Wider Europe

Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods.

I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I'm drilling down on two issues: the Baltic states connecting to the continental electricity grid and the EU’s proposed new sanctions package.

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Wider Europe Briefing: The Baltic States Finally Leave The Soviet Union Behind

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Briefing #1: Baltic States To Join Europe's Electrical Grid

What You Need To Know: This coming weekend it will finally happen. The three Baltic states -- Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania -- will disconnect on February 8 from the IPS/UPS electricity transmission grid that links Russia, Belarus, and the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad. The following day, the three countries will join the synchronous grid of Continental Europe (also known as the UCTE grid), which includes most European countries, from Portugal in the west to Ukraine and Turkey in the east.

For the Baltic countries, this move, known as the "Baltic Synchro," is a historic moment. It means that they, not Moscow, will be able to better manage and control their own electricity supplies. Diplomats from the Baltic region that I have spoken to see the move as shaking off the last vestiges of the Soviet era, comparing it to when Soviet troops left the countries in the 1990s.

Envisaged to initially happen at the end of 2025, the "Baltic Synchro" was brought forward by nearly 11 months, in large part due the war in Ukraine and the Baltic countries' desire to become completely independent from potential Russian energy blackmail.

Deep Background: It has been a long journey. The Baltic countries first signaled their readiness to join the continental grid back in 2007 and then applied in 2018. Last year, they informed Moscow and Minsk that they would leave the Brell agreement that has kept them in IPS/UPS.

In the background, they have been preparing for a while. The synchronization is not just a technical process, it's a legal one as well with plenty of paperwork and negotiations. "It's not too dissimilar from joining the euro zone or [the visa-free] Schengen [zone]," one Baltic diplomat told me.

The Baltic countries have been preparing their infrastructure as well, to the tune of 1.6 billion euros ($1.64 billion), 75 percent of which comes from the EU budget. This money was needed to build overhead power lines, boost frequency management, enhance and build out electricity substations, and upgrade IT systems.

The main investment has been the connection of the Baltic power system to the continental grid. So far, there is only one interconnection -- the LitPol Link, between Lithuania and Poland. Another link between the countries, named Harmony, is expected to be ready in 2030-31.

Drilling Down

• The Baltic states are connected to Finland and Sweden via links such as Estlink 1&2 and Nordbalt. But while these links are vital for energy import and export, they cannot be used for so-called "frequency control" and "balancing services," key components of managing a power grid. There is also another issue here: Sweden, Finland, Norway, as well as eastern areas of Denmark, are not part of the continental grid but the Nordic one.
• Estonia initially pushed to synchronize with the Nordic system, but the three countries eventually opted for the continental connection.
• The fact that there is just one interconnector, the LitPol Link, for the next few years with the continental grid could be problematic. In between disconnecting from the IPS/UPS grid on February 8 and synchronizing with the continental grid on February 9, the Baltics will be in so-called "island mode." There will probably not be any electricity cuts, but the challenge will be to manage the frequencies when not connected to a particular grid.
• A diplomat with insight into the process, who wished to remain anonymous, told me that he will be worried on February 8 and that "the run-up is really tense." And with just one interconnector to the continent, "island mode" could happen more often in the case of repairs or bad weather.
• The Baltic countries could also be vulnerable to so-called hybrid attacks. It has not gone unnoticed that several undersea Baltic pipelines and cables have been severed or damaged in the last year, with suspicion that Russia is responsible. To some degree, this has also vindicated the decision to connect the grids via land to Poland rather than undersea.
• Baltic diplomats I have spoken to say they are sure that the recent incidents at sea are related to the impending "Baltic Synchro." One told me that "there is an obvious link to what is happening in the Baltic Sea, especially if you look at intent, capacity, capabilities, and track record." Another diplomat said that "the Russians are annoyed. I can only speculate but this is the dismantling of the infrastructure of the old empire. But there is no way back, desynchronization will have to happen."
• So far, Baltic diplomats have said that Russia and Belarus have been professional and played by the rules when it comes to leaving the Brell agreement. But even if nothing untoward happens at the weekend, there are still fears that the Kremlin could shift gears and launch various "hybrid" measures in the future.
• Regardless, the Baltic countries will remain vulnerable. There are thousands of kilometers of overhead power lines, hundreds of substations, and it is physically impossible to protect everything. Although, as one Baltic diplomat optimistically said, there are enough connections and reserves to "operate in island mode without major inconvenience."

