China In Eurasia

Welcome back to the China In Eurasia briefing, an RFE/RL newsletter tracking China's resurgent influence from Eastern Europe to Central Asia. To subscribe, click here.

I'm RFE/RL correspondent Reid Standish and here's what I'm following right now.

Xi Jinping used his opening remarks at China's weeklong Communist Party congress to outline a vision of how to lead the country toward superpower status as he defended his decade in power and said that tough policy lines would be needed to enshrine China's rise amid growing global threats.

Finding Perspective: The Chinese leader is poised to claim his third term by the end of the week, but the process is only a formality at this point.

With Xi's hold on power cemented at home, he used his lengthy October 16 report to China's ruling elite to warn that risk-filled times are coming to the country and the world and called on Communist Party members to adopt a fighting spirit to domestic challenges and continue to seize opportunities unveiled by changes on the global stage.

While light on specifics, the vision set forth by Xi points towards even more hard-line policies from Beijing as it grapples with economic headwinds at home, an intensifying rivalry with the United States, and fierce technological competition abroad.

When Xi came to power a decade ago, China had just overtaken Japan to become the world's second-largest economy, but it now potentially faces its second-lowest growth rate in 46 years, with the International Monetary Fund recently cutting its forecast for China's growth to 3.2 percent this year.

In another sign of weakened growth, Beijing also abruptly delayed the publication of its third-quarter GDP data, a day before it was set to be released.

Xi will also need to focus on changing the country's economic model and patching vulnerabilities in its financial system, which achieved record growth as a result of China's unfettered debt-fuelled expansion over the past decade.

Why It Matters: There's no going back for Xi. Having already changed the fundamental rules of Chinese politics, expect the same to hold true for foreign policy.

However, unlike when Xi first took power, China is now in a much more confrontational position with the West.

In its recently released national security strategy, the Biden administration labeled China as the most consequential geopolitical challenge to the United States despite Moscow's war with Ukraine.

The European Union, which has generally not been as hawkish toward Beijing as Washington, said that its relationship with China had fundamentally changed, with Josep Borrell saying that growing competition with the country had outstripped other aspects of bilateral relations.

China now finds itself more insular than before and the recipe for continued frayed ties with the West is ever-present.

During his speech, Xi outlined an aggressive foreign policy and railed against future "external attempts to suppress and contain" China, with added attention to the Indo-Pacific region.

But Beijing also risks pushing too hard, too quickly and sparking even tougher Western pushback -- something that Kevin Rudd, president of the Asia Society and former Australian prime minister, believes Xi is wary of, especially in regards to Taiwan.

"[Xi] doesn't want an accidental conflict with the Americans in the 2020s," Rudd wrote in a recent article. "Under present conditions, the risk that China might lose is still too great. He hopes to change that by the 2030s."

Read More

● For a deeper look at the opaque and high-stakes world of China's elite politics, read this article by Chinese writer Deng Yuwen in Foreign Policy.

● Among many interesting tidbits in a Politico interview with former U.S. National Security Council official Fiona Hill, I found this comment about Beijing and Moscow particularly interesting: "Once we get past the party Congress in China, we should watch how the Chinese-Russian relationship plays out. China would be instrumental in signaling to Putin how far he can go in terms of pursuing his endgame."

Expert Corner: The View From Taiwan

Readers asked: "Xi Jinping has likely secured his third term and seems to have his sights firmly on Taiwan. How does this new era look from Taipei and is a Chinese invasion of Taiwan a given at this point?"

To find out more, I asked William Yang, Deutsche Welle's Taiwan-based East Asia correspondent:

"People in Taiwan are closely following the messages as well as military activities adopted by China, especially since U.S. House of Representatives Speaker Nancy Pelosi's visit in August. Since the threat from China is nothing new to Taiwanese people, most of them have developed a coping mechanism in which they don't let provocative gestures or predictive media reports affect their daily lives too much, while they remain alert and up-to-date about the latest signals coming from Beijing. With that being said, there is certainly a slight increase of the sense of urgency since August."

Do you have a question about China's growing footprint in Eurasia? Send it to me at StandishR@rferl.org or reply directly to this e-mail and I'll get it answered by leading experts and policymakers.

Three More Stories From Eurasia

1. The New Central Asia

The fallout from the Ukraine war continues to have ripple effects across Central Asia, leading to shifting dynamics for how the region deals with external players, particularly China and Russia.

What It Means: China received a win at the United Nations earlier this month, in part thanks to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan voting differently than how they had in the past when it came to Xinjiang.

In a close contest at the UN's top human rights body in Geneva, a vote to hold a debate on alleged rights abuses by Beijing against Uyghurs, ethnic Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and other minorities in China's western Xinjiang region lost out.

