Wider Europe

Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods. To subscribe, please click here.

I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I'm drilling down on two major issues: the content of the EU's ninth sanctions package on Russia and the future of the EU's Eastern Partnership program.

Brief #1: The EU's Ninth Russia Sanctions Package: Who Is Being Targeted And How Strong Is It?

What You Need To Know: The European Union this week is set to agree on its ninth sanctions package on Russia since the invasion of Ukraine in late February. The new package, presented by the European Commission to EU member states' ambassadors on December 7, will reportedly target media outlets, people close to the Kremlin, and about 2 billion euros ($2.1 billion) worth of EU-Russia trade.

There is hope that it will be finalized when EU foreign ministers gather in Brussels for their monthly meeting on December 12. EU member states have already debated the sanction texts three times and, while Hungary has voiced skepticism about the role of sanctions in helping to end the war, Budapest will likely give the thumbs-up eventually, as the new measures don't target the Russian energy sector.

Deep Background: In truth, this package is rather weak. EU diplomats I've spoken to say that it appears that Brussels has run out of ideas and is now largely focusing on the nitty-gritty of closing loopholes from previous rounds.

One of those loopholes will be a prohibition on Bulgaria -- starting February 5, 2023 -- from transferring or selling petroleum products that are processed from Russian crude oil to other EU member states. It isn't clear if Bulgaria will be OK with this.

Perhaps the biggest economic sanction in this ninth round will be a proposed prohibition on new EU investments in the Russian mining sector. But, as always, there are exemptions. Quite a few minerals are excluded from the ban, such as aluminum, iron ore, nickel, and copper -- making the measure much weaker in reality.

Drilling Down

• In the new measures, about 200 Russian people and entities are set to have their assets frozen and be banned from entering the EU. It is a big and eclectic mix of people: parliamentary deputies, including the first woman in space, Valentina Tereshkova; an assortment of governors and media personalities; members of the family of Chechen strongman Ramzan Kadyrov; and people who, according to the EU, are responsible for the "illegal transportation of Ukrainian children to Russia and their adoption by Russian families."
• Among the entities listed, there are also various paramilitary and white supremacist outfits linked to the already sanctioned Vagner group of military mercenaries currently fighting in Ukraine. The armed forces of Russia are also targeted, including the national guard, the navy, land and airborne forces, and the military intelligence agency (GRU). Banks such as the Russian Regional Development Bank, the Credit Bank of Moscow, and Dalnevostochny Bank are included, as well as political parties such as the Kremlin-loyal United Russia party, the Communist Party, and the Kremlin-friendly A Just Russia and Liberal Democratic Party of Russia.
• More Russian media companies might also be hit by the new sanctions. The EU has already banned outfits such as RT and Sputnik, but is now targeting NTV Mir, Rossia-1, REN-TV, Pervyi Kanal, and Roskomnadzor, the Russian state agency responsible for overseeing media. The draft legal text introducing these sanctions, which has been seen by RFE/RL, notes that these Russian media outlets "are essential and instrumental in bringing forward and supporting the aggression against Ukraine, and for the destabilization of its neighboring countries" and that such actions also pose "a significant and direct threat to the [European] Union's public order and security."
• This should mean that the bloc will impose restrictive measures to suspend the broadcasting activities of these media outlets within the EU, and those broadcasting from outside. There is, however, not a complete ban on their activities in the EU. The legal text stipulates that the new measures "do not prevent the media outlets and their staff from carrying out activities in the union other than broadcasting, such as research and interviews."
• Perhaps the most important -- but also the most complicated -- part of the package is a 120-page list of products that can no longer be exported to Russia. Very detailed and technical in its descriptions, the list includes items that could contribute to the Russian military effort, such as unmanned aerial vehicles (including toy drones), generators, hard drives, IT components, night-vision and radio-navigation equipment, cameras, lasers, lenses, and various underwater gear.

Brief #2: Is There Still A Future For The EU's Eastern Partnership?

What You Need To Know: On December 12, the foreign ministers of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine will meet (via video link) with their 27 EU counterparts in Brussels for a scheduled three-hour "Eastern Partnership (EaP) foreign ministers meeting." Few concrete outcomes are expected -- and the question likely on the minds of many politicians and bureaucrats is whether the Eastern Partnership has outlived its purpose.

Created back in 2009 after a Polish-Swedish initiative, the EaP aimed to bring six former Soviet republics closer to the bloc without the explicit offer of future membership.