Briefing #2: New EU Proposed Sanctions To Target Shadow Fleet, LNG

What You Need To Know: The European Commission last week sent out to EU member states its proposal for the next round of sanctions on Russia and Belarus, with a goal to have the package unanimously agreed by the time of the third anniversary of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in late February. The proposal, seen by RFE/RL, would mean more sanctions targeting Russian aluminum, media, and the so-called "shadow fleet" but would lack any more meaningful restrictions on Russian energy. Brussels is clearly mindful that some member states are wary about soaring energy prices in the bloc.

This proposed round of sanctions, the 16th in three years, comes just a week after Hungary threatened to veto the six-month rollover of the previous packages. Budapest was expressing annoyance that Russian gas to the EU via Ukraine was halted at the new year. While not being able to reverse that decision, Budapest finally gave its green light to the rollover ahead of the January 31 deadline. That came after the bloc agreed on a joint statement in which the European Commission would get assurances from Kyiv regarding the continuation of oil supplies via pipeline to the EU.

It is in this context that the European Commission decided not to propose fresh sanctions on Russian liquefied natural gas (LNG), despite several EU member states, notably in the Nordic-Baltic region, calling for it.

Moscow's LNG exports to the bloc skyrocketed last year, with 9 percent of Germany's gas imports coming from Russia. Instead, there will just be minor measures such as the banning of Russian LNG going to EU terminals not connected to the bloc's gas system and prohibiting the temporary storage of Russian crude oil and petroleum products within the EU.

Deep Background: The headline-grabbing stuff in this round of proposed sanctions is an EU broadcast ban on TASS, Russia's state news agency. Similarly to the previous rounds of sanctions against RT and RIA Novosti, this means that journalists from these media organizations can still operate in the EU, but you won't be able to access their content on EU territory. Other Russian media outlets such as Zvezda, Lenta.ru, and RuBaltic will also be targeted.

Then there is the suggested import ban on primary aluminum, the pure form of the metal obtained without recycling or reprocessing, from Russia. Given that import of other types of aluminum are already banned, Brussels is aiming to now have a blanket prohibition of Russian aluminum products entering the bloc. The proposed sanctions also include export bans from the EU to Russia on gaming controllers and consoles, given fears in the EU that their components are being used to build drones.

Drilling Down

• Russia's "shadow fleet" -- the network of tankers and other vessels used by Russia to evade Western oil sanctions -- will also be targeted, according to the proposal. So far, the EU has drawn up a list of 79 vessels that can't dock or receive any shipping services in the EU. Under the proposal, an additional 74 vessels would be added -- although, curiously, this does not include the vessels involved in recent incidents in the Baltic Sea that damaged undersea infrastructure.
• Under the proposal, there would be more bans on exporting dual-use goods to companies based in China, India, Kazakhstan, Turkey, and Uzbekistan, among others. Brussels suspects these firms of reexporting such dual-use goods to Russia.
• Seventeen regional Russian banks would also be subject to being locked out of SWIFT, the global financial message system, for cross-border money transfers, joining most of the big Russian banks that have already been "de-SWIFTED." Interestingly, though perhaps not surprisingly, Gazprombank, which many EU countries have dealings with, has not yet met this fate.
• According to the sanctions proposal, an additional 35 people would be slapped with asset freezes and visa bans. They are mainly directors of military companies and politicians Russia has installed in occupied parts of eastern Ukraine. A few names do stick out. One is Kristina Potupchik, a famous Russian blogger, who the EU claims "disseminates misinformation on the war in Ukraine" and the TV presenter Yulia Baranovskaya, who, according to the document seen by RFE/RL, stands accused of "publicly promoting Russian war crimes such as the forced deportation of Ukrainian children." Aleksandr Stuglev, the organizer of the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, is also proposed for blacklisting.
• Lastly, new sanctions on Belarus have been proposed. The sanctions would largely mean EU export bans on electronic devices, conductors, and telecommunications, navigation, and aviation equipment, as well as on various types of sensors and lasers.

Looking Ahead

Poland currently holds the rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union and, on February 6-7, the entire European Commission will travel to the northern Polish city of Gdansk to meet the Polish government. Expect that the Polish hosts will be flashing their credentials as one of the bloc's preeminent members, especially now that both France and Germany are struggling with various domestic issues. There will likely be plenty of references to Solidarity, as Gdansk is the birthplace of the trade union that was pivotal in the country's transition from communism to democracy.