Seventeen countries voted in favor, 19 were against, and 11 abstained in the vote. The diplomatic victory for Beijing was in part because Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, which had traditionally abstained when it came to voting on Xinjiang, voted against the motion, supporting China's position. (Ukraine also abstained, but later said it wished to switch its position to vote in favor of holding a debate.)

In other signs of shifts under way, Russian President Vladimir Putin visited Central Asia on October 13 amid Moscow's diminishing influence in the region.

As my colleague Chris Rickleton wrote in a recent article, deep problems within the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the Moscow-led security bloc, are brewing and Russia has few tools to fix the situation. (Chris and my colleague Steve Gutterman also explored this and more in a recent podcast episode.)

While Russia is too large and powerful to not be influential in Central Asia, it's clear that its reputation is suffering due to the war in Ukraine and China is picking up some of the pieces, with some tangible results already visible.

2. Chinese Police Go Global

Beijing has opened dozens of what it calls "110 Overseas Police Service Centers" around the world, some of which are being used to intimidate and blackmail suspects into returning home to China in order to face charges in breach of global extradition laws, according to a new report from the watchdog group Safeguard Defenders.

What You Need To Know: The report claims Chinese regional police forces have set up at least 54 offices on five continents, stretching from Uzbekistan to Hungary to Canada. The centers get their name from the police emergency telephone number in China, 110.

The Chinese government claims that the overseas police service centers are set up to help Chinese diaspora and tourists with everyday problems, but Safeguard Defenders says in its investigation that the stations are part of an expanding and complex surveillance and monitoring network that allows the Chinese Communist Party to reach far beyond its borders.

"These operations eschew official bilateral police and judicial cooperation and violate the international rule of law and may violate the territorial integrity of third countries involved in setting up a parallel policing mechanism using illegal methods," the report says.

3. Watching Tajikistan's Debt

Tajikistan's substantial foreign debt -- the vast majority of which is owed to China -- was under fire during a recent UN panel, my colleagues at RFE/RL's Tajik Service reported.

The Details: The questions over Dushanbe's external debt came from members of the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, who raised their growing concerns about the financial commitments to a visiting delegation of Tajik officials.

Tajikistan's foreign debt currently sits at $3.3 billion -- 60 percent of which (roughly $1.98 billion) is owed to the state-run Export-Import Bank of China.

The Central Asian country's foreign debt has more than doubled in the past decade. Despite concerns over this -- and the fact that Tajikistan's debt exceeds 40 percent of its GDP -- the officials questioned at the United Nations insist that they have the situation under control and will be able to meet their repayment schedules.

Across The Supercontinent

Prep Work: Pavel Fischer, the chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Czech Senate, told RFE/RL's Ukrainian Service that the European Union needs to draw lessons from Russia's invasion of Ukraine for a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan and have a sanctions plan already in place.

Racial Recognition: The Chinese company Dahua, the world's second-largest security-camera manufacturer, is marketing AI-powered cameras on its own website that can detect "race," "skin color," and even so-called "Xinjiang" or "Tibet" facial features. Read the full report from IPVM.

Covid-Zero Goes Abroad: According to an investigation by Australia's ABC, the Pakistani Army has been enforcing China's strict COVID-19 restrictions at a Belt and Road Initiative-funded power plant in Pakistan, which is operated by a Chinese company.

Welcome To Dushanbe: Tajikistan is hosting an international counterterrorism conference that will feature representatives from the European Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), China, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Qatar, and other states, RFE/RL's Tajik Service reports.

One Thing To Watch

Preparations for a possible Biden-Xi meeting on the sidelines of the G20 summit in Indonesia began months ago, but with the meeting getting closer, there are some reports that Beijing is backpedaling on having a face to face with Biden.

Politico reported recently that Beijing won't engage with U.S. officials trying to draft an agenda for the meeting, which could prevent it from taking place. The White House denied the report, but China has signaled its frustrations of late over enhanced U.S. pressure and could look to back out.

A meeting between the two leaders at the G20 -- which takes place on November 15-16 -- could go a long way to calming tensions between the United States and China, which have descended to a new low point.

That's all from me for now. Don't forget to send me any questions, comments, or tips that you might have.

Until next time,

Reid Standish

If you enjoyed this briefing and don't want to miss the next edition, subscribe here. It will be sent to your in-box on the first and third Wednesdays of each month.

Welcome back to the China In Eurasia briefing, an RFE/RL newsletter tracking China's resurgent influence from Eastern Europe to Central Asia.

I'm RFE/RL correspondent Reid Standish and here's what I'm following right now.

