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Russian President Vladimir Putin will visit China for a two-day state on May 16-17 to push for more Chinese support for Moscow's war effort in Ukraine.
Russian President Vladimir Putin will visit China for a two-day state on May 16-17 to push for more Chinese support for Moscow's war effort in Ukraine.

Russian President Vladimir Putin will visit China for a two-day state visit where he’s set to press Chinese leader Xi Jinping for more support to sustain his country’s sanctions-hit economy and war machine in Ukraine.

The May 16-17 visit is Putin’s first foreign trip since he was sworn in for a fifth presidential term one week ago and comes as Beijing continues to extend a key economic lifeline to Moscow to help soften the blow of Western economic sanctions that have limited Russian access to global supply chains and international markets. The United States has increased its warnings in recent months about China’s crucial role in helping Russia on the battlefield by aiding its defense industry through the supply of nonlethal but militarily useful dual-use products.

Analysts say a main objective for Putin’s trip will be to find ways to circumvent U.S. restrictions that have driven down Chinese exports to Russia in March and April following a boom in consumer products and dual-use goods since Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

Both U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken and U.S. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen warned Beijing during visits to China in April that Chinese companies -- and financial institutions -- could face secondary sanctions for supplying Moscow’s defense industry.

“There are clear signals that the economic component of the war will be a crucial piece of [the visit],” Nathaniel Sher, a senior research analyst at Carnegie China, told RFE/RL. “Every month, China is exporting more than $300 million worth of dual-use products to Russia and isn’t hiding it. There [are] few reasons to see why they’d stop now.”

An analysis of Chinese customs data by Sher shows that Chinese exports to Russia have risen by more than 60 percent since the invasion of Ukraine and that in 2023 some 90 percent of “high-priority” dual-use goods used in Russian weapons production was imported from China. China’s total trade volume with Russia also rose by 26 percent in 2023 to a record $240 billion.

Underscoring the importance of Russia’s defense sector to Putin’s China trip is a Kremlin reshuffle that saw him appoint technocrat economist Andrei Belousov as defense minister on May 12. Defense spending in Russia has been ratcheted up and experts say Belousov’s appointment is part of an effort to raise military production for the war in Ukraine in preparation for a yearslong campaign.

Belousov, who has held several top economic roles over the last decade, also has extensive experience dealing with China. Both Xi and Putin will meet with policy teams specializing in trade, energy, and security cooperation during the visit and Alexander Gabuev, the director of the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center, says that since Xi’s state visit to Moscow in 2023 both Beijing and Moscow have “invested serious effort…to get senior officials on both sides to know each other well.”

“As Beijing and Moscow expand their defense industrial cooperation, Putin has elevated high-caliber professionals with China experience,” Gabuev wrote on X, formerly Twitter.

Meeting An 'Old Friend'

Since the announcement of a Russia-China “no limits” partnership in February 2022, which was followed by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine just days later, the countries have moved closer together despite sanctions and political pressure from the West.

In previewing the visit, the Kremlin said Putin and Xi would “discuss the whole range of issues in detail in their all-encompassing partnership and strategic relationship.”

The two leaders will also sign a joint statement and take part in an event celebrating the 75th anniversary of diplomatic relations between China and the Soviet Union, the Kremlin added.

Putin will also meet Chinese Prime Minister Li Qiang to discuss trade and humanitarian issues, the Kremlin said, and then visit the northeastern Chinese city of Harbin to open two bilateral trade events.

The state visit will mark the 43rd time that Putin and Xi have met. In an interview with China’s state-run Xinhua news agency on May 15, the Russian leader praised Xi as an “old friend” and said China-Russia ties have reached new heights as both countries “strengthen foreign policy coordination in the interests of building a just multipolar world order.”

Alicja Bachulska, a China policy expert at the European Council on Foreign Relations, says the timing of the visit is key, as it follows a high-profile European tour by Xi to France, Serbia, and Hungary.

“The optics suggest that the two leaders will talk about China’s key takeaways from Xi’s meetings in Europe, many of which concerned the situation in Ukraine,” she said.

Both countries serve as important geopolitical counterweights for each other in their rivalries with the United States. Moscow has stepped up military drills in the East China Sea with Beijing and U.S. intelligence officials warning in May that Russia and China are working closely together on military issues, including any potential invasion of Taiwan.

Meanwhile, amid Russia’s isolation from the West, China has displaced the European Union as Russia’s largest trading partner and become the biggest market for Russian oil and gas.