That's all for this week! Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on Twitter @RikardJozwiak, or on e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.

Until next time,

Rikard Jozwiak

If you enjoyed this briefing and don't want to miss the next edition subscribe here.

Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods.

I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I'm drilling down on two issues: boosting European defense spending, and how the bloc is dealing with (or not dealing with) Georgia's controversial new president.

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Wider Europe Briefing: How Will The EU Respond To Trump's Defense Demands?

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Briefing #1: How Can The EU Boost Its Defense Spending?

What You Need To Know: One of the biggest talking points in Brussels this year is European defense and how to boost it. This discussion has gained momentum due to Russian advances in Ukraine and the pressure from a new U.S. administration. U.S. President Donald Trump has reiterated that 5 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) should be the new benchmark for defense spending -- a target that no EU nation is currently meeting.

It is therefore no surprise that Poland -- which, with 4.7 percent, is the bloc's highest defense spender in terms of the share of its national budget -- has adopted the official slogan "Security, Europe" for its ongoing EU presidency. And defense will be the only topic on the agenda when the 27 EU leaders gather on February 3 at Chateau de Limont, close to Brussels, for an informal summit.

Deep Background: Two guests are invited to that summit: Firstly, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer, who will meet all his EU counterparts together for the first time. That will pave the way for a proper EU-U.K. summit later in the year, where the potential for more concrete defense cooperation between London and Brussels can be hammered out.

The second guest is NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte, who has heeded Trump's 5 percent call. Rutte recently noted that European nations need to ramp up spending considerably and, if not, "then start your Russian language courses or go to New Zealand."

EU officials have also dialed up the rhetoric. The new EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas has talked up intelligence reports noting that Moscow could test the bloc's readiness to defend itself in 3-5 years and noted that, in 2024, the 27 EU countries collectively spent an average of 1.9 percent of GDP on defense, while Russia spent 9 percent.

As always on defense, the question is if Europeans can walk the walk and not just talk the talk. The informal summit will not have any formal conclusions or declarations. Instead, the ideas floating around will contribute, by March, to a much-touted European Commission white paper on how to boost EU defense.

After that, leaders will meet again in June in Brussels for a proper summit to hopefully take some decisions. But that same month, the European Commission will publish its proposal for the next long-term EU budget (2028-2034) that will set off all sorts of jockeying in EU capitals, given that the last long-term budget equaled nearly 2 trillion euro ($2.1 trillion). And it is here that EU defense spending may fall by the wayside.

Drilling Down

• The European Commission is likely to push for more cash for defense but will member states in the end agree? Or would they prefer to devote money to other sectors, such as agriculture or the lucrative Cohesion Funds that benefit less affluent regions in the bloc?
• One of the reasons why the abovementioned white paper is coming in March is to avoid it becoming a part of the internal debate in Germany in the run-up to February 23 parliamentary elections. This is because it is likely to contain some controversial ideas on how to boost European defense spending.
• One of those issues would be jointly borrowed EU defense bonds. While joint debt was agreed as a temporary solution to boost the EU economy after the economic shock of COVID-19 lockdowns, it is still anathema among the more frugal northern countries, such as Germany and the Netherlands.
• Another contested idea could be to let the EU's European Investment Bank (EIB) fund defense projects in the bloc -- something it has never done before. EIB raises funds by borrowing on the international capital markets due to its triple-A rating.
• There is, however, a fear in the EU that the bank, by investing in lagging European defense firms, will jeopardize its stellar credit rating.
• In the end, it may fall to member states to simply increasing defense spending. The question is if they can. Many European economies are barely growing, and inflation is a huge issue. France is politically unstable and Germany needs to get around its constitutional limitations on borrowing.
• And then there is the perennial issue -- even if more money is being spent on defense, how can one ensure that the money isn't just going to national defense concerns that produce gear that isn't necessarily compatible with other member states? In other words, is there a genuine political and economic will beyond the Brussels bubble to create a proper EU defense market?
• There is also a tendency within the EU to buy weapons and ammunition from countries such as South Korea, Turkey, and the United States. Some European officials I have spoken to concede that perhaps the best way to pacify Washington could be for a country to increase its defense budget simply by buying more U.S. arms.