Chinese leader Xi Jinping is expected to be anointed by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) for an unprecedented third term in office on October 16, but despite accumulating extraordinary power, Xi faces strong headwinds at home and abroad.

Finding Perspective: Xi is already the most dominant figure inside China and a third term will leave him as the most powerful Chinese leader since Mao Zedong.

Since taking power a decade ago, Xi has presided over an increasingly aggressive authoritarian state powered by China's multi-decade economic growth. During that span, he expanded Chinese influence abroad with projects like the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), expanded the military, took on economic inequality at home, removed political rivals through an expansive anti-corruption campaign, and shifted Chinese foreign policy into a more assertive gear, with Beijing positioning itself on the global stage as a superpower.

Xi abolished the restraints of collective leadership of his predecessors Hu Jintao and Jiang Zemin and shied away from the market reforms that defined China's rise in recent decades. It's also clear that he feels his hold on power is firmly in place, with his trip to Central Asia in September -- his first foreign visit since the pandemic -- as a signal that he sees no threats from rivals at home.

But as Xi prepares for another five year term, he'll have to grapple with a series of looming domestic crises -- from a mounting property-market crash to demographic strain to fallout from COVID Zero policies -- and newfound international resistance to Beijing over its threats to Taiwan, human rights abuses in Xinjiang, support for Vladimir Putin amid his invasion of Ukraine, and confrontational "wolf warrior" style of diplomacy.

Why It Matters: China under Xi is increasingly distrusted and feared around the world, which could not only further damage Beijing's international standing, but also stall the country's continued rise.

A new survey from the Pew Research Center suggested opinion about China in the world's most advanced economies "has turned precipitously more negative" in the past decade since Xi took office, with a majority in all countries saying that they have "little or no confidence in Xi's approach to world affairs."

The German Marshall Fund found similar findings in a recent study, with majorities in advanced economies largely seeing China today as a "rival" or "competitor."

But as Cai Xia, a retired professor of the CCP Central Party School now living in exile, wrote recently, this is unlikely to resonate with Xi himself.

"Xi will no doubt see his victory as a mandate to do whatever he wants," Cai predicted.

As seen during the recent Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit, Xi wants to push for a new multipolar world order with China at the top, but with mounting pressure at home and abroad, he could overreach.

Read More

● Economic gloom is setting in and the Financial Times digs into China's property bubble, which could be "a slow-motion financial crisis" for the country.

● What would a Chinese invasion of Taiwan actually look like? Former CIA analyst and Atlantic Council senior fellow John Culver explains.

Expert Corner: Can China Benefit From War Fallout in Central Asia?

Readers asked: "Central Asian countries are distancing from Russia over the war in Ukraine. Does a weakened and less influential Russia play into China's hand and strengthen its influence there?"

To find out more, I asked Temur Umarov, a fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace:

"It's hard to jump to conclusions right now that Russia is in decline and China would immediately replace it in Central Asia. There are still many factors that keep Russia as a dominant power there. The region, even today, still depends on Russia economically and logistically. So, in the near future, it's too early to claim that China is on the verge of replacing Russia.

"But this shift is also inevitable for Central Asia and the region will keep finding alternatives to Russia -- and the No. 1 option is China. Every single crisis Russia has with the West and the world adds fuel and speeds up this process that leaves China more influential in Central Asia than before.

"In the near future, I would also expect more cooperation from Beijing and Moscow in Central Asia and, of course, this would be because Russia is weaker than ever and it needs China and is looking for ways to grow that relationship. Beijing is also very pragmatic and would look to work with Russia, which has better knowledge of Central Asia than Beijing."

Do you have a question about China's growing footprint in Eurasia? Send it to me at StandishR@rferl.org or reply directly to this e-mail and I'll get it answered by leading experts and policymakers.

Three More Stories From Eurasia

1. China's New Symbol In The Balkans

China has built a new cultural center in Belgrade at the site of its former embassy that was bombed in a NATO air strike in 1999.

During a recent reporting trip to Serbia, I reported on where the construction of the center stands now and the symbolic role it could play for China in the Balkans.

The Details: Despite not being officially opened yet, the center appears to be in full swing.

Staff come and go regularly and the Chamber of Chinese Companies, which is part of the complex, opened this spring. The center is slated to be one of the largest in all of Europe and will house classrooms, a Confucius Institute, exhibitions, office space for Chinese and Serbian companies, and also accommodation for diplomats and other visiting delegations.

But beyond its practical functions, it holds deep symbolic value.

The 1999 bombing of the embassy by NATO and the perceived tragedy and humiliation suffered at the hands of the West serves as a basis for Belgrade and Beijing's ties.

