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China In Eurasia

Czech President Milos Zeman (left), Chinese President Xi Jinping (center), and Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev (right) pose at the China International Import Expo in Shanghai.
Czech President Milos Zeman (left), Chinese President Xi Jinping (center), and Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev (right) pose at the China International Import Expo in Shanghai.

Welcome back to the China In Eurasia briefing, an RFE/RL newsletter tracking China’s resurgent influence from Eastern Europe to Central Asia.

I’m RFE/RL correspondent Reid Stanadish and here’s what I’m following right now.

Where Chinese Influence Is Rising And Falling

In another sign of the changing mood toward China across Europe, the Czech Republic is considering an exit from China’s “16+1” investment platform for Central and Eastern Europe.

Finding Perspective: A resolution calling for the country to quit the body has been passed by a parliamentary committee to the Czech foreign ministry and government and will then decide on whether to leave.

Launched in 2012 to include China and 16 European countries, the Chinese-led format was designed as a way to secure greater political and economic influence for Beijing and came to represent a prevailing view at the time that tighter ties with China could lead to a wave of investment and trade in former Communist Europe.

Czech President Milos Zeman helped champion this push to pull Prague closer to Beijing and even gave a lavish red-carpet welcome for Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2016. But a series of controversies over the years and a lack of investment into the region have seen the once-optimistic view in the Czech Republic and elsewhere shift.

The platform itself had even taken Greece as a member in 2019 to make it the “17+1.” But that proved to be the high-water mark for the bloc. Lithuania left in 2021 amid a diplomatic spat with Beijing, and many capitals in the region, including Prague, have begun to build up stronger ties with Taiwan in the past few years, which has further strained relations with China.

That reorientation has accelerated since Czech Prime Minister Petr Fiala’s center-right government came to power in November 2021 and pledged to reaffirm Prague’s EU and NATO ties.

China’s pro-Russian positions amid the Ukraine war have also contributed to the souring mood toward Beijing and will be in focus as the Czech Republic takes up the EU presidency on July 1.

Why It Matters: Public opinion toward China is diverging across the world as tensions rise among big powers.

In Europe, surveys show that unfavorable views about the Chinese government have steadily risen since the beginning of the pandemic in 2020, while in Central Asia -- where Beijing has invested heavily and plays a large role in the region -- polls also show a steady decrease in favorable views.

Across Africa, meanwhile, Chinese investments appear to have paved a way to greater influence, despite multiple controversies.

According to a new poll conducted by the Ichikowitz Family Foundation, 76 percent of 4,507 young Africans across 15 countries who were surveyed named China as a foreign power with a positive influence on their lives, compared with 72 percent for the United States.

Read More

● The Czech Republic could tailor its EU presidency to further focus on China. Filip Sebok, a research fellow at the Association for International Affairs in Prague, unpacks what that could look like.

Expert Corner: The European Parliament Turns to Xinjiang

Readers asked: “The European Parliament voted last week to call China's treatment of Uyghurs and other groups 'crimes against humanity and serious risk of genocide.' How significant is it, and what does it mean moving forward?”

To find out more, I asked Rikard Jozwiak, Europe editor at RFE/RL:

“It is worth stating right off the bat that the European Parliament is a foreign-policy pygmy and any resolution it passes in this field is non-binding on the powerful European Commission and the 27 EU member states. So, in that sense, there isn’t much political significance other than the purely symbolic.

“Nonetheless, there can be developments further down the road. Since MEPs really don’t have too much diplomatic skin in the game to begin with, it allows them to pass a much more outspoken text -- and this is where Chinese sensitivities come into play. Could it create a backlash from Beijing where more MEPs are sanctioned? In one way, the EP would relish such a recognition, and in return, one can probably conclude that the chamber will never give its consent to the currently frozen EU-China Comprehensive Agreement trade pact.

“The EP is also known for playing a ‘soothsaying’ role, where it often passes resolutions that seem fanciful at the time but then get implemented by the entire bloc a few years down the road as politics evolve. So, while I caution not to read too much into this for now, this isn’t the end of the road for this issue, either.”

