Canada, most European countries, [and] to some extent South Korea, Japan. If those countries mobilize their economies just a little bit, Ukraine will eventually win the war. That's one historical generality.
It's only going to end when Ukraine wins. If you want it to end, the best way to talk about it is [by saying] it should end."
Another is that wars are fought in territory and not in people's minds. The Russians have been quite good at getting inside the minds of people in the West and distracting us from basic territorial realities. Ukraine can win if Ukraine controls the north coast to the Black Sea. Ukraine can win if it is able to make it too costly for Russia to continue the war.
I believe those things are possible, but no historian and no political scientist can tell you what's going to happen. It's possible for Ukraine to win this war if it has the support of its allies, if we focus on controlling the correct territories, and we understand that war is essentially political, not psychological. It's not about our feelings; it's about how long [Russian President Vladimir] Putin politically can keep doing what he's doing.
RFE/RL: Western leaders say they support Ukraine so that it has a strong position in future negotiations. Will such negotiations be actually possible? What will they look like?
Snyder: It's a tricky question for me because I'm not a diplomat. I can only say that the best negotiating position is when you've won the war. The distinction people make between a strong negotiating position and winning the war is not a distinction I think is really valid. If you want Ukraine to be in a strong negotiating position, that means you want them to win the war. And you should say so, because that's much clearer.
Defeating Russia in war is the best thing that we could do for Russia. What happens in Russia, though, after that is up to the Russians."
It also leads to more effective action because the language about helping Ukraine “as long as it takes” or the language about Ukraine prevailing or the language about Russia not winning is practically unclear. But if you start talking about winning, then you think, “OK, what can I do to make a victory possible?” And that leads to a different political dynamic or a different institutional dynamic. It's also the most humane way to talk about the war, because it's only going to end when Ukraine wins. If you want it to end, the best way to talk about it is [by saying] it should end.
I've been trying to get Americans to talk about winning since March or April 2022, and they have been moving in that direction. It's just been frustratingly slow. I don't want to promise you anything that's not going to happen, but I do think that they are slowly moving in that direction. It'll be interesting to see what the Biden administration does now because they are, in a way, liberated. They don't have to worry so much about the election or about what the press says. I think they're going to have much more of a free hand in the next four to five months.
RFE/RL: There also is a popular idea that every empire eventually falls. Do you think Russia will inevitably disintegrate into ethnic states?
Snyder: I have a very specific view, which is that it's good for empires to lose wars. They don't always lose them, but it's good for them to lose. Poland, Germany, Italy -- these are all postimperial countries. Spain, France, Britain -- these are postimperial countries. This thing called European integration is a postimperial phenomenon. In daily political practice, trying to maintain an empire is inconsistent with trying to maintain the rule of law or human rights at home.
I personally don't think the Russian Federation will fall apart. But what I'm sure of is that it's not going to be America that does it."
One sees that with Russia, they're obviously trying to just carry out a genocide in Ukraine, but the war makes it impossible for any kind of normal politics to function in Russia. Do I think the Russian Empire has to fall apart? The Russian state could continue without being an empire. That's also possible. I think that's more likely.
But I think Americans and Ukrainians and others should think about it this way: Defeating Russia in war is the best thing that we could do for Russia. What happens in Russia, though, after that is up to the Russians, up to the people who live on that territory. I'd put it that way. It would be good for them to lose this war, just like it was good for France to lose in Algeria, just like it was good for Germany to lose in 1945.
RFE/RL: There is an impression that people in the West are afraid of Russia's possible disintegration in the same way they feared the disintegration of the Soviet Union. How does one convince Western societies that nuclear proliferation will not be a problem and that Ukrainians should not pay for this fear with their lives?
Snyder: That's a good question. The problem in a way is that we overestimate our own power. We didn't want Yugoslavia to fall apart. It fell apart. We didn't want Czechoslovakia to fall apart. It fell apart. We didn't want the Soviet Union to fall apart. I'm just going to stop on that moment because there's so much myth around that now, largely thanks to the Russians. But the Americans were working really hard in 1991 to keep the Soviet Union together. That's what we wanted. But we couldn't do it.
People always feel safer when they're doing nothing. But you have to compare risks."
What we should be learning is that we don't actually have that much control. I personally don't think the Russian Federation will fall apart. But what I'm sure of is that it's not going to be America that does it. It'll be Russians or Chechens or Bashkirs. It won't be us. Our policy probably won't make any difference.
What happens is that we get trapped in our own vanity. We think we control so much, but we don't really control whether Russia falls apart or not. If Russia falls apart because Putin fought a stupid war, that won't be our fault. It's a possible scenario we should prepare for. But what we shouldn't think is, “We have to stop that,” because that's not our job and we can't even if we wanted to. That's not the kind of thing that we in the West have the power to do.
That fear is understandable, but I think it becomes a kind of excuse because people always feel safer when they're doing nothing. But you have to compare risks. The risk of Russia destroying Ukraine, carrying out a genocide, becoming more powerful, preparing the way for a Chinese-led world order, and so forth is much greater than the risk of Russia losing the war and then Russians deciding, “OK, now that we've lost a war, what are we going to do?”
Personally, I think it would be fine for Russia to be in a moment like they were in 1905 when they lost to Japan. Their attitude toward Japan was very similar: “We can't possibly lose this war. It's an inferior country, inferior culture.” Then when they lost, they had some elections and land reform and they thought about things. It wouldn't be bad for Russia for that to happen [again]. If Russia does lose, the outcome is probably going to be a good one.
RFE/RL: One of the main topics in Ukraine is mobilization and the fact that not many volunteers are left. According to a recent opinion poll by [the Ukrainian think tank] Razumkov Center, only 30 percent of Ukrainians believe it is shameful to hide from conscription. From a historical point of view, how important is the capacity to mobilize new soldiers and to motivate the population? Is it possible to win a war when the people aren’t motivated to join the military?
Snyder: We're in a different kind of war now. Ukrainians have shown a remarkable willingness to defend their country and in the previous 2 1/2 years have made enormous sacrifices on a scale which I think most Western societies would have trouble even imagining. The polling about mobilization now has to be taken in that context.
We can have this conversation. In Russia, we'd immediately be in prison if we talked about people not mobilizing. We'd literally be breaking the law."
The sort of war we're in now is going to be won by drones and anti-drone protection and is going to be won by airplanes. It's going to be won by destroying Russian airfields. It's going to be won by destroying the bridge at Kerch. It's going to be won by making it impossible for Russia to do anything else. Russia's in a position where they think they have to take all the Donbas. They think they have to keep taking territory.
It's true that there are fewer Ukrainians [willing to fight], and it's true the Ukrainians are fighting alone. It's reasonable for Ukrainian authorities to be planning for a war where they're going to make it impossible for Russia to continue rather than trying to forcibly push away every Russian soldier on Ukrainian territory.
Certainly, willingness to fight is a factor on the Ukrainian side as well as on the Russian side. It's kind of a race to see where it gets worse first. The Russians are now losing a lot of men to gain very little territory, and they're telling ever-worse stories about why they're doing it.
[We know more about this issue in Ukraine, because] Ukraine is a democracy, it's a country where people have freedom of discussion; it's different in Ukraine than in Russia. We can have this conversation. In Russia, we'd immediately be in prison if we talked about people not mobilizing. We'd literally be breaking the law.
But that doesn't mean that in Russia it's not an issue. In Russia it becomes a political issue. It’s important but inside these larger contexts.