Since then, the goalposts have moved several times, complicating the initiative's original focus. The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February led to Brussels taking the historic decision in June to recognize both Moldova and Ukraine as EU candidate countries, plus selecting a slightly behind Georgia as a potential candidate.

But the Eastern Partnership has also seen two other members -- Armenia and Azerbaijan -- waging war against each other in 2020, with substantial clashes still occurring this year. And Belarus suspended its participation in the partnership in 2021 after it was sanctioned by the EU for its brutal crackdown on people protesting election results widely viewed as falsified.

Yet despite the obvious contradictions and complications of treating the six countries as a mini-bloc, Brussels will most likely persist with the Eastern Partnership for now.

Deep Background: If you ask officials from Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine privately about the EaP, you probably won't be bowled over with praise. Yes, they are happy about what the partnership has delivered previously, in terms of visa-free travel for their citizens and association agreements with the bloc that include free-trade deals.

But after having spent the last few years pushing for even closer relations, officials from Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine are quietly expressing concern that the Eastern Partnership will get in the way of their newly won EU accession statuses. And the idea of being grouped together with the authoritarian regimes of Azerbaijan and Belarus isn't exactly appealing either.

As these things normally tend to work, the officials' public positions are a little more moderate. According to Brussels bureaucrats I have spoken to, officials from the Eastern Partnership countries have apparently given the go-ahead to continue with the current setup.

And in a discussion paper ahead of the December 12 meeting -- authored by the Czech Republic, Poland, and Romania, and seen by RFE/RL -- it states that, "despite openly voiced skepticisms," Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine are "assessing what could be the added value of the EaP in the accession process." The paper concludes that "the EaP remains a relevant framework, which has not exhausted its full regional potential and can continue to have a purpose for all partners."

Drilling Down

• So, what does this all mean? Brussels has urged the three countries to come up with suggestions for how the partnership can be used in the future to prepare them for EU membership. Don't be surprised if there are more proposals from Brussels about physical infrastructure connecting the Eastern partners with the EU. Or perhaps we might see the trio of countries getting more access to the EU's digital market, for instance by enjoying the same "roam-like-home" provisions that EU citizens currently do.
• As always, Russia is the elephant in the room. The country is hardly mentioned in summit declarations or conclusions. The aforementioned discussion paper points out that the partners all "share common threats, especially in the security domain whose source is mainly Russia's malign activity." So it's very likely that the EU will propose more assistance, money, and resources to combat Russian disinformation and to boost cybersecurity.
• And then there will be the call for the EU to do more to defuse conflicts in the region. Look no further than European Council President Charles Michel's recent efforts to facilitate dialogue between Armenia and Azerbaijan, with another Brussels meeting between the two countries' leaders in the pipeline. Also expect the bloc, before the winter holidays, to extend the monitoring mission on the Armenian side of the border, which was agreed back in October.

While the EU, unlike Turkey and Russia, is seen as more of an honest broker by both Baku and Yerevan, questions do remain as to whether the bloc really can guarantee the safety of the people in Azerbaijani's breakaway region of Nagorno-Karabakh.

• And then, what to do about Belarus? There is still hope that Minsk will return to the fold, hopefully with a more democratic leadership. At the last Eastern Partnership summit in Brussels in 2021, there was an empty chair representing the country. Officials in Brussels are considering whether to fill that chair with a representative from Belarus's democratic opposition for the next big meeting.
• It isn't clear when the next Eastern Partnership summit might be. Normally, they are held every other year, so there should be one in 2023. There is a push for Stockholm to host it during Sweden's stint as president of the Council of the European Union in the first half of next year, but the Swedish diplomats I have spoken to are less sure, saying that a summit without any concrete "deliverables" wouldn't do much justice to the Eastern Partnership at the moment.

Looking Ahead

Kosovo is expected to officially hand in its EU membership application in Brussels on December 15, just ahead of the EU summit that starts later that day. Member states are likely "to take note" of the application, although the big question remains of how to proceed with five member states still not recognizing Kosovo's independence.

There is more movement in the EU-Western Balkans relationship. Bosnia-Herzegovina is expected to be recognized as an official EU candidate country. This might happen either when the bloc's Europe ministers meet on December 13 in Brussels to discuss and adopt so-called "conclusions" on EU enlargement, or it might be announced when EU leaders convene for a summit in the Belgian capital on December 15-16.

That's all for this week. Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on Twitter @RikardJozwiak or on e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.