But this has also raised the risk of Russia becoming economically reliant on China, which has left it with less leverage in negotiations over its vital energy sector.

Russia is hoping China will replace Europe as the major market for its gas exports, but the two countries are yet to reach a deal on the Power of Siberia-2 pipeline, which would supply China with gas from fields previously serving European markets.

Testing A 'No Limits' Partnership

This risk of overreliance is also a factor in the flow of dual-use products from China to Russia, says Dennis Wilder, a former director for China on the U.S. National Security Council.

“Putin seems happy with what he’s getting from the Chinese defense industry,” Wilder told RFE/RL. “I don't think he feels he needs to get lethal weapons from them because he wants Russia to build these weapons. It's less costly to do it that way.”

Putin and Xi attend the signing ceremony in Shanghai in 2014 for a 30-year contract for Russia to supply China with natural gas.
Putin and Xi attend the signing ceremony in Shanghai in 2014 for a 30-year contract for Russia to supply China with natural gas.

Wilder, a research fellow at Georgetown University, says the Kremlin is hoping to sustain the flow of dual-use goods to refurbish its defense industry, which is currently looking to boost the production of weapons and ammunition as the war in Ukraine grinds into its third year.

North Korea has also supplied Russia with millions of artillery shells for the Ukraine war and transferred ballistic missiles and other weapons in exchange for food and raw materials to manufacture weapons. South Korea and the United States have since accused North Korea and Russia of trading arms in violation of UN sanctions and expressed concern that Moscow could supply Pyongyang with more advanced military technology.

While no visit has been confirmed, Putin expressed his willingness to visit North Korea in January after an invitation from leader Kim Jong Un and some experts have speculated that Putin could visit Pyongyang following his trip to China.

“The North Korea element is an important wrinkle in this relationship and I imagine it will also be discussed in Beijing,” Wilder said. “North Korea can help Russia militarily where China can’t, but this new relationship with Putin and Kim is worrisome to the Chinese as it could further destabilize things in the [Korean] Peninsula.”

Xi Jinping is leaving after showing that China’s influence in Central and Eastern Europe is still strong.
Xi Jinping is leaving after showing that China’s influence in Central and Eastern Europe is still strong.

I'm RFE/RL correspondent Reid Standish and welcome back to the China In Eurasia briefing, an RFE/RL newsletter tracking China's resurgent influence from Eastern Europe to Central Asia.

This is a special edition of the newsletter focused on Xi Jinping’s Europe trip this week, including a country-by-country breakdown on what happened during his visits to France, Serbia, and Hungary.

In a trip that had many storylines, Chinese leader Xi Jinping is heading back to Beijing after a high-profile five-day European tour with stops in France, Serbia, and Hungary that allowed Beijing to shore up its footing in Central and Eastern Europe.

Here’s why that’s important.

Finding Perspective: While Xi’s trip dealt with everything from trade ties with the European Union to China’s relationship with Russia amid the war in Ukraine, the tour can be boiled down to one overarching message from China: Xi leads a rising global superpower that can’t be contained and its influence in Europe is here to stay.

The Chinese leader received opulent red-carpet welcomes in Paris from French President Emmanuel Macron and from China-friendly leaders like Serbia’s Aleksandar Vucic in Belgrade and Hungary’s Viktor Orban in Budapest.

In France, Macron looked to hammer home some tougher European positions on Ukraine and trade subsidies -- particularly over the ongoing EU probe into Chinese electric vehicles on the European market -- while still looking to charm Xi on other issues.

Ahead of the visit, Macron had argued in public statements for Europe to establish “a more balanced” trade relationship with China, and that issue was tackled on May 6 during three-way talks with Xi and EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen.

As Theresa Fallon, director of the Center for Russia Europe Asia Studies, told me ahead of the visit, this would allow for Macron to “play good cop” and von der Leyen “to play bad cop” in dealing with Xi.

However, Xi looked effective at deflecting concerns and driving a wedge between Macron and von der Leyen by either flatly denying any problems, misrepresenting China’s position, or offering concessions that were only rhetorical.

In Belgrade and Budapest, meanwhile, Xi looked triumphant and received highly choreographed welcomes that reinforced Chinese messaging about deep divisions within Europe over how to engage with China.

Xi left both countries after announcing new strategic partnerships and investments that will further cement China’s relevance in Central and Eastern Europe.

Why It Matters: Public opinion on China across much of Europe has soured dramatically in recent years, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe.