Do you have a question about China’s growing footprint in Eurasia? Send it to me at StandishR@rferl.org or reply directly to this e-mail and I’ll get it answered by leading experts and policymakers.

Three More Stories From Eurasia

1. New Opportunities

As Central Asian governments look to limit their reliance on Russia and grapple with the fallout from economic sanctions that the Kremlin's war has brought to the region, China is seeing new opportunities to expand its ties, as I reported here.

The Details: Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi wrapped up a visit to Kazakhstan on June 7 and the third annual China + Central Asia foreign ministers' meeting in Nur-Sultan on June 8.

At both gatherings, Wang expressed concern about the spillover effects from the Ukraine war and took veiled aim at the United States by urging Central Asian governments to stay out of geopolitical conflicts.

For Beijing, the uptick in activity is a chance to reaffirm its influence in the region, where it has become a type of reluctant hegemon.

Central Asian countries, meanwhile, are hoping that Chinese investment and trade can help plug the hole being left by global economic fallout from the Ukraine war, although there are major questions about how much more Beijing is willing to pour into the region.

It’s for those reasons that local governments are also trying to build up trade ties with other countries, especially Turkey, which has been on a renewed push in Central Asia since the war began.

2. Orban And Hungary’s Chinese Campus

More than a year after thousands of protesters took to Budapest to demonstrate against plans to use taxpayer money to build a $1.8 billion Chinese university in Hungary, Prime Minister Viktor Orban’s government is sidelining the opposition and clearing a path for the controversial project, my colleague Akos Keller-Alant from RFE/RL’s Hungarian Service and I reported.

What It Means: The 2021 protests signaled a mounting public backlash against plans to host Shanghai's prestigious Fudan University in the capital and led to pledges from the government to hold a referendum on the issue.

But since Orban’s resounding April election win, his government is backtracking on that promise, with the Constitutional Court -- which is said to be stacked by Orban loyalists -- ruling on May 18 that the referendum was unconstitutional as it concerns an international agreement between Hungary and China.

The decision is part of a wider set of moves by the nationalist Orban that analysts say is designed to consolidate his hold on power and use the court to sideline the political opposition while clearing the way for the Chinese project in the process.

3. Montenegro’s Long Road

After eight years of delays, a highway project in Montenegro paid for by a massive $1 billion Chinese loan is nearing completion, but it still faces lingering questions about its future, my colleague Predrag Tomovic from RFE/RL’s Balkan Service and I reported.

What You Need To Know: Once hailed by China as a landmark deal within the Belt and Road Initiative, the highway has since become a cautionary tale that fused together the perils of poor-quality Chinese construction and cursory lending practices with endemic local corruption concerns in the Balkan country.

But that long chapter looks set to close, with Montenegrin Prime Minister Dritan Abazovic announcing in May that the first 41-kilometer section of the highway would open this summer.

The remaining 122 kilometers of the originally planned road are still unbuilt and its future uncertain. At the moment, the initial stretch of road fades out into the middle of a large, forested area, and no funds are currently available to continue building the remaining portion.

Across The Supercontinent

Shopping Spree: Russia earned $96.8 billion from fossil-fuel exports during the first 100 days of its war in Ukraine, according to a new report from the Center for Research on Energy and Clean Air.

While the EU comprises 61 percent of exported fossil fuels, China overtook Germany as the biggest single-country buyer of Russian energy.

The Movable Picket: During Wang’s trip to Kazakhstan, protesters gathered outside the Chinese Embassy in the Kazakh capital, Nur-Sultan, demanding the release of relatives they say are held in camps in Xinjiang, my colleague Saniash Toiken from RFE/RL’s Kazakh Service reported.

Beyond Putin and Xi: Despite drawing closer in many respects, distrust, criticism, and a quiet rivalry remain part of China and Russia’s complicated ties.

I reported on a recent Chinese hacking campaign targeting Russian military-development institutes and what it means for Beijing and Moscow’s relationship moving forward.