Until next time,

Rikard Jozwiak

If you enjoyed this briefing and don't want to miss the next edition, subscribe here. It will be sent to your inbox every Monday.

And you can always reach us at newsletters@rferl.org.

Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's new newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods. To subscribe, please click here.

I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I'm drilling down on two major issues: the EU's adoption of a global price cap on seaborne Russian oil and a look ahead to the EU-Western Balkans summit in Tirana.

Brief #1: The EU has adopted a global price cap on Russian oil. How did we get here, and how will it work?

What You Need To Know: On December 2, the European Union, the Group of Seven (G7) advanced economies, and Australia agreed on a $60-per-barrel price cap on Russian seaborne oil and petroleum products. The cap comes into effect on December 5, the same day EU sanctions on Russian oil come into force.

The sanctions, intended to punish the Kremlin for Russia's invasion of Ukraine, stop the inflow of around 90 percent of Russian oil to the EU, with only some landlocked Central European member states still benefitting from pipelined Russian oil and Croatia and Bulgaria getting some shipped petroleum products.

The G7 nations first agreed to work on a global price cap back in September with the view to achieve three things: Reduce spiraling energy prices, diminish Russian profits on oil sales to dent its war effort in Ukraine, and still ensure there is a reliable supply of Russian petroleum products on the global market as poorer countries in Africa and Asia have voiced concerns about a complete cutoff.

After months of deliberations, the G7 finally presented a proposal to the EU in mid-November for a cap in the range of $65-70 per barrel -- a level reflecting the prices in September, when Russian oil traded at $68-76 per barrel. While the G7 could go alone on this, they desperately want the EU onboard considering the bloc has some of the world's biggest maritime transporters and insurers in its ranks.

Deep Background: For the past few weeks, the EU has gone back and forth on the issue of the price cap and other related provisions. The talks have essentially been about two groupings: the hawks, consisting of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland, and the maritime nations of Cyprus, Greece, and Malta.

The hawks dismissed the $65-70 price range, arguing it was toothless as the price on the market now has dropped to around $52 and Moscow has budgeted for a price of $65 per barrel in 2023. A cap around that price, they argued, would do little to affect Russia's ability to wage war, adding that the cap should be as low as $30.

The seafaring trio of Cyprus, Greece, and Malta, on the other hand, lobbied hard for the price not to drop below $70, pointing to the loss of funds for the shipping industry and commitments the countries have to transport oil to poorer countries.

After weeks of talks in Brussels on various levels, the compromise was first $65 per barrel, then $62, before it finally reached $60 -- the absolute lowest the G7 was willing to consider.

Drilling Down:

• The $60 price cap can only fly due to other provisions in the EU legislation. In the text, there is an exemption for maritime transport to third countries "for the urgent prevention or mitigation of an event likely to have a serious and significant impact on human health and safety or the environment, or as a response to natural disasters."
• There is also a clarification stipulating that the price cap enters into force as of December 5 for crude oil and as of February 5, 2023, for petroleum products, giving exporting countries some leeway.
• Cyprus, Greece, and Malta have also managed to get in writing that the European Commission, by early next year, should draw up measures "aiming at preserving the credibility and strategic importance of the union's shipping industry" and a clarification that oil and petroleum products that "originate in a third country and are only being loaded in, departing from, or transiting through Russia" are exempt from the cap. However, Russian oil that is transported together with oil from other sources is subject to the price cap.
• The hawks, on the other hand, have also secured a couple of "wins" in the legislation. One is that the price cap should be linked to a new EU sanctions package on Russia and Belarus, with consultations on its content having started over the weekend. The idea is that this package should be agreed well before the EU summit in Brussels on December 15-16.
• The hawks are also happy that a review clause has been inserted into the legislation to see how effective the price cap is, with a first evaluation expected in mid-January and with European diplomats returning to the issue every two months thereafter. The idea is that the cap can be adjustable and always stay around 5 percent below the market rate.

Brief #2: A reset of EU-Western Balkans relations in Tirana?

What You Need To Know: EU leaders will meet with their counterparts from the Western Balkan six (Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia) in the Albanian capital of Tirana on December 6.

The meeting is significant for one big reason: It is the first time an EU-Western Balkans summit is being held outside the EU. All the diplomats I have spoken to say there are two unofficial goals for the summit, namely maintain a united front and avoid any fallouts. There have certainly been bad precedents on that front in the past 12 months.

The last summit, in Brdo, Slovenia, in fall 2021, was dominated by fights about whether the final declaration should contain the word "enlargement," as some Western EU member states at the time were reluctant to commit to expanding the club.