When Xi last visited Europe in 2016, he was warmly embraced in Prague by then-Czech President Milos Zeman amid a wave of high-profile investments and visits to the Czech Republic, Serbia, and Poland.

Poland has since slowed its engagement with Beijing, and the Czech Republic, under new leadership, has become one of Europe’s more hawkish governments on China. Only Serbia has continued to deepen its ties out of that 2016 grouping.

While that marked a notable step back in the region, along with the irrelevance of the 14+1 Chinese format for engaging with Central and Eastern Europe, this recent visit shows that China can’t be blocked and that Beijing has plenty of new cards to play in its broader relations with Europe.

Reflecting this Chinese view, Renmin University Professor Wang Wen wrote in a recent column that the strategic scales look set to tilt in China’s favor because “Europe is eager for economic recovery more than ever.”

“Europe is having a rethink: After losing Russia, it can't afford to lose China, too,” Wang wrote.

Three More Stories From Xi's Visit

1. France: Wining And Dining Can Only Go So Far

Macron, who has sought to develop Europe as a strategically autonomous military and economic power, tackled a host of issues with Xi, but was hoping that this independent line could shine through when discussing the war in Ukraine.

What It Means: During joint statements to the press, Xi announced that he backed Macron’s call for an “Olympics truce,” which the French president saw as an opportunity to “work toward a sustainable resolution [of conflicts] in the full respect of international law.”

The comments and behind the scenes talks reportedly left some in Macron’s circle cautiously upbeat that Xi could be receptive to curtailing some of China’s backing for Russia amid the war in Ukraine.

But Xi also conceded very little, at least publicly.

He reiterated that China will not deliver weapons to Russia and would “strictly control” exports of dual-use equipment, both of which are positions that his government has already vowed to enforce.

Xi also made no acknowledgement of Western concerns that China is helping to keep the Russian economy running by giving it access to goods sanctioned by the West, and he then accused Washington and other Western countries of hypocrisy by fueling the conflict through weapons deliveries to Ukraine.

“We oppose using the Ukraine crisis to cast blame, smear a third country, and incite a new Cold War,” Xi said on May 6.

While some French officials may have walked away with some glimmers of hope, that assessment is not widely shared. As I reported ahead of Xi’s visit, EU officials said that China was looking to bargain its participation this summer in a peace conference on Ukraine as a way to pave “the way for Moscow's participation in similar meetings in the future,” one official told RFE/RL.

Xi’s true stance is also borne out in Russia and on the battlefield in Ukraine. A U.S. intelligence assessment said that, in 2023, about 90 percent of Russia’s microelectronics came from China, which Russia has used to make missiles, tanks, and aircraft. The same research said that nearly 70 percent of Russia’s approximately $900 million in machine tool imports in the last quarter of 2023 came from China.

2. Serbia: Reverence, Shared Grievance, And A Dose of Caution

Greeted by cheering crowds, Xi and Vucic praised their countries’ “ironclad friendship” with one another, as they signed 28 new cooperation agreements and announced a new deal that would “deepen and elevate the comprehensive strategic partnership between China and Serbia.”

The Details: The visit to Serbia touched on both substance and symbolism.

Serbia under Vucic has remained solidly pro-Chinese and still looks to China for billions of dollars in investment, something that Vuk Vuksanovic, a senior researcher at the Belgrade Center for Security Policy, told RFE/RL’s Balkan Service has turned Beijing into Serbia’s “most important partner in the East at the moment,” even surpassing Moscow now that “Russian-Serbian ties are under constant scrutiny because of Ukraine.”

The elevated strategic partnership reflects that trend, as does a new free-trade agreement signed before the visit that Vucic said would allow Serbia to export 95 percent of its goods duty-free to China.

Belgrade and Beijing also signed 28 documents that would continue to deepen their ties. While most of the agreements were vague and did not have dollar figures attached, they covered a range of issues, from ministerial exchanges to state media agreements, that chart a course for a larger Chinese role in the Balkan country.

When it came to the symbolism of the visit, Xi arrived on the 25th anniversary of NATO’s accidental 1999 bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade. In an article published on May 7 by Politika, a Serbian newspaper, Xi said that “NATO flagrantly bombed the Chinese Embassy,” which “will stay in the shared memory of the Chinese and Serbian peoples.”

But Xi also decided to skip the former embassy site during his visit, which is now a large Chinese cultural center that also includes a memorial for the bombing.

