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A Chinese engineer supervises workers building a bridge over a river in Ghari Dupatta, Pakistan.
A Chinese engineer supervises workers building a bridge over a river in Ghari Dupatta, Pakistan.

A few weeks before the Sri Lankan president fled the country amid growing protests triggered by its debt-laden economy's default and financial crisis, a top Kyrgyz official issued a warning about the Central Asian nation's own dire forecast as the turmoil unfolded.

"We must always remember the need to pay [our] public debt," Akylbek Japarov, the chairman of Kyrgyzstan's cabinet of ministers, said at a parliamentary session in late June.

Like Sri Lanka, Kyrgyzstan also has a swelling state debt and took on billions worth of loans over the last decade from China's Export-Import Bank for a series of infrastructure plans under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Chinese leader Xi Jinping's signature policy, which he once dubbed "the project of the century."

Kyrgyzstan's debt currently sits north of $5.1 billion, according to the Foreign Ministry, 42 percent of which is owed to Beijing. But Bishkek is struggling to cope with a contracting economy and has so far failed to yield a commercial return on the projects backed by its huge Chinese loans. This has prompted fears the country will be unable to pay off its loans or even meet interest payments. The mounting financial pressure has also raised concerns that the country may have to hand over lucrative assets if it fails to meet its repayment obligations.

"I'm not scaremongering, but if we do not pay this debt, [China's] Export-Import Bank can take over [projects]. This has already been [discussed] in cases in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and other countries," Japarov said. "We cannot sit back and rely only on [God]. We all need to unite in order to maintain our independence."

That warning comes as sovereign-debt distress spreads in several countries along the BRI, prompting China's first overseas debt crisis as it grapples with a mounting pile of nonperforming loans and increased scrutiny of how Chinese lending has exacerbated economic pressures on vulnerable governments.

"There's no doubt that the Chinese Ministry of Finance and central bank are looking at their dashboards and their red lights are going off right now," Bradley Parks, executive director of the AidData Lab at the College of William and Mary in Virginia, told RFE/RL.

The globe-spanning scale of BRI, which was launched in 2013 by Beijing as the largest infrastructure program undertaken by a single country, has left it with a list of risky debtors around the world -- including Argentina, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan, Venezuela, Zambia, and Iran -- that hoped to take advantage of the surge in Chinese overseas lending but now find themselves struggling with a debt crisis the World Bank has warned could trigger a series of defaults not seen since the 1980s.

For China, this marks what analysts describe as a crucial inflection point after nearly 10 years of runaway lending under the guise of the BRI that has been exacerbated recently by rising inflation, soaring energy costs, and tightening global financial conditions due to the war in Ukraine and the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic. In such an environment, Beijing could be looking to streamline and scale back its hallmark initiative.

Chinese President Xi Jinping and the Central Asian presidents discuss investment projects during a virtual summit to mark 30 years of relations on January 25.
Chinese President Xi Jinping and the Central Asian presidents discuss investment projects during a virtual summit to mark 30 years of relations on January 25.

"China is growing more concerned about it not being able to get paid back, so we have seen a pullback in lending that is set to accelerate," Alicia Garcia-Herrero, the chief economist for Asia-Pacific at the investment bank Natixis, told RFE/RL. "China is also under growing economic pressure at home now and is becoming more hesitant to lend to risky countries. [This] has [opened] a new phase of the BRI."

Growing Debt Pressure

The BRI has helped make China the world's largest bilateral lender and seen it give out loans totaling $932 billion since it was established eight years ago, according to data collected by the Green Finance and Development Center at Fudan University in Shanghai.

But even before the current debt crisis, the headwinds against the BRI were mounting.

Loans issued in recent years are turning bad at an unprecedented rate, with research by Rhodium Group, a New York-based research consultancy, showing that the value of Chinese loans that required negotiation soared to $52 billion in 2020 and 2021, a threefold increase from the previous two years.

One study of Chinese lending published in April by a team of leading economists also shows the current scale of the debt crisis, with its research indicating 60 percent of Chinese loans are given to countries in financial distress, compared to only 5 percent in 2010 before the BRI was launched.

Other research done by William and Mary’s AidData Lab, which maintains one of the most comprehensive datasets on Chinese development finance, shows that 35 percent of BRI infrastructure projects currently face major implementation problems.

In the face of such pressures, Beijing has begun to issue so-called "rescue loans" to starve off defaults, with AidData showing that tens of billions of dollars have been issued by Chinese state institutions to countries such as Pakistan, Belarus, Egypt, Mongolia, Turkey, and Sri Lanka, to help service their loans and avoid default.