Briefing #2: With Georgia, The EU Is In A Diplomatic No-Man's-Land

What You Need To Know: Three months after controversial Georgian parliamentary elections took place on October 26, the EU -- and to a lesser degree NATO -- are still unsure of how to proceed in their relations with Tbilisi.

The issue has become even more complicated as the ruling Georgian Dream party in December 2024 elected and inaugurated Mikheil Kavelashvili as the president of the country. It was the first indirect election of the largely ceremonial head of state in the South Caucasus republic after constitutional changes in 2017 did away with a direct public vote.

Kavelashvili's presidency is disputed by the country's opposition; by Salome Zurabishvili, who still claims the presidency as her own until, she says, a legitimate replacement has been elected; and by some parts of the international community. The European Parliament, in late November 2024, overwhelmingly passed a resolution calling for fresh Georgian elections and rejected the parliament that subsequently elected Kavelashvili.

Deep Background: For the Council of the EU, the most powerful part of the bloc where the 27 EU member states sit, the situation is less clear cut. Operating by consensus on foreign policy matters, the room is divided by countries such as Hungary and Slovakia, which rushed to congratulate Georgian Dream directly in late October 2024, and hawks such as Estonia and Lithuania.

Speaking to several EU officials on background, it appears as if they would prefer to just kick the can down the road on Kavelashvili and not have to deal with Georgia at all at the moment. As one senior official put it: "There is no 'EU deal' on this -- in fact, we have classic EU limbo. Nobody wants to say anything, nobody wants to touch it, and nobody definitely wants to put anything on paper."

A second diplomat I spoke to was even blunter, saying that "we are not taking steps on this right now but, at some point, we will have to face questions on this."

A third source from a country critical of the current regime in Tbilisi was rather gloomy about predicting the future: "It's impossible to have unanimity on nonrecognition policy [of the] Georgian authorities. We will try to keep the line [on] limiting contact with the president and new government as much as possible. But I am afraid with time it will not be possible."

Many EU officials note that the bloc currently only engages with Georgia on a technical level in order to "depoliticize" the situation, but no one knows how long this will go on.

Drilling Down

• There are two other reasons why the EU is unable to move forward. One is the reading of what happened during the controversial parliamentary elections last year. The full OSCE/ODHIR report on the vote, which was released in December 2024, hasn't settled the issue. "We cannot state that the election results were illegal or illegitimate. We still talk about irregularities. We haven't moved beyond that point," one EU official told me on background.
• The second issue is that the EU has a lot going on. When EU foreign ministers met in Brussels for their first council of the year on January 27, they discussed Ukraine, the situation in the Middle East, and then how to deal with the new U.S. administration. Georgia was relegated to the end of the meeting under "Current Affairs." Little was decided when Georgia was discussed by ministers in December 2024.
• Sanctions on leading Georgian Dream officials -- similar to those imposed by the United States -- were shot down and all that was green-lighted was a mostly symbolic measure of new visa requirements for Georgian diplomatic passport holders
• At NATO things are a bit simpler. One official, speaking anonymously because they were not authorized to speak on the record, told me that "the short answer is yes, we see [Kavelashvili] as the Georgian president. The long answer is that it is a difficult situation. Officially. we are not saying much, but if we must invite him to an event like a summit, we would. It is, however, worth pointing out that we don't foresee that Georgian ministers will be invited to NATO ministerials this year, nor any Georgian leaders to the NATO summit in The Hague in June."
• What is also under way in the military alliance is that some joint programs with Georgia might be suspended, notably cooperation with the country's Defense Ministry. This could come after a review, in which all NATO-Georgia cooperation will be scrutinized. The review should be presented to the 32 NATO member states in the coming weeks.

Looking Ahead

EU member states should finally get the European Commission proposal for the next sanctions package on Russia this week. The EU executive has worked on what would be the 16th round of measures against Russia since early January and, according to officials familiar with the topic, says the idea is to target Russian aluminum, agricultural products, liquefied natural gas, and banks, as well as its shadow fleet, which defies embargoes to carry Russian crude oil and petroleum products. Brussels hopes to agree on the package around the third anniversary of the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in late February.

That's all for this week! Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on Twitter @RikardJozwiak, or on e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.

Until next time,

Rikard Jozwiak

If you enjoyed this briefing and don't want to miss the next edition subscribe here.