A Warning: Just Finance International, an NGO focused on the environment and human rights, published a report on June 13 detailing how a “weakening of law and transparency in Serbia has provided loopholes for large-scale infrastructure investments, including from China.”

One Thing To Watch

The geopolitical ripple effects from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine are being felt across Asia and were on display at Singapore’s Shangri-La Dialogue that gathered 40 countries.

Speaking one day before an address by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy that generated some controversy to its illusions to Taiwan, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida said the Ukraine war should be a wake-up call for East Asia.

While he did not mention Beijing explicitly, China’s military buildup in the Pacific, as well as provocations from North Korea and growing cooperation in the region between Beijing and Moscow, all loomed behind Kishida’s comments.

That’s all from me for now. Don’t forget to send me any questions, comments, or tips that you might have.

Until next time,

Reid Standish

If you enjoyed this briefing and don't want to miss the next edition, subscribe here. It will be sent to your in-box on the first and third Wednesdays of each month.

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi meets the foreign ministers of the five Central Asian countries in Kazakhstan on June 8.
Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi meets the foreign ministers of the five Central Asian countries in Kazakhstan on June 8.

Since Moscow's February invasion of Ukraine, Central Asian governments have sought to limit their reliance on Russia and grapple with the economic fallout from economic sanctions that the Kremlin's war has brought to their region.

For China and Turkey -- two powers with long-standing ties to Central Asia of different magnitudes -- this has opened the door to new opportunities as the region's leaders reassess their balancing acts between various world powers.

Turkey recently expanded its footprint in Central Asia, signing trade and defense agreements, stepping up arms sales, and President Recep Tayyip Erdogan conducting high-profile meetings with his counterparts in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.

China, meanwhile, has continued to follow the course it set out decades ago by pursuing its security interests in the region and ensuring access to energy exports and valuable minerals. It has also stepped up its diplomatic engagement and hardened its rhetoric.

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi wrapped up a visit to Kazakhstan on June 7 and the third annual China + Central Asia foreign ministers' meeting in Nur-Sultan on June 8, where he "expressed deep concern about the serious spillover impact of the Ukraine crisis," urged Central Asian governments to stay out of geopolitical conflicts, and reaffirmed Beijing's economic interests in the region.

"There's a noticeable increase of activity both from Turkey and China in Central Asia [since the war started]," Erica Marat of the National Defense University in Washington told RFE/RL. "Both countries see an opportunity to expand their own presence in the region."

The interest in strong ties is also mutual, she adds.

Chinese President Xi Jinping and the Central Asian presidents during a virtual summit to mark 30 years of relations on January 25.
Chinese President Xi Jinping and the Central Asian presidents during a virtual summit to mark 30 years of relations on January 25.

The Kremlin still wields strong influence over Central Asian capitals and governments have been careful not to criticize Russia, but they've also moved to distance themselves and are eager to find alternative partners to Moscow, especially as they face a dimming regional economic forecast and key political transitions.

In March, Serdar Berdymukhammedov, son of longtime autocratic Turkmen leader Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov, took office as president.

And Kazakhstan voted in a June 5 constitutional referendum that will reduce the powers of the presidency and strip former President Nursultan Nazarbaev of his remaining influence. The amendments came after violent unrest in January and a shadowy political struggle behind the scenes between current President Qasym-Zhomart Toqaev and Nazarbaev.

Toqaev says the changes are meant to limit future nepotism by barring the president's relatives from holding government positions, although critics say the new constitution won't alter the nature of Kazakhstan's authoritarian system.

"Russia doesn't have the capacity to follow through on all the initiatives it has brought to Central Asia over the years, so while [Moscow] is looking elsewhere, other states are trying to take advantage of it," Luca Anceschi, a Eurasian studies professor at the University of Glasgow, told RFE/RL. "But for Central Asia, it's about the domestic context. They want to limit and contain any fallout from the war."

