Wider Europe

Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods.

I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I'm drilling down on two big issues: the leadership vacuum at the OSCE and what Mark Rutte will have on his plate at NATO.

Briefing #1: Stalemate At The OSCE

What You Need To Know: The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is currently leaderless and rudderless. As of September 4, the four top positions in the organization -- the secretary-general, the director of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), the high commissioner on national minorities, and the representative on freedom of the media -- have been run by so-called "officers-in-charge" with no executive powers. The mandates for the four roles have expired with no new appointees in place.

This after Malta, the chair of the OSCE for 2024, spent the entire summer trying to find four leaders that the 57 OSCE member countries from Europe, Asia, and North America could agree on. The current stalemate could potentially drag on through the fall, leaving one of the few political organizations in which all European states still meet in complete disarray.

Deep Background: The whole process started in early May, with Malta calling for candidates for the positions. Thirteen candidates were put forward for the four roles by the deadline at the end of that month. Then Valletta founded a "Group of Friends of the OSCE Chairmanship," which consisted of representatives from Austria, Finland, Liechtenstein, North Macedonia, Turkmenistan, and the United Kingdom, to help sift through the candidacies and see if some sort of consensus could be found.

After asking the candidates about issues such as the future role of the OSCE, Russia's continued presence in the organization, and the war in Ukraine, the group presented a package in early August referred to as the "chair's proposal." In this, Igli Hasani, the current Albanian foreign minister, would be the new secretary-general; Dutch diplomat Christophe Kamp would take over the ODIHR; the former Georgian state minister for reconciliation and civic equality, Ketevan Tsikhelashvili, would take over as the new high commissioner on national minorities; and the post of representative on freedom of the media was suggested for Jan Braathu, a Norwegian diplomat and current head of the OSCE mission in Kosovo.

But, so far, it's not been plain sailing. In an internal document authored by Malta and seen by RFE/RL, it was noted in September that, "while the overwhelming majority of participating states expressed their readiness to join consensus, the chair took note at the Preparatory Committee meeting of 22 August 2024 that full agreement had not yet been reached."

The paper outlined that the main issue was a so-called "alternative proposal" pushed jointly by Greece and Turkey. In this possible lineup, Braathu and Tsikhelashvili remain in the same positions, but instead of Hasani and Kamp, the Ankara and Athens duo are proposing former Turkish Foreign Minister Feridun Sinirlioglu as secretary-general and Greek diplomat Maria Telalian for the ODIHR job.

This proposal notes that, "in response to the requests from both [Turkey] and Greece, and in recognition of the political significance of their joint candidacies...the chair is providing the opportunity for participating states to consider the following alternative package." After that, Valletta called for an informal meeting at the ambassadorial level in Vienna, where the organization is based, on September 23 to discuss both packages and get some clarity.

Drilling Down

• Clarity is not what they got. While the "chair's proposal" still enjoys "wide support," according to diplomats I have spoken to, the Greek-Turkish proposal also has its supporters.
• This proposal is presented as a "unity and compromise" deal, bringing together two historical rivals. Cyprus, which normally votes against anything Turkish, backed down at the September 23 meeting, clearing one potential roadblock.
• The EU is split. Normally, EU countries, which represent nearly half of the OSCE's membership, try to maintain a united front, but this time, Malta and Greece are in different corners -- with many member states apparently caught in the middle.
• The impasse has also opened another can of worms. Candidates proposed earlier, who didn't get much initial support, are suddenly back on the table, such as Bosnian Dunja Mijatovic, who is eyeing the ODIHR job.
• Enter Russia. What surprised some during the process was that there weren't any clear Moscow-backed candidates for any of the four positions -- something of an anomaly, as the Kremlin had previously been rather active in putting names forward.
• Russia does, however, reject the idea of having Tsikhelashvili as the high commissioner on national minorities, especially as she worked as a minister to reintegrate Russian-occupied South Ossetia and Abkhazia into Georgia. The problem here is that there are only two other known alternatives for the minorities job. One is Hungarian diplomat Rita Izsak-Ndiaye, whom the Baltic states, Poland, and Ukraine find unpalatable due to Budapest's close links to Moscow. The other candidate, Canadian John MacGregor, is currently the head of the OSCE center in Ashgabat, Turkmenistan.
• MacGregor would be a popular choice, but if he were to replace Tsikhelashvili in the "chair's proposal," the four top positions would be all male. Given that gender balance is a priority for the OSCE, this is not a small obstacle.
• The upshot is that we're back to square one with no clear timelines. The issue could easily drag on up to the annual OSCE ministerial meeting in Malta on December 5-6. At this meeting, other issues need to be discussed, such as the organization's future chairs. Finland will take over in 2025, but ideally the chairs for 2026 and 2027 should also be settled in December and discussion on that has not even started.