That was nothing compared to the acrimony after the more informal meeting between EU and Western Balkan leaders held in Brussels on June 23.

While it was a historic day for Ukraine and Moldova as the bloc's leaders acknowledged the pair as EU candidate countries, Bosnia failed to get the same recognition, and Albania and North Macedonia were once again denied the possibility to start EU accession talks because Bulgaria still had bilateral issues with Skopje.

Deep Background: There are indications the Tirana summit will go a little more smoothly. For starters, it's just a half-day meeting, which simply means less time to fall out. And secondly, the draft declaration seen by RFE/RL that the EU-27 have worked on over the past few weeks -- and that EU diplomats hope the Western Balkan partners will align with -- is both optimistic while not being too critical of the Balkans six.

Since the war in Ukraine began, enlargement skeptics such as France and the Netherlands have warmed to the idea that non-EU countries wanting to join the bloc isn't such a bad geopolitical move after all.

Over the summer, the Bulgaria-North Macedonia impasse was lifted and now, ahead of the summit, the draft declaration that European officials have been working on confidently proclaims that "the EU reconfirms its full and unequivocal commitment to the European Union membership perspective of the Western Balkans and calls for the acceleration of the accession process."

Even the word "enlargement" features now and again in this draft declaration. Sticking points are also being played down. The big one is Serbia's continued refusal to align with any of the EU's sanctions on Russia. So far, this has had few consequences for Belgrade, and the declaration doesn't even single the country out in this respect.

Drilling Down:

• There will also be some "deliverables" in Tirana. A joint declaration by EU and Western Balkans telecom operators will be signed that should pave the way for the first reduction in roaming costs between the bloc and the Western Balkans in 2023, with a view to fully removing it thereafter.
• A recent uptick of migrants coming to the EU via the so-called Western Balkans route has caused concern in some EU capitals. Expect the EU to call on their Balkan partners for more efforts to combat smuggling and human trafficking in Tirana. The EU recently pledged 40 million euros ($41.9 million) to strengthen border management in the region and another 30 million euros will be announced to aid investigations and prosecutions with regard to smuggling and trafficking.
• Some of the trickier issues will be tackled later in December. One of them is whether to grant Bosnia EU candidate status this year. All indications are that EU member states will agree to this when their respective Europe ministers meet in Brussels on December 13, but the current draft European Council conclusions on enlargement, seen by RFE/RL, so far make no mention of this.
• European diplomats, speaking on condition of anonymity, tell me they believe Bosnia will gain candidate status but with conditions -- a similar deal granted to Ukraine and Moldova in the summer.
• EU leaders might make the decision at the EU summit a few days later (December 15-16). Ultimately, European ministers might not agree on the enlargement conclusions. That has happened before, and there are indications it could happen again.
• It is not only the correct wording on Bosnia that remains to be settled. Bulgaria wants to push for stronger language on North Macedonia in order to pressure Skopje to live up to bilateral agreements, while some Eastern member states want a more ambitious text on Ukraine. It may just be semantics to outsiders, but for EU diplomats this is their bread and butter.

Looking Ahead

The European Commission last week announced that Hungary had not done enough to unblock 7.5 billion euros worth of EU funds, even if Brussels on the same day gave a conditional green light for Budapest to eventually receive its post-coronavirus recovery money from the EU.

Whether that's enough for Hungary to lift its veto on the 18 billion euros in EU aid for Ukraine remains to be seen. Expect EU finance ministers to discuss this when they meet in Brussels on December 6, even though they probably will need an emergency meeting later in December to try to solve all outstanding issues, including finding a plan B for sending money to Kyiv.

Also, look out for the EU home affairs ministers meeting on December 8 in Brussels to decide on the Schengen fate for Bulgaria, Croatia, and Romania. No one appears to have any issues with Croatia becoming a member of the passport-free Schengen Area on January 1, but the Dutch still have problems greenlighting Bulgaria's bid.

Austria appears to want to block both Bulgaria and Romania, even though Vienna apparently might soften its stance when the European Commission on December 5 publishes an action plan on how to combat increased migration on the Western Balkans route. The smart money right now is on only Croatia getting the thumbs up.

That's all for this week. Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on Twitter @RikardJozwiak or on e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.

Until next time,

Rikard Jozwiak

If you enjoyed this briefing and don't want to miss the next edition, subscribe here. It will be sent to your inbox every Monday.

And you can always reach us at newsletters@rferl.org.