"We are at a major pivot point right now. The scale of this widespread debt pressure is something that China has never faced before and it is having to reinvent BRI on the fly," Matthew Mingey, senior research analyst at Rhodium Group, told RFE/RL.

A July report from the Green Finance and Development Center showed how the BRI is becoming more risk-averse, with new investment in Russia, once a mainstay of the initiative, falling to zero in the first half of 2022, while engagement in Pakistan dropped by 56 percent during the same period.

China is increasingly investing in oil and gas, making up about 80 percent of Chinese overseas energy investments for the first half of 2022 and 66 percent of Chinese construction contracts, with Saudi Arabia being the top recipient.

People walk by a display board showcasing China's construction projects at the media center of the Belt and Road Initiative in Beijing.
People walk by a display board showcasing China's construction projects at the media center of the Belt and Road Initiative in Beijing.

Christoph Nedopil Wang, the director of the center behind the report, told RFE/RL that Beijing is increasingly targeting resource-backed investments as they present a "more straightforward way" for Chinese institutions to be repaid compared to large-scale infrastructure projects.

According to Mingey, the spreading debt distress coupled with slowing global growth and a more cautious approach from Beijing means that China will need to search for new ways to solve the problem at hand. Rescue loans are a time-buying measure and in the case of Sri Lanka, they still failed to offset a default. The big question, he says, is to what extent Beijing will participate with multilateral institutions in debt resolution programs in BRI countries.

"Previously, the playbook was simple: It was to defer, restructure, and give space and time for borrowers to sort things out," Mingey says. "But China has an aversion to refinancing, and Chinese creditors have not always played well with multilateral institutions, private creditors, or public bilateral ones. So, it's a question of what tools China can use now."

The Road Ahead For Bishkek, Islamabad

Chinese loans are not the sole cause of debt distress or defaults. Sri Lanka has international debts of more than $50 billion, with only about $5 billion owed to China.

But Beijing's lending to the South Asian country has been controversial, with critics arguing that credit for projects has been extended at high rates and money from the glut of foreign borrowing is being misused, amid accusations of corruption.

Similar allegations have dogged BRI-backed projects in Kyrgyzstan and Pakistan.

In the case of Pakistan, the country of 220 million people is the biggest single recipient of BRI financing worldwide and hosts the $62 billion collection of infrastructure projects known as the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).

A security guard stands outside a ship at the port of Gwadar, which has been leased to a Chinese corporation by the Pakistani government.
A security guard stands outside a ship at the port of Gwadar, which has been leased to a Chinese corporation by the Pakistani government.

Similar to Sri Lanka, the viability of some projects have been brought into question in Pakistan, including a port project in Gwadar along the strategically important mouth to the Strait of Hormuz, which has often been trumpeted as a BRI priority.

But tensions over the implementation of BRI projects has strained relations for both Beijing and Islamabad. Still, Beijing has issued a string of loans aimed at averting a default, with a consortium of Chinese state banks lending $2.3 billion to Pakistan in late June.

Beijing has reportedly urged Islamabad to repair ties with the IMF and resurrect a loan program agreed in 2019, of which the fund has so far given only about half of the agreed $6 billion sum.

Pakistani Finance Minister Miftah Ismail told Bloomberg on August 1 that progress had been made on the loan, which could stave off a default, but analysts say Islamabad's finances remain strained, and Mingey said that Pakistan is still a leading "domino to fall" after Sri Lanka amid the debt crisis and possibility of further defaults.

Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov (left) meets with Chinese leader Xi Jinping on February 6.
Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov (left) meets with Chinese leader Xi Jinping on February 6.

Kyrgyz officials have spoken about the urgency of making their payments to China and say they are capable of meeting their obligations to foreign creditors, with President Sadyr Japarov promising not to delay foreign debt repayment even for "one hour."

Japarov warned about the consequences of not meeting its debt payments to China in 2021, with discussion around the handing over of the rights of the Jetim-Too iron ore mine to Chinese firms as one avenue to resolve a dispute. Japarov has since said that the mine will be developed locally, but the possibility of a Chinese takeover still hangs over the project, as does other Chinese-financed projects such as the Bishkek thermal power plant, which could be placed under external management if Kyrgyzstan does not pay off its debts on time.

Navigating A New Crisis

One of the unique dimensions to the current debt crisis that analysts say raises the stakes is China's relative inexperience and the lack of precedence in dealing with such issues.

For more than 60 years, sovereign-debt restructurings have been coordinated by the Paris Club, an informal association of 22 mostly Western major creditor countries. Created in 1956, the group has signed hundreds of agreements across the world, often working with the IMF.