Briefing #2: Mark Rutte's To-Do List At NATO

What You Need To Know: Today, October 1, Mark Rutte takes over from Norway's Jens Stoltenberg as NATO's secretary-general. Rutte, the longest-serving prime minister in Dutch history, is very much seen as a "continuation candidate." Like Stoltenberg, who served a decade at the helm of the military alliance, Rutte is known for having a talent for striking difficult political compromises. He enjoys widespread support among key member states, not in the least for his supposedly dry humor that can grease the wheels of diplomacy.

It will be something of a soft start for the Dutchman. On October 17-18, the Brussels headquarters will host the annual fall meeting of NATO's 32 defense ministers. Subsequently, the foreign ministers will descend upon the Belgian capital on December 3-4. However, it is not anticipated that those ministerial meetings will yield much.

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At first, Rutte is expected do a fair bit of traveling to key NATO capitals. It's a long while away, but he'll also have to start preparing for the NATO summit on June 24-26, 2025, in his hometown, The Hague. In order to cement his position within the military organization, it's important that the summit is a success. At the top of his agenda, there are three topics he is expected to tackle: NATO's collective defense, support for Ukraine, and a new Russia strategy.

Deep Background: None of these things are new; in fact Stoltenberg spent much of his time grappling with the same things. The Norwegian was, according to diplomats I have spoken to, always pushing for more ambitious language in NATO communiques on Ukraine. He was also reportedly key in securing a Ukraine command center in the German city of Wiesbaden to coordinate security assistance to Kyiv.

In the future, Rutte will be responsible for ensuring that the organization transitions from a somewhat American enterprise to one that includes a greater number of NATO allies. He will also likely be committed to continuing the alliance's support for war-torn Ukraine.

On that, he enjoys close relations with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy and, as Dutch prime minister, he helped get F-16 fighter aircraft sent to Ukraine, secured stronger EU economic sanctions on Moscow despite Dutch dependency on trade, and helped move Ukraine along the path toward EU membership.

One of the things he may have to deal with in the short term is the tricky question of whether Ukraine will get an invitation to join NATO. There is hope in Ukraine that the United States -- partly as a result of outgoing President Joe Biden's foreign policy -- will consent to this soon.

Diplomats I have spoken to at NATO are less sure about this, however. Germany, Hungary, and Slovakia are still not convinced Ukraine belongs in the military alliance, plus there are other European states that also aren't sure. There has been no real movement on this issue from what was agreed at this summer's Washington summit, one diplomat told me, referring to the agreed line that "we will be in a position to extend an invitation to Ukraine to join the alliance when allies agree and conditions are met."