The emphasis on the center is also a sign that after years of pouring billions worth of investment and loans into Serbia that China is looking to expand its cultural footprint, too.

"We should look at [the center] as not only a hub for China's presence in Serbia, but also as a hub with the potential to spread the influence of Chinese companies and culture across the Balkans," Stefan Vladisavljev, an expert on Beijing's role in the Balkans and program director at Foundation BFPE, a Belgrade-based think tank, told me.

2. What Does Xi Want From Putin?

Amid battlefield losses in Ukraine and a chaotic mobilization campaign under way, Putin finds himself under mounting pressure, raising renewed questions about the future of the "no limits" partnership declared with Xi back in February.

What You Need To Know: September was a dizzying month for developments between Beijing and Moscow.

Like the rest of the international community -- with the exception of North Korea -- Beijing has not recognized Putin's September 30 decrees that four Ukrainian regions are now part of Russia. China never recognized Russia's forceful annexation of the Crimean Peninsula in 2014 and Beijing abstained from a recent vote condemning the referendums at the UN Security Council, which was eventually vetoed by Moscow.

Before that, the Russian Security Council claimed on September 19 that Moscow and Beijing had agreed on "further military cooperation" with a focus on exercises and senior contacts.

All of this came on the heels of a Xi and Putin meeting on the sidelines of the SCO -- their first since the invasion of Ukraine -- where the Russian president acknowledged Xi's "questions and concerns" with the war (an exchange I dug into here.)

There are no signs that this has had any moderating influence on Putin. Since then, he ordered a "partial" mobilization and declared Ukrainian territory to be part of Russia.

Despite the slew of Russian setbacks, Beijing clearly still sees value in its ties with Moscow, which are becoming increasingly unbalanced in China's favor.

During their SCO meeting, Putin -- a world leader famous for his bravado and making others wait -- appeared deferential to Xi by praising the Chinese leader, saying he respected his "balanced stance" on the war in Ukraine, backing Beijing's One China policy, and opposing "provocations" by the United States in the Taiwan Strait.

3. Central Asia's Model Trains

In a long-awaited announcement for Central Asian leaders, China, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan agreed on construction of a railway network between the three countries that could have a big impact on regional trade, RFE/RL's Kyrgyz Service reported.

What It Means: While still facing some skepticism, the agreement was reached at the SCO summit in Samarkand and Beijing agreed to provide $4 billion-$5 billion in financing for the project.

However, it may still be years before the project truly gets off the ground and impact assessments are still being completed. The railway line has been met with enthusiasm by Central Asian leaders, though, and so far seems to be an example of China stepping in to provide the region with the kind of infrastructure it wants.

After years of scandals with past projects and growing concerns over saddling countries with debt, Beijing is moving cautiously with the railway and appears to be going with a slower timeline despite calls for an accelerated plan from Bishkek.

Across The Supercontinent

Espionage: Valery Mitko, an 81-year-old Russian scientist placed under house arrest after being charged with high treason and allegedly spying for China two years ago, died on October 2, RFE/RL's Russian Service reported.

Speed Limits: The first 41-kilometer stretch of Montenegro's controversial $1 billion highway is open and running. My colleagues at RFE/RL's Balkan Service have a video of the new highway and how locals feel about it now that it's in use.

Karachi Shooting: A Chinese national was shot dead and two others were wounded on September 28, when unidentified attackers opened fire inside a dental clinic in the Pakistani city of Karachi, Radio Mashaal, RFE/RL's Pakistani service, reports.

Holes In The System: A recent study by the Central and Eastern European Center for Asian Studies looked at how vulnerable Hungary's critical infrastructure is to Chinese hacking or snooping and found it to be high, my colleague Akos Keller-Alant from RFE/RL's Hungarian Service reports.

One Thing To Watch

Beijing is looking to change the rules of the game for Taiwan, this time in regards to its military footing toward the self-governing island.

After carrying out war games in early August in response to a visit to by U.S. House of Representatives Speaker Nancy Pelosi, China is looking to keep that posture as part of the new status quo.

The Taiwanese Defense Ministry said that Beijing was looking to "normalize" its military activities near Taiwan, including crossing the median line of the Taiwan Strait, which could pose a challenge for Taipei "unlike [any] it has seen before," according to the ministry.

"In the future, the activities of Chinese communist military aircraft and ships entering our air-defense-identification zone, crossing the median line, and approaching maritime areas close to the island will gradually become more normalized," the ministry said in a statement.

That's all from me for now. Don't forget to send me any questions, comments, or tips that you might have.

Until next time,

Reid Standish

If you enjoyed this briefing and don't want to miss the next edition, subscribe here. It will be sent to your in-box on the first and third Wednesdays of each month.