China is not a member of the Paris Club and only became a major creditor nation in the last two decades, as the BRI helped catapult its status as a leading lender.

AidData's Parks says that little is known about how Beijing will approach its role as an important creditor in a time of growing distress, but that China has frustrated restructuring efforts in the past, which often involve compromises and pain for both borrowers and lenders -- and will also require them to work other international creditors who are owed outstanding debts from the same countries.

"Every successful sovereign-debt restructuring has happened when all creditors have taken a haircut and structured agreements so that no one creditor bears a disproportionate burden," Parks said. "We're waiting for the precedent to be set here with China and its restructuring."

A hint of how China could approach this issue will be seen in how Beijing resolves this in Sri Lanka, Zambia, Laos, Cambodia, and Ethiopia, which are now restructuring their debts with China and creditors like the World Bank and IMF.

On July 30, China announced that it had agreed to provide debt relief to Zambia, which paves the way for a future IMF bailout in a potentially precedent-setting move for how Beijing will work with other lenders under the so-called Common Framework for debt treatments agreed by the G20 in late 2020.

"As originally conceived, BRI cannot sustain itself according to that original vision, but we shouldn't underestimate the Chinese," said Parks. "They are quite strong at learning and adapting to their past mistakes."

Correction: An earlier version of the article misattributed research about the percentage of BRI countries in debt distress. The study was done by economists Sebastian Horn, Carmen Reinhart, and Christoph Trebesch, not AidData Lab.
Railway workers prepare for a freight train to begin its journey from Shijiazhuang, China, to Moscow. (file photo)
Railway workers prepare for a freight train to begin its journey from Shijiazhuang, China, to Moscow. (file photo)

New investment in Russia through China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) fell to zero in the first half of 2022, while Chinese outlays in Pakistan dropped by 56 percent during the same period.

These are the findings of a new report from the Green Finance and Development Center at Fudan University in Shanghai, which point to growing headwinds facing Chinese President Xi Jinping’s signature foreign policy venture that he once dubbed “the project of the century.”

Both Russia and Pakistan have been among the top beneficiaries of Chinese development spending through the BRI. Moscow signed deals worth about $2 billion in 2021 alone and Islamabad hosts a $62 billion collection of infrastructure and energy projects known as the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).

The Fudan University report highlights the changing nature of the BRI as it adapts to a combination of a strained global economy, China’s shifting position in the world, and many countries who inked deals and took out loans through the initiative now grappling with a growing debt crisis.

BRI spending has been declining for several years as Beijing becomes more risk averse. The report shows a total of $28.4 billion in Chinese investment across 147 BRI countries over the first half of 2022, down from $29.6 billion over the same period last year.

The BRI’s rapid expansion since 2013 has helped China become the world’s largest source of development credit, and how Beijing navigates the program’s future will have global consequences.

To find out more, RFE/RL spoke with Christoph Nedopil Wang, the director of the Green Finance and Development Center at Fudan University who helped write the report.

RFE/RL: One of the leading takeaways from your report is that China is increasingly investing in oil and gas, making up about 80 percent of Chinese overseas energy investments for the first half of 2022 and 66 percent of Chinese construction contracts. Saudi Arabia has become a major recipient of Chinese investment along with other nations in the Middle East. What does this tell us about the current state of the BRI and also where it is heading?

Christoph Nedopil Wang
Christoph Nedopil Wang

Christoph Nedopil Wang: We saw last year in the 2021 report that one of the major recipients of Chinese engagement was Iraq and it was similarly through fossil fuel-backed projects. I think one of the interpretations that we are exploring is that resource-backed investments are increasing because they are a way to reduce risks.

China has been trying to manage financial risks for a number of different reasons, including that the overall [Chinese] economy after [the] COVID-19 [pandemic] -- as well as in a lot of the BRI countries -- has not been performing as well as expected. Therefore, [Chinese] government sponsored projects or sovereign guarantees from these [BRI] countries are much harder to get for a variety of other projects.

Whereas, if you have resource backed projects like oil and gas it is relatively clear how you're going to get your money back. Therefore, these projects tend to be a lot lower risk and quite lucrative, particularly in today's markets of high fossil fuel prices.

RFE/RL: Another finding of the report is that some countries that were leading partners of the BRI received no Chinese engagement so far this year, including Russia. Is this drop-off in investment in Russia largely due to Beijing wanting to avoid secondary U.S. sanctions over Moscow’s war in Ukraine or are there other factors that help explain this?

Nedopil Wang: It's the first time that in any of the recorded periods that we looked at [where] we couldn't identify any large deal between China and Russia. It's an event that hasn't happened before, [but] of course, all of the questions and potential reasons about why this happened are speculation for the moment.

