China In Eurasia

Hoping to boost his country’s economic prospects and deepen its energy links with China, Turkmen President Serdar Berdymukhammedov arrived in Beijing on January 5 for a two-day state visit.

Few details have been made available about the trip, but the visit marks Berdymukhammedov’s first official visit to China since succeeding his father, Gurbanguly, as president in March 2022 in a managed election.

Chinese state media have said that Berdymukhammedov will meet with Chinese leader Xi Jinping and that delegations from both sides will discuss issues ranging from Afghanistan to investment through Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative infrastructure project.

But energy ties, particularly natural gas pipelines to China, look set to dominate the Turkmen leader’s visit.

Turkmenistan has the world’s fourth-largest gas reserves and China plays a central role in the Central Asian nation’s foreign policy and in powering its economy.

This growing dependency on China is reflected in Turkmenistan’s trade with Beijing. The vast majority of the $10 billion in annual bilateral trade is made up of Turkmen exports, mostly of natural gas.

This dynamic looks set to increase further, with yearly trade turnover increasing some 53 percent in 2022 and Ashgabat looking to renew Chinese support for an additional pipeline transporting Turkmen gas across Central Asia to China.

Analysts, however, caution that Berdymukhammedov has few cards to play in talks with Beijing, especially as Turkmenistan continues to grapple with a lingering economic crisis in the form of rampant inflation, rising poverty, and increased food insecurity.

Many details around the two countries’ energy ties remain opaque, but the Turkmen side may be looking to shore up the terms of its arrangement with Beijing in hopes of stabilizing its uncertain finances, analysts say.

“We don’t know all the terms, lengths, or prices when it comes to gas [contracts] with China,” Luca Anceschi, a professor of Eurasian Studies at the University of Glasgow, told RFE/RL. “The hope for Turkmenistan is to get some continuity with China and make sure that the flow of gas stays steady.”

A Limited Balancing Act

Berdymukhammedov last met Xi in September on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Uzbekistan. The Chinese leader’s first trip abroad since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, the visit marked Beijing’s symbolic focus on Central Asia.

For the Turkmen leader, solidifying and expanding relations with Beijing are a key priority, analysts say.

As energy ties with Russia -- which was the cornerstone of Turkmenistan’s foreign policy following the collapse of the Soviet Union -- came under strain and eventually deteriorated in the mid-2000s, Ashgabat turned to Beijing in hopes of offsetting its reliance on Russian pipelines to access markets.

This culminated in the opening of the China-Central Asia pipeline network in 2009, which boosted ties between the two countries and saw China become the sole buyer of natural gas from Turkmenistan for a period.

Anceschi says this was a turning point that set the stage for Ashgabat’s current predicament.

Natural gas exports account for most of Turkmenistan’s revenues. The country has grappled with market fluctuations and repaying China for the debt it incurred for building the pipeline, which cut into its gas revenues.

“The problem is that Turkmenistan does not have many international partners,” Anceschi said. “But the calculations are different for the regime. The national interest is defined through a narrow elite that oversees this authoritarian and kleptocratic system -- and relying on one large partner like China still allows them to pursue this agenda.”

Still, Turkmenistan has made attempts to better insulate itself from its reliance on the Chinese market.

While China remains the country’s top energy client, Russia has resumed buying some Turkmen gas in recent years. Since Berdymukhammedov succeeded his father, Ashgabat has also accelerated its outreach to the Kremlin, with the Turkmen leader making his first trip abroad to Moscow in June to meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin.

“It’s clear that Serdar [Berdymukhammedov] has prioritized outreach to Russia since coming to power,” Raffaello Pantucci, a senior fellow at London’s Royal United Services Institute and at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore, told RFE/RL. “It shows what they are trying to do in terms of opening up new routes and trying to diversify their partners.”

Pipe Dreams

Still, analysts say, there are limits on how much Russia, which is also a supplier of natural gas to China, can help Ashgabat balance its dependence on Beijing -- a dynamic that is likely to play out during Berdymukhammedov’s visit.

In 2021, China invested in new wells at Turkmenistan’s Galkynysh gas field. Ashgabat is also hoping Beijing will accelerate the expansion of a pipeline network that could bring more of the country’s gas to the Chinese market.

The current network to China is made up of three parallel pipelines -- known as Line A, B, and C -- that run from Turkmenistan through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Around 80 percent of the gas that flows through the pipelines is from Turkmenistan. Berdymukhammedov is now looking to turn the new section of the network -- Line D -- into reality.