Drilling Down

• There is also the bread-and-butter issue of collective defense. There are gaps, notably on the alliance's eastern flank. One thing for the alliance to address is to improve the so-called rotational model, in other words to get more air-defense systems on the vulnerable eastern flank.
• In the end, it comes down to one thing: the need for more spending on defense. That 23 out 32 NATO allies spend 2 percent of their gross domestic product on defense is celebrated in Brussels, but as one country's ambassador to the alliance told me: 2 percent spending on defense is not adequate and what's needed is something closer to 3.5. The question is if Rutte, who was known as a prudent spender as prime minister, can cajole others to loosen the purse strings.
• And then there is Russia. Revising NATO's Russian policy will be high on the agenda moving toward the summit in The Hague next year. NATO already agreed at the Washington summit that "Russia remains the most significant and direct threat to allies' security." But the question is if NATO will go further, perhaps coming up with some sort of "containment policy," even though many don't like the Cold War-like association of that phrase.
• And what of the NATO-Russia Council, which hasn't met since just before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022? And what about the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act, which established political guidelines between the alliance and the Kremlin?
• Given Rutte's penchant for compromise and his leadership of a country that is a member of both the EU and NATO, many expect (or at least, hope) that he can improve NATO-EU cooperation. Not so much, perhaps, from an institutional point of view, but rather informally, member to member. There continues to be deadlock between Cyprus (on the EU side) and Turkey (on the NATO side), which results in the blocking of deeper, formal joint ventures between the two institutions.
• It could be that, for this, the stars are aligned. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen; her incoming foreign policy chief, Kaja Kallas; and the new head of the European Council, Antonio Costa, are all ardent trans-Atlanticists. The same is true for Andrius Kubilius, the former Lithuanian prime minister and proposed European commissioner for defense.
• Whatever happens, it's not going to be easy for Rutte. There will undoubtedly be issues with Hungary. Budapest was the last NATO member to give its approval for Rutte. Plus, the Dutchman and Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban have clashed before, notably when Rutte pushed for some EU funds meant for Hungary to be frozen.
• Rutte is sometimes known as a "Trump-whisperer" for his role in reportedly helping to convince Trump that it was the U.S. president's push that contributed to European allies ramping up defense spending. So if Trump does return to the White House, that relationship would be key.
• Rutte will also need to pick his deputy. The two known candidates for the deputy secretary-general position are the former defense minister of North Macedonia, Radmila Sekerinska, and the former foreign minister of Bulgaria, Mariya Gabriel. Sekerinska is the presumed favorite, and there is also a possibility that former Croatian President Kolinda Grabar-Kitarovic could be in the running.
• There is a desire within NATO that the top job goes to a woman and someone from the alliance's east. But as one NATO source told me: "We also wanted a woman from Eastern Europe as the UN secretary-general and ended up with a Portuguese man, Antonio Guterres, back in 2017."

Looking Ahead

An interesting case is coming up in the General Court of the European Union on October 2. It concerns a ban, in place since 2022, on EU firms providing legal advice to the Russian government, as well as companies established in the country. Some European bar associations are contesting these sanctions, and the ruling will give an indication of the true strength of the bloc's economic sanctions on Russia.

That's all for this week! Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on X @RikardJozwiak, or on e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.

Until next time,

Rikard Jozwiak

If you enjoyed this briefing and don't want to miss the next edition subscribe here.

Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods.

I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and, in a break from my usual format, I'm writing about my impressions from Kyiv after spending a few days there last week.

The Briefing: Kyiv In The Sunshine -- For Now At Least

Last week, I visited Ukraine for the first time since Russia's full-scale invasion in February 2022. It was just a short visit, two nights in Kyiv to attend a conference, so I can't draw too many meaningful conclusions about the state of the country. But the one thing that struck me (and many foreigners who have visited the city over the last couple of years) is how normal everything seems to be, at least in the capital city.

Trendy and vibrant cafes and restaurants were buzzing in the summery weather, reminding me of the Kyiv I had visited before. And, during my brief time there, there were no air-raid sirens -- an almost daily occurrence for Ukrainians across the country.

But look a little closer and you start to notice how war has changed things. For a city with a prewar population of 4 million, I didn't see many middle-aged men. Later in the evening, as the midnight curfew approached, the city lights that had once lit up the sky were substantially dimmed.

In the regions, I was told, these two phenomena -- a lack of men and night light -- is even more pronounced. The Ukrainian recruitment drive is firing on all cylinders, with persistent rumors that the minimum age for the draft may be lowered below 25.

Despite the good vibes on the streets, most indicators point to a rather grim final few months of the year for Ukraine.

EU Enlargement Enthusiasm

I was in Kyiv to attend a one-day conference, the EU Accession Exchange Forum, organized by two of the city's most relevant think tanks, the New Europe Center and the International Renaissance Foundation.

The event was set up three years ago when Ukraine, together with Georgia and Moldova, applied and almost immediately got an invite to join the EU. It brings together politicians, officials, and analysts involved in the process.