China has never confirmed that it's trying to avoid the sanctions with Russia, and it is [still] trading very regularly, particularly in fossil fuels, with Russia. So, it's not that there is no engagement between China and Russia. It's that there's no construction and investment recorded in the first half of 2022. It might be that Beijing is playing it safe and reducing the risk of any secondary sanctions, but it might also have other factors behind it.

That applies for other countries that have seen a drop in Chinese engagement such as Egypt. I think it’s not possible to say there is a trend yet and that [this drop] is because Egypt has fallen out of favor with Beijing. China is actually constructing quite a bit of the new capital in Egypt and it’s therefore a bit tricky to make big conclusions from a half-year window. Some larger deals might be announced later in the year and so it’s still somewhat difficult to decipher the long-term trend.

RFE/RL: But are these drop-offs surprising to you? It seems like a noteworthy shift, especially for Russia, given where things stood in previous years.

Nedopil Wang: It was definitely a surprising finding. It's the first time that we did not see any engagement in Russia for any period of time.

But again, we can only speculate on the exact reasons right now and there will not be an official announcement by China about why this has happened.

RFE/RL: China’s engagement in Pakistan through the CPEC has been one of the flagship projects of the BRI. But your findings show that investment dropped by about 56 percent. What would you say is the main reason for this and what does it say about the future of the project overall?

Nedopil Wang: Pakistan has, since the establishment of the BRI through CPEC, been one of the most prominent corridors and China and Pakistan have exchanged a number of really impressive contracts to build infrastructure for energy, road, and rail transportation over the years.

Pakistan went through some big political changes last year and this year and there has been some reevaluation of the political risks from the Chinese side, as well as some reevaluation about the current economic situation in the country, which is not as strong as it was when a lot of this investment started.

With that in mind, perhaps it’s not too surprising. It might also be healthy for CPEC to have a breather and reevaluate what kind of projects are actually driving it forward and what is working, what is not, and what might be needed.

Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan (left) and Chinese President Xi Jinping meet in Beijing on February 6.
Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan (left) and Chinese President Xi Jinping meet in Beijing on February 6.

RFE/RL: We’re entering an interesting period as the BRI approaches its 10-year anniversary. The venture has shifted and adapted in many ways already. Currently, there is discussion of a potential overseas debt crisis mounting with BRI. Do you think that these problems are prompting a rethink in Beijing about the economic risks from the type of big infrastructure lending we’ve traditionally seen?

Nedopil Wang: I would be very surprised if not all of the involved players in China, from the ministries to the financial institutions and also the developers, are having to rethink their engagement in a number of different ways.

The number one reason is that the overall economic situation in a lot of the BRI countries is different now. A lot of the deals were done back when everybody was still in kumbaya mode believing that they could develop and finance anything. That has changed. There have been some sovereign debt crises and defaults in some BRI countries, and they have been trying to renegotiate their debt with China.

There’s a clear recognition now of the risks involved and also a reduced appetite for further financial engagement. You also have other impediments right now, such as China having very strict travel controls due to COVID restrictions.

It's very hard right now for Chinese managers or Chinese developers to travel from China to any of the BRI countries to make deals or to actually do due diligence and plan a large-scale project. That’s a major detriment to making new deals. It doesn’t mean that there aren’t any new deals, because Chinese companies and financial institutions have staff on the ground, but things are just more cumbersome now.

Chinese President Xi Jinping speaks at the second Belt and Road Forum in 2019.
Chinese President Xi Jinping speaks at the second Belt and Road Forum in 2019.

China is also domestically in a different situation than it was in 2015-2017 when a lot of these BRI deals were being signed. Chinese financial institutions are focusing a lot of their effort to support the domestic economy and are potentially less interested in adding on more loans to foreign projects. So, there's also a reevaluation happening from the financial institutions.

Overall, there's a host of reasons why we're seeing a shift from these larger-scale projects to potentially smaller ones.

Going back to your first question, there is a growing focus on resource deals. In a way, those are perfect projects for any developer because the risk is very low. Essentially, you get your financing and there is a more straightforward way for you to get your money back, which is not the case with other big infrastructure projects that have much longer payback periods with much higher uncertainty.

This interview has been edited and condensed for clarity.

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About The Newsletter

China In Eurasia
Reid Standish

In recent years, it has become impossible to tell the biggest stories shaping Eurasia without considering China’s resurgent influence in local business, politics, security, and culture.

Subscribe to this biweekly dispatch in which correspondent Reid Standish builds on the local reporting from RFE/RL’s journalists across Eurasia to give you unique insights into Beijing’s ambitions and challenges.

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