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China In Eurasia

Chinese President Xi Jinping (right) speaks with Russian President Vladimir Putin via video conference on June 28, 2021.
Chinese President Xi Jinping (right) speaks with Russian President Vladimir Putin via video conference on June 28, 2021.

As NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg warned Beijing at a March 23 press conference not to aid Russia in the Ukraine war, a batch of e-mails believed to be sent by Chinese state-sponsored hackers landed in the inboxes of researchers and engineers at several Russian military-development institutes.

The e-mails all carried the same headline purporting to contain Russian names on a U.S. sanctions list over Moscow’s war in Ukraine, but according to a recent report by the Israeli-American cybersecurity firm Check Point, they were part of a multiyear Chinese spy operation against Russia that actually contained documents that installed malware on the sensitive networks after being opened.

Taken together, the two events on the same day in March exemplify the increasingly complex relations between the two countries as they build solidarity over their antagonism toward the United States while simultaneously being tested by the political and economic fallout from Russia’s February 24 invasion.

After three months of war in Ukraine, Beijing still refuses to condemn Moscow's actions and Chinese President Xi Jinping is among the few world leaders yet to have direct talks with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy. China has also continued to speak out against Western sanctions targeting Russia and has begun ramping up purchases of Russian oil at bargain prices, helping to fill the vacuum left by Western buyers that backed away from the market following the start of the war.

“Now that the West has taken a ‘dictator's position’ [against Russia], our economic ties with China will grow even faster,” Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said on May 23.

But despite drawing closer in many respects -- a fact laid bare by a February 4 announcement by Xi and Russian President Vladimir Putin in which they heralded a new era of “no-limits” partnership -- distrust, criticism, and a quiet rivalry remain part of the two countries’ complicated ties.

“The so-called revitalization of Russia under Putin's reign is based on a false premise,” said Gao Yusheng, who served as China's ambassador to Ukraine from 2005 to 2007. “Russia's decline is evident in all areas...and has had a significant negative impact on the Russian military and its combat capabilities.”

Veiled Critiques

Gao’s comments came at a Beijing seminar in April that was later published by Phoenix News Media, a partially state-owned Chinese television network, as a transcript on May 10.

“The Russian military’s economic and financial strength, which are not commensurate with its status as a so-called military superpower, could not support a high-tech war,” Gao said. “The Russian Army’s poverty-driven defeat was evident.”

The article was taken down within hours of being posted, but the public criticism by Gao is part of a growing number of Chinese analysts and former officials who have voiced skepticism about Moscow's motives for invading and its future as a partner given the military failures it has suffered in Ukraine.

“I still don't see how any country would have dared to invade the world's [number] 2 military power,” Gong Fangbin, a military strategist and retired professor at China’s People's Liberation Army (PLA) National Defense University, wrote in a recent article on WeChat. “Russia has shown the world time and again that no one dares touch an inch of its land.”

The article by Gong was also censored, but it points toward growing frustration among Chinese experts and scholars with Moscow’s argument that it's being cornered by NATO, a claim it has used to rationalize the invasion of Ukraine.

A TV shows news about Russia's invasion of Ukraine at a shopping mall in Hangzhou, in eastern China, on February 25.
A TV shows news about Russia's invasion of Ukraine at a shopping mall in Hangzhou, in eastern China, on February 25.

While such commentators are still blaming Washington for the conflict, they highlight a growing vein of criticism of Russia’s actions that first appeared in early March when Hu Wei, vice chairman of the Public Policy Research Center, which sits under an advisory agency to China’s state council, called on Beijing to distance itself from Russia as soon as possible over its war in Ukraine.

As the nature of the war in Ukraine has continued to evolve, Beijing has become increasingly cautious in dealing with Moscow. Chinese companies and the government have not sent economic or military aid to Russia and Chinese brokers have been careful to avoid secondary sanctions in dealing with the Russian economy.

Elsewhere, Chinese diplomats have looked to portray themselves as neutral in the Ukraine war and gone into damage control to avoid reputational blowback.

“Russia's war with Ukraine, no matter how reasonable in responding to NATO’s expansion, cannot be said to be legitimate,” Zhou Bo, a retired senior PLA officer, said on May 9 at an event hosted by an Indian think tank in Delhi. “Both [India and China] have suffered a bit in terms of our credibility and reputation because we refuse to overtly condemn Russia.”