The New Business As Usual

Despite Wang's calls to keep geopolitics out of the region during his visit this week, the Chinese official took veiled aim at the United States in the readout from his meeting with Toqaev, which happened shortly after a late May tour of Central Asia by U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs Donald Lu.

"China hopes that Central Asian countries will stand firm, eliminate interference, strengthen coordination, cooperate in good faith, and safeguard regional peace and stability," the Chinese statement said. "China has never sought geopolitical interests in Central Asia, and never allows nonregional forces to stir up trouble in the region."

Wang was referring to Washington -- already a target before the Ukraine war -- but the acrimony has grown as China has sought to shift blame for any economic pain felt inside Central Asia on the United States and the West for imposing sanctions against Russia.

The Kazakh readout of the meeting between Toqaev and Wang did not include the Chinese foreign minister's warning about geopolitics, instead focusing on Chinese President Xi Jinping's backing of Toqaev's political agenda at home and his plan to visit Kazakhstan in the fall.

The summit with all five Central Asian foreign ministers ended with mostly boilerplate statements of cooperation and deepening trade ties, with local governments using the talks to call for improved transport links, including a long-discussed railroad project linking China with Uzbekistan through Kyrgyzstan making it into the final readout.

While Chinese engagement has deepened in recent years and continues to accelerate, there are still lingering questions from regional observers about how entwined Beijing wants to become in Central Asia and whether China can be the economic engine for the region that local governments have hoped.

"I don't know if the war has changed how the region is seen by Beijing," Anceschi said. "I'm also not sure if China wants any more of a footprint in Central Asia than it already has."

A Push From Ankara

Amid the regional reshuffle and Russia's changing financial fortunes, Turkey has made a renewed push into Central Asia.

Kazakh President Qasym-Zhomart Toqaev (center) meets with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Ankara during a state visit in May.
Kazakh President Qasym-Zhomart Toqaev (center) meets with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Ankara during a state visit in May.

In March, Erdogan wrapped up a two-day trip to Uzbekistan and left with 10 agreements and a pledge with Tashkent to increase their annual bilateral trade volume to $10 billion. A similar figure emerged from Toqaev's May 10 state visit to Turkey, which both Ankara and Nur-Sultan heralded as a new era of ties.

"The Russian invasion of Ukraine has served as yet another impetus" for Turkish engagement in Central Asia, Emil Avdaliani, from the European University in Tbilisi and director of Middle East studies at the Georgian think tank Geocase, told RFE/RL.

Turkey has had a long-standing presence in Central Asia, but it has developed unevenly since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, with Ankara generally struggling to make significant gains for influence. But Turkish hard power -- particularly its drones that gave Azerbaijan a decisive advantage in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war and are now being deployed by Ukrainian forces -- has helped boost its image.

Turkmenistan is a longtime client for Turkish arms, especially the Bayraktar TB2 drones, and Kyrgyzstan also bought its own in 2021 following a border conflict with Tajikistan.

But perhaps the greatest opportunity that Central Asia and Turkey provide for each other is on trade.

Avdaliani says Ankara still faces limits in the size of its economy and the resources available to it when compared to Russia, China, or the United States, but that a larger Turkish role is currently welcomed in the region and is well-placed to fill part of the void left by Russia following the Ukraine invasion.

In particular, Turkey is looking to position itself as a viable alternative to Russia's role along China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which ferries goods from western China through Central Asia and Russia to European markets.

With sanctions against Russia now cutting off that route, Turkey could become a convenient way to bypass Russia.

"The Central Asian states, and Kazakhstan in particular, are seeking greater Turkish engagement because of changes in connectivity patterns across Eurasia," Avdaliani said.

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About The Newsletter

In recent years, it has become impossible to tell the biggest stories shaping Eurasia without considering China’s resurgent influence in local business, politics, security, and culture.

Subscribe to this weekly dispatch in which correspondent Reid Standish builds on the local reporting from RFE/RL’s journalists across Eurasia to give you unique insights into Beijing’s ambitions and challenges.

To subscribe, click here.

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