At least on this particular topic, the mood was upbeat. Katarina Mathernova, the EU's Ukraine ambassador, noted that there is a "sense of inevitability now on enlargement. It is in the air." But she was quick to caution that the quick march to getting candidate status in 2022 and officially opening talks just two years later will inevitably slow down. "We are now going from a sprint to a marathon. It is simply hard to shortcut technical work," Mathernova said.

Yet it didn't prevent the Ukrainian minister for European and Euro-Atlantic integration, Olha Stefanishyna, who recently also took over the tricky justice portfolio in a recent government reshuffle, from claiming that Ukraine would join both the EU and NATO by 2030.

Coming fresh from a successful trip to Brussels, where the European Commission was happy with progress made by Kyiv on justice-related reforms, she exuded confidence. The hope in Brussels is that negotiations on at least five out of 33 accession chapters can start during the first half of 2025, although Ukraine is pushing for at least half of all the chapters to be opened in that period.

Ihor Zhovkva, the powerful deputy presidential chief of staff, also made a credible sales pitch on why the EU should embrace Ukrainian membership quickly by noting that the bloc "will be more of a geopolitical player after Ukraine's military victory."

He also noted that the "deep state in the EU bureaucracy was not on the side of Ukrainian membership" back in 2022, saying there was originally talk of semi-candidacy or pre-candidacy instead of being offered regular candidate status. That upgrade, he said, was due to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy's close personal rapport with EU leaders and Kyiv's performance on the battlefield.

A New Polish-Ukrainian Spat

Ukraine is clearly banking on this dynamic (Zelenskiy and battlefield strength) to continue propelling it toward the West. But will it be tested soon?

Just before my visit, there was a lot of talk in Kyiv about an ill-tempered meeting between Zelenskiy and Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski.

According to press reports, the Ukrainian president complained about Warsaw being slow to transfer military equipment, whereas Sikorski played down Kyiv's chances of joining the EU anytime soon, saying the process took Warsaw a decade.

Sikorski also reportedly pressed the Ukrainian side on the 1943 Volhynia massacre of ethnic Poles by Ukrainian nationalists, demanding a proper exhumation and burial of the victims.

I also heard from two Western diplomats, who didn't want to be named, that another source of friction was that Sikorski, before their meeting, had met with Petro Poroshenko, the former Ukrainian president and rival of Zelenskiy.

As both Sikorski and Poroshenko belong to the powerful pan-European center-right European People's Party group, a meeting made perfect sense. But it did increase speculation, at least among the diplomats I spoke to, that Poroshenko may challenge Zelenskiy in elections in 2025, potentially teaming up with Valeriy Zaluzhniy, the former commander in chief and one of a few Ukrainians who can match the incumbent's popularity.

Elections, however, may not be even held next year. Many Ukrainians have been quick to point out that the country's constitution prevents holding elections in wartime and that it would be logistically impossible to organize due to the amount of people serving on the front lines and the large number of Ukrainian refugees living outside the country.

If reports of the possible Polish-Ukrainian spat are true, it would be a good indicator of how Ukraine's EU accession is not going to be the cakewalk some in Kyiv believe it to be. Hungary is normally the main wrench in the works when it comes to EU support for Ukraine, but there are 26 other member states with vetoes.

Poland will increasingly see its eastern neighbor as a competitor, notably in the agricultural sector, so it's unlikely the sniping between the two countries will go away.

Meanwhile, Back In Brussels...

Back in Brussels, the new European Commission lineup was unveiled for the next five years. While the European Commission has emphasized that enlargement is now a priority, the candidate for the enlargement portfolio went to the Slovenian politician and diplomat Marta Kos, the only presumptive commissioner who still hasn't been confirmed by her own capital, after her nomination got caught up in political spats in Ljubljana.

The fact that Kos is neither a political heavyweight nor does she come from a country that is one of the most ardent Ukraine-supporters, didn't go unnoticed in Kyiv.

But there was another crucial issue that wasn't touched upon much here. During the unveiling, there was little talk about how the EU must reform to take in new members. These reforms would encompass anything from agricultural funds to how the bloc should function politically.

As always, the bottom line is about money, and, in this regard, it is telling how quickly rich countries like the Netherlands and Germany have shot down ideas about the EU going more into debt to allow for a bigger budget.