Below The Surface

While Beijing shows no signs of dropping Russia as a partner, the Ukraine war has strained how many Chinese policymakers and thinkers view the country’s future trajectory.

“We have a fundamental difference in our overlooks and outlooks regarding an international order,” said Zhou, who added that Russia’s growing isolation will lead to its export-dependent economy coming under increasing strain.

This could mask a growing imbalance between the two countries, as they remain together in their shared desire to push back against U.S. influence around the world, but increasingly divergent in their abilities to do so.

Chinese tanks roll about 250 kilometers southeast of the Russian city of Chita during the Vostok 2018 military exercises in September 2018.
Chinese tanks roll about 250 kilometers southeast of the Russian city of Chita during the Vostok 2018 military exercises in September 2018.

Given the Chinese espionage operation, which according to Check Point began as early as July 2021, Beijing wants access to Russian military technology and secrets, something that China is believed to have been targeting for decades.

Despite the war, military cooperation is also still under way. China and Russia held their first joint military exercise since Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine on May 24, with both countries sending out nuclear-capable bombers over areas of northeast Asia in a display of force while U.S. President Joe Biden visited the region.

Still, the Ukraine war has damaged Russia’s image in the eyes of a growing array of Chinese analysts.

“So, apart from the largest nuclear arsenal, how important [will] Russia be 20 years from now?” Zhou said.

Demonstrators march on May 13 in Geneva outside UN headquarters over what they say is a lack of attention to the persecution of Uyghurs and other groups in China by UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet.
Demonstrators march on May 13 in Geneva outside UN headquarters over what they say is a lack of attention to the persecution of Uyghurs and other groups in China by UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet.

Michelle Bachelet, the UN high commissioner for human rights, has begun a six-day trip to China amid warnings from rights groups and some Western governments that her visit could whitewash Beijing’s human rights abuses in China’s northwestern Xinjiang region.

The tour starts in the southern city of Guangzhou and will include visits to the Xinjiang cities of Kashgar and Urumqi, the regional capital. While the trip is set to focus on China’s human rights record and include issues such as Beijing’s crackdown on Hong Kong and its policies in Tibet and Inner Mongolia, the Chinese Communist Party’s internment-camp system and sweeping dragnet against its Muslim population in Xinjiang will dominate the agenda.

The arrival of Bachelet marks the first formal visit to China by a UN high commissioner for human rights since 2005 and comes after years of discussions with Beijing to arrange it. Few details are known about the visit and what Bachelet will do and hopes to achieve in the visit, which has prompted protest and backlash that China could look to use the trip to blunt outside scrutiny and criticism of its human rights record.

Such concerns were raised by the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China (IPAC) -- an international cross-party group of legislators -- which in a May 20 statement signed by more than 40 lawmakers from 18 countries accused Beijing of organizing a “Potemkin-style tour” that could damage the credibility of Bachelet’s office.

China has locked up more than 1 million Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and other Muslim minorities in a series of detention centers in Xinjiang, a sprawling region that borders Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. Beijing is accused of grave rights abuses there, including a vast system designed to eliminate those groups’ distinct cultural identities.

“It defies credibility that the Chinese government will allow the high commissioner to see anything they don’t want her to see, or allow human rights defenders, victims, and their families to speak to her safely, unsupervised, and without fear of reprisal,” Sophie Richardson, China director at Human Rights Watch, said in a statement.

“Bachelet’s legacy as high commissioner will be measured by her willingness to hold a powerful state accountable for crimes against humanity committed on her watch,” the statement added.

Mounting Concerns

The overriding concern for rights groups, Uyghur activists, and Western officials is that Bachelet, the UN’s top rights official who previously served as Chilean president, will be denied the type of unimpeded access necessary for her office to properly probe the allegations and mounting evidence about Chinese government abuses in Xinjiang and beyond.

The UN’s Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) has been negotiating with Beijing since 2018 for “unfettered, meaningful access” to Xinjiang. A five-person advance group from Bachelet’s team arrived in China on April 25 to prepare for the visit that her office said will include meeting with a wide range of civil society representatives.