The fourth line will follow a different route through Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan to China, but it faces a host of logistical, technological, and political roadblocks that have delayed it for nearly a decade.

Still, Ashgabat is eager to forge ahead as the new pipeline would increase exports through the Central Asia-China gas network by 30 billion cubic meters (bcm) to a potential capacity of 85 bcm annually. That would provide additional revenue for the cash-strapped Turkmen government.

Beijing has offered public support for the venture and the China National Petroleum Corporation will reportedly finance its construction.

But China is in no hurry for the pipeline to come online. Turkmenistan’s gas exports to China through the existing pipeline network have yet to be maximized. Beijing also has a diverse set of natural gas suppliers around the world, with Russia also sending gas via pipeline and Australia being a top exporter of liquefied natural gas.

Analysts say this imbalance gives Turkmenistan little leverage as it presses for more favorable pricing on gas and speedier timelines in the construction of future pipelines.

Anceschi adds that, despite these obstacles, China still remains an appealing partner for Ashgabat.

“This level of dependence here may be astounding to an outside observer, but it fits well with the idea that Turkmenistan’s foreign policy is about keeping elites in power,” he said. “They need to have a certain amount of energy revenue while not being too exposed internationally, and this leaves China as the main option.”

As Russian tanks rolled into neighboring Georgia under the cover of darkness in August 2008, Beijing’s initial reaction was one of quiet irritation.

Then-Chinese leader Hu Jintao was reportedly frustrated and embarrassed that Moscow had chosen the opening day of the Summer Olympics in Beijing to launch its invasion, with China even moving to block Russian diplomatic attempts to legitimize the war in various multilateral organizations and neighboring regions, such as Central Asia.

Fast forward to February 2022 and a very different picture of the evolving China-Russia relationship -- defined by a growing ideological affinity to rewrite the global order and a shared opposition to the United States on the global stage -- begins to come into focus.

With the drumbeats of a Russian invasion growing louder once again earlier this year as another Chinese-hosted Olympics approached, President Vladimir Putin traveled to Beijing to meet with his counterpart, Xi Jinping, where the two leaders marked a new era in their countries’ ties by announcing the start of a “no-limits” strategic partnership.

In a sign of how much China and Russia’s relationship had transformed in the 14 years between the events, the two leaders signed a 5,300-word joint statement on February 4 before the Olympics' opening ceremony that offered a blueprint for further political, economic, and military cooperation while showcasing a common front against the West.

But that newly declared unlimited partnership would soon be put to the test.

On February 24, Russian tanks once again rolled into a former Soviet neighbor, this time sparking the largest war in Europe since World War II. Unlike Georgia, however, Putin’s invasion of Ukraine triggered a swift economic and political response from the West, and Ukrainian forces -- equipped with a steady stream of Western arms -- have managed to push back Russian troops and derail the Kremlin’s war goals in a series of embarrassing setbacks.

Since then, Beijing has walked an awkward line with Moscow: speaking out against Western sanctions against Russia and often boosting the Kremlin’s narrative on the war, while at the same time distancing itself diplomatically from Putin and sometimes offering veiled criticism of the invasion.

After a year that has shattered many expectations and dissolved several myths about China and Russia’s relationship, what does 2023 have in store?

“The military ineptness of Russia has somewhat diminished [its standing], but China remains committed to Russia as a strategic partner,” Steve Tsang, director of SOAS University London's China Institute, told RFE/RL. “Russia may have proved itself less valuable, but [Beijing] continues to see the United States as a strategic competitor and will want to have Russia on its side.”

A Strategic Prize

Despite the many problems that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has unleashed at home and abroad, Chinese strategists still view Moscow’s growing attachment to China as an advantage as Beijing deepens its global competition with the United States.

“The relationship is still understood as a real asset and prize for Xi, even if there will be a weaker Russia emerging from this war,” Andew Small, a senior fellow at the German Marshall Fund and the author of No Limits: The Inside Story Of China's War With The West, told RFE/RL.

Analysts contend that the war has left Beijing uneasy and, at times, Chinese officials have signaled their displeasure, such as backing a statement in November at the G20 summit in Indonesia taking aim at Moscow for the global political and economic fallout caused by its invasion.

But the war has also left Russia more dependent on China -- both politically and economically -- than ever before, and Putin’s willingness to openly challenge the United States still holds great appeal for Beijing as it continues to rise on the global stage.