Jana Kobzova, who worked as the adviser to the former Slovak President Zuzana Caputova, noted in one of the panels at the event that "you don't want to end up in a small United Nations. The EU must have the conversation about internal reforms also with Ukraine. But it needs to happen in parallel with the accession process."

NATO And Zelenskiy's 'Victory Plan'

Interestingly, the idea of Ukraine joining NATO before the EU seems to have resurfaced in Kyiv with several experts at the conference pointing out that the countries of Central and Eastern Europe first joined the military alliance and then, shortly afterwards, the EU.

Zelenskiy is due in the United States this week and is expected to present a so-called Victory Plan to U.S. President Joe Biden as well as the presidential candidates, Kamala Harris and Donald Trump.

Little is known about the content of the plan, but there was a lot of talk at the conference about the possibility of Ukraine pressing to get a NATO invitation now to get the ball rolling even though that membership couldn't happen until after the war is over.

The thinking from the Ukrainians is that this would be part of Biden's foreign policy legacy before he leaves the White House in January. If the United States did support formally inviting Ukraine, it would be a huge boost, but Kyiv still needs the other 31 members on board. There are several vocal skeptics, including Germany, Hungary, and Slovakia, and, even if Ukraine did secure a invitation to join the military alliance, it would be mostly symbolic and not an indication that NATO membership is coming anytime soon.

The other thing Zelenskiy will seek is permission from the United States to use Western weapons to strike deeper inside Russia. As one diplomat rather dryly put it: "Allowing long-range strikes appears to have been days and weeks away for days and weeks already."

One possible scenario is there would be a partial green light on the quiet without any big announcements. Even if that happened, there are still plenty of other issues to grapple with.

Not all of the Patriot missiles promised to Ukraine at the July NATO summit in Washington, D.C. have arrived yet. At the same time, there is no evidence that the Iranian ballistic missiles that Russia has received from Tehran have been used yet. That, however, is probably only a matter of time.

To complicate matters further, the crucial city of Pokrovsk may very well fall within months. For the Russian Army, that would open up the way to major cities such as Dnipro and Zaporizhzhya.

A Long Winter To Come

What appears clear is Moscow will target the Ukrainian energy grid, especially when the heating season starts in a couple of weeks. That's partly why the European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen came to Kyiv last week, bearing gifts including some 160 million euros ($178 million) to cover around 25 percent of Ukraine's energy needs for the winter ahead.

But will this be enough? Air defenses are still lacking in many areas of the country to cover vital energy infrastructure, and this could get dire this winter, especially if the temperatures dip below -10 degrees Celsius for longer periods.

More Western money is on the way -- with von der Leyen also announcing in Kyiv that the European Commission had adopted proposals to lend 35 billion euros ($39 million) backed by frozen Russian state assets in the West. This loan doesn't need consensus from EU member states to go ahead, so it is unlikely to be blocked. But this money is just part of a wider scheme in which the United States could chip in as well.

On this, Washington has been noncommittal so far, as most frozen Russian cash is in the EU and the sanctions are rolled over every six months -- which is too often, according to the United States.

The European Commission has now suggested to EU member states that sanctions on Russian Central Bank assets should be rolled over every 36 months, while other sectoral sanctions are prolonged every six months to allay American fears and allow them to send money to Ukraine as well. The decisions on sectoral sanctions are taken by unanimity in Brussels, and, EU diplomats speaking on background, told me that Hungary won't approve this until after the U.S. presidential election in November -- preventing Kyiv from getting much-needed cash during a critical period.

Looking Ahead

Most high-level politicians are spending this week in New York for the United Nations General Assembly, but there is also the EU's General Affairs Council, where ministers from all member states come to Brussels to discuss and coordinate issues related to the bloc's policies.

At the council on September 24, Europe ministers from the 27 member states will welcome their counterparts from the EU candidate countries Albania, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia to discuss the state of the rule of law in their countries. It is not usual that ministers from non-EU countries participate in the council in this way, but it will become more common the closer candidates get to the bloc.

That's all for this week. Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on Twitter @RikardJozwiak, or on e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.

Until next time,

Rikard Jozwiak

If you enjoyed this briefing and don't want to miss the next edition subscribe here.