While the Chinese Foreign Ministry used the occasion to criticize NATO, the move shows a cautious approach from Xi when it comes to exciting anti-Western bombast at home and abroad, where it could have overshadowed other aspects of his visit.

3. Hungary: A Risky Gamble That's Paying Off

Xi finished his Europe trip with a stop in another friendly nation, touching down on May 8 in Budapest, where he inked new investments and elevated Hungary’s relationship with China to new heights.

What You Need To Know: Xi’s visit marks a capstone for Orban’s embrace of China that positions Hungary as a bridgehead for Chinese influence in Central and Eastern Europe.

In an article in Magyar Nemzet, which is controlled by Orban’s governing Fidesz party, Xi called for Hungary to “lead” the region’s relations with Beijing and said that China wanted to work closely with Budapest on Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects. The Chinese leader also promised to “speed up” construction of a high-speed train line between Budapest and Belgrade that has been delayed for years.

During the visit, Xi and Orban also pledged to elevate their ties to an “all-weather comprehensive strategic partnership” -- a Chinese classification that denotes the highest possible type of relationship that Beijing can have with another country. Only Belarus, Pakistan, and Uzbekistan are labeled as “all-weather” partners.

The move is sure to further strain Hungary’s already fraught relationship with Brussels, as will the 18 joint projects with China that were announced by Hungarian Foreign Minister Peter Szijjarto.

While the announcement of the deals lacked details, they would include a high-speed rail project to Budapest’s international airport from the city and a new rail line across the country to transport electric cars, batteries, and other products from Chinese factories planned to be built in eastern Hungary. Budapest and Beijing also vowed to cooperate on nuclear energy projects.

The focus on electric vehicles is noteworthy as Hungary is looking to Chinese investment to establish itself as Europe’s premier manufacturing hub for electric vehicles, batteries, and other new technologies.

China’s electric vehicle giant BYD announced in December that it would build an assembly plant in Hungary, its first production facility in Europe. Great Wall Motor, another major Chinese electric vehicle maker, is also looking into building an even bigger factory in Hungary.

More From Xi’s Europe Trip

Taiwan and Kosovo: During his shared remarks with Xi, Vucic used the occasion to tie Serbia’s territorial claims with Kosovo to Beijing’s own claims over Taiwan.

“Just as we have clear positions on the issue of Chinese integrity -- that Taiwan is China -- so they support the territory of Serbia without any reservation,” Vucic said. Xi later said that China “supports Serbia’s efforts to preserve its territorial integrity regarding Kosovo.”

The Next Issue: Ahead of Xi’s visit and amid a slew of Chinese espionage and trade scandals in Europe, my colleagues and I looked at the spread of Chinese-made surveillance cameras from Dahua and Hikvision, two partially Chinese state-owned companies, across Central and Eastern Europe.

An RFE/RL survey of nine countries in the region shows that governments have purchased millions of cameras over the last five years, despite the devices’ security vulnerabilities and the manufacturers’ lax data practices.

No Presser: After their talks on May 9, Xi and Orban held what was billed as a news conference, but was instead just both leaders reading statements without taking any questions.

Xi famously avoids any unscripted media encounters. MTVA, a state-owned and financed Hungarian channel, had the exclusive broadcast rights to Xi’s visit, and my colleagues in RFE/RL’s Hungarian Service were not granted accreditation from the Hungarian prime minister’s office to attend.

Prime Time: As Xi arrived at Belgrade's airport on May 7, Serbia’s state-owned television station even interrupted a broadcast of the Eurovision Song Contest to make way for coverage of the welcoming ceremony for the Chinese leader.

One Thing To Watch

Now that Xi’s big Europe trip is a wrap, attention will turn to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s upcoming visit to China. The dates for the Russian leader’s trip have not yet been confirmed, but Bloomberg quoted Kremlin sources saying that it would take place May 15-16.

That’s all from me for now. Don’t forget to send me any questions, comments, or tips that you might have.

Until next time,

Reid Standish

If you enjoyed this briefing and don't want to miss the next edition, subscribe here. It will be sent to your inbox every other Wednesday.

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About The Newsletter

In recent years, it has become impossible to tell the biggest stories shaping Eurasia without considering China’s resurgent influence in local business, politics, security, and culture.

Subscribe to this weekly dispatch in which correspondent Reid Standish builds on the local reporting from RFE/RL’s journalists across Eurasia to give you unique insights into Beijing’s ambitions and challenges.

To subscribe, click here.

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