“A weaker Russia is still a better partner than any other option China has, especially in terms of its military, economic, and political value,” Small said. “The strategic landscape is still the same for Xi. Beijing expects to be embarking on a [period of] struggle, and it isn't willing to bend.”

Brokering this partnership has been a long-term goal for Chinese policymakers, said Small. While both Beijing and Moscow often found overlapping interests at international bodies like the United Nations, their relationship was still defined by deep distrust, especially on the Russian side.

For many years, Moscow had essentially closed the Russian market to Chinese investment.

The Kremlin remained cautious over gas-pipeline deals that could augment Chinese energy security and held back when it came to arms sales for advanced weapons like the S-400 missile-defense system and Su-35 fighter jets, which Russian officials thought would allow Chinese arms companies to reverse engineer the products.

But much of that changed following Russia’s forceful annexation of Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula in 2014 and the outbreak of fighting in the eastern part of the country. Moscow found itself grappling with Western sanctions, including from the European Union -- its largest energy customer -- and, in May of that year, Putin departed for Shanghai, where he sought to kickstart Moscow’s pivot to the East with a massive $400 billion gas deal in the form of the long-stalled Power of Siberia pipeline bringing energy to China.

Further restrictions were lifted in the months that followed as Russia sold advanced fighter aircraft and missile systems to the Chinese, at the same time changing its tune about Beijing’s Belt And Road Initiative (BRI) investment project, which had previously been seen as a way to encroach on Russian influence in areas like Central Asia that the Kremlin views as its sphere of influence.

“The interesting part of this [Ukraine] war and its consequences for China is whether these risks that it has seen Russia take are worth it,” Small said, in reference to Chinese ambitions to claim self-governing Taiwan, which Beijing views as a rogue province. “It clearly showed them how damaging this can be if poorly calculated.”

Watching 2023

Looking ahead into a new year, a central question remains about how China will navigate the evolving nature of its ties with Russia following its gambit in Ukraine.

While experts say it remains clear that Beijing has no intentions of dropping Moscow as a partner, there are clearly limits to the extent of any political or economic lifeline that China would offer Russia.

“China seems likely to continue offering strong rhetorical support for Russia, but practical military and economic support is less likely,” Charles Dunst, a fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and author of Defeating The Dictators, told RFE/RL. “The United States has repeatedly warned China that military and economic support for Russia would prompt U.S. sanctions -- a situation that China, with its economy in a somewhat precarious position, wants to avoid.”

With that in mind, China looks set to continue buying discounted Russian energy and aiming to make transactions in rubles or Chinese renminbi as part of a broader effort to insulate itself from sanctions blowback.

Likewise, many Russian regions have set new trade records with neighboring Chinese provinces -- a dependence that looks set to grow in the future.

China seems unlikely to become a major financial backer of Russia in the near future, says Agathe Demarais, global forecasting director for Economist Intelligence and the author of Backfire: How Sanctions Reshape The World Against U.S. Interests.

“Russia will try to do anything it can to boost energy exports to China,” she told RFE/RL. “That shouldn’t be hard for oil, but the problem will be gas, which is the lifeline of the Russian regime. Nearly all Russian pipelines are geared to Europe, and building new ones is costly, requires advanced technology, and takes time and money.”

Uncertainty also exists over any form of Chinese moves to help Russia avoid the biting U.S. sanctions on its economy.

Beijing has in the past helped other partners like Iran navigate multilateral sanctions, where it aimed to soften the financial blow and buy cheap oil. But Demarais said China also inflamed its ties with Tehran during this period by pushing too hard on Iran during negotiations and taking advantage of the country's economic desperation.

With Russia, Beijing will be looking to learn from that experience and find a balance between pursuing its own energy and financial interests while also keeping Russia firmly in its corner.

“China knows that it will be able to get concessions from a desperate and cash-strapped Russia,” Demarais said. “Also, Chinese firms aren't too excited about stepping up business with Russia as they fear that secondary sanctions could be applied, and Chinese firms don't want to take risks. This means that the relationship will be very unbalanced, and China has the upper hand.”

With an eye on 2023, the German Marshall Fund’s Small said the key task for Chinese strategists is keeping Moscow close while still keeping ties with the West intact, which Beijing appears to be successful in doing following a new wave of outreach with European leaders like French President Emmanuel Macron and European Council President Charles Michel.

“They know that Russia wants respect, and if they give that, then this is a cheap trade for Beijing,” Small added. “If they treat Russia as an equal -- even if they don't think they are -- then this will pay dividends for China, and that’s been a growing part of how Xi has approached this entire relationship.” ​