Foreign journalists take photos and record videos outside a location in China's Xinjiang region that was identified in early 2020 as a "reeducation" facility.
Foreign journalists take photos and record videos outside a location in China's Xinjiang region that was identified in early 2020 as a "reeducation" facility.

But China’s sensitivity to criticism, its record of reprisals against activists, and its pervasive surveillance capabilities have left many doubting that such criteria can be met.

“We're deeply concerned about the upcoming visit,” U.S. State Department spokesman Ned Price said in a May 20 press briefing, adding that the United States had “no expectation that the [Chinese government] will grant the necessary access required to conduct a complete, unmanipulated assessment of the human rights environment in Xinjiang.”

In anticipation of the visit, Radio Free Asia reported that officials in Xinjiang were warning Uyghurs not to speak with foreigners and that police in Kashgar were being sent to “political study sessions” to prepare for the UN trip.

UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet (file photo)
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet (file photo)

On May 26, the first day of her trip, Bachelet conducted virtual meetings with the heads of around 70 diplomatic missions in China and according to Bloomberg, the UN official aimed to lower expectations about her visit on the call, with several diplomats also expressing “profound concerns” about attempts by Beijing to manipulate the trip.

Chinese officials have repeatedly stated on multiple occasions that Bachelet’s visit should not be turned into a “so-called investigation” and have said that they would only welcome a “friendly visit.”

The OHCHR is also set to release a report that it has been working on for more than three years that is based on interviews with camp survivors, consultations with leading scholars, and mounting open-source evidence, such as satellite images and leaked Chinese government documents.

Eager to see the report’s findings, hundreds of rights groups around the world have for months urged Bachelet to release the document, but it remains unpublished and there are worries the current trip could be used to mask those findings.

“It’s time for the UN to officially recognize the brave public testimony of survivors, thousands of pages of leaked Chinese government documents, meticulous peer-reviewed research, and hundreds of damning satellite images of concentration camps,” Omer Kanat, executive director of the Uyghur Human Rights Project, wrote in an article for The Diplomat. “The trip will be nothing more than a propaganda exercise.”

Beijing’s Global Campaign

China has dismissed the allegations and accounts of its actions in Xinjiang as politically motivated lies, saying that its so-called “reeducation camps” in Xinjiang have been necessary to curb extremism in a region that it considers a hotbed of ethnic and religious tensions.

In the face of growing international scrutiny about its policies -- the United States and several Western parliaments have declared that Beijing’s actions amount to genocide and crimes against humanity -- Beijing has looked to use its rising political and economic influence to deflect criticism and gain support from some governments.

Police officers patrol the old city in Kashgar in China's Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.
Police officers patrol the old city in Kashgar in China's Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.

Beijing has hosted tours of Xinjiang with diplomats and officials from countries with China-friendly policies, such as Sudan and Tajikistan, where they have then praised Chinese policies in state and local media.

This influence has also extended to international organizations like the UN, where Beijing has pushed and persuaded many developing countries to support or abstain from voting on measures censoring China, leaving only a core group of largely Western nations willing to challenge Chinese policies.

When Ukraine joined more than 40 countries at the UN Human Rights Council in calling for “unfettered access” to Xinjiang in June 2021, RFE/RL and the Associated Press reported that Beijing threatened to limit trade and withhold access to COVID-19 vaccines to force Kyiv to remove its name from the statement.

China’s policies in Xinjiang have also deeply impacted its neighbors, especially in Central Asia.

Kazakhstan, for example, became an unexpected flashpoint of activism following the expansions of Beijing's camp system in 2017 and 2018 due to family connections between Kazakhs and Xinjiang’s ethnic Kazakh minority, with several former detainees publishing testimonies after fleeing China for the Central Asian country.

Meanwhile, Tajikistan is the subject of a filing by Uyghur organizations to the International Criminal Court (ICC) alleging that the Central Asian government has allowed Chinese officials to operate on its territory in order to deport Uyghurs back to China to try and coerce them into becoming informants.

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About The Newsletter

China In Eurasia
Reid Standish

In recent years, it has become impossible to tell the biggest stories shaping Eurasia without considering China’s resurgent influence in local business, politics, security, and culture.

Subscribe to this biweekly dispatch in which correspondent Reid Standish builds on the local reporting from RFE/RL’s journalists across Eurasia to give you unique insights into Beijing’s ambitions and challenges.

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