Accessibility links

Breaking News

China In Eurasia

A man in Peshawar, Pakistan, watches news in a shop after the Foreign Ministry announced the country had conducted air strikes inside Iran targeting separatist militants on January 18.
A man in Peshawar, Pakistan, watches news in a shop after the Foreign Ministry announced the country had conducted air strikes inside Iran targeting separatist militants on January 18.

Air strikes and diplomatic sparring between Iran and Pakistan have raised difficult questions for China and its influence in the region amid growing fears the upheaval sweeping across the Middle East could spread.

Since the tit-for-tat strikes on January 16 and 18 against militant and separatist groups, Islamabad and Tehran have signaled they want to de-escalate the situation and that their foreign ministers will hold talks in Pakistan on January 29.

But the attacks have exposed the fine line between peace and conflict in the region and put the spotlight on China, a close partner of both countries, to see if it can use its sway to ramp down tensions and avoid a conflict that would jeopardize Beijing's economic and geopolitical interests in the region.

"For China, the stakes are high and they really can't afford for things to get any worse between Iran and Pakistan," Abdul Basit, an associate research fellow at Singapore's S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, told RFE/RL.

China has tens of billions of dollars of investments in Iran and Pakistan and both countries are high-level partners that benefit from Chinese political and economic support.

Following the missile-strike exchange, China's Foreign Ministry called for calm and said it would "play a constructive role in cooling down the situation," without giving details.

Beijing is now expected to step up its engagement to head off another crisis in the region, in what analysts say is yet another test for China's influence after recently hitting its limit with the war in Gaza, shipping attacks in the Red Sea by Iranian-backed Huthi militants, and the growing instability across the Middle East these events have caused.

"We're yet to see anything really concrete where China has stepped in to solve an international crisis," Sari Arho Havren, an associate fellow at London's Royal United Services Institute, told RFE/RL. "[But] China has a reputational image at stake where it's presenting itself as the alternative to the United States, even though assumptions about how powerful it really is in the Middle East are now being scrutinized."

What's Going On Between Iran And Pakistan?

The Iranian strikes in Pakistan were part of a series of similar attacks launched by Iran that also hit targets in Iraq and Syria.

In Pakistan, Tehran said it was targeting the Sunni separatist group Jaish al-Adl with drones and missiles in Pakistan's southwestern Balochistan Province. Jaish al-Adl operates mostly in Iran's southeastern Sistan-Baluchistan Province but is also suspected to be in neighboring Pakistan. The group claimed responsibility for a December 15 attack on a police station in southeastern Iran that killed 11 officers.

In response, Islamabad said its military conducted air strikes in Sistan-Baluchistan targeting the Baloch Liberation Front and the Baloch Liberation Army, two separatist groups believed to be hiding in Iran.

The exchange of strikes was followed by Pakistan recalling its ambassador from Iran and blocking Tehran's ambassador to Islamabad from returning to his post.

On January 21, the Counterterrorism Department in Pakistan's southwestern Sindh Province announced it had arrested a suspect in a 2019 assassination attempt on a top Pakistani cleric who is a member of the Zainebiyoun Brigade, a militant group allegedly backed by Iran.

But since the strikes on each other's territory, Iran and Pakistan have cooled their rhetoric and signaled that they intend to de-escalate, echoing sentiment through official statements that the neighbors are "brotherly countries" that should pursue dialogue and cooperation.

People gather near rubble in the aftermath of Pakistan's military strike on an Iranian village in Sistan-Baluchistan Province on January 18.
People gather near rubble in the aftermath of Pakistan's military strike on an Iranian village in Sistan-Baluchistan Province on January 18.

Basit says this stems largely from the fact that the countries see themselves spread too thin in dealing with a host of pressing foreign and domestic issues.

Tehran has grappled with a series of attacks across the country, including a January 3 twin bombing that killed more than 90 people, and is engaged across the region directly or through groups that it backed such as Yemen's Huthis and Lebanon's Hizballah.

The tit-for-tat attacks, meanwhile, come as Pakistan is embroiled in an economic crisis and prepares to hold high-stakes elections on February 8, the first since former Prime Minister Imran Khan was removed in a vote of no confidence in April 2021, setting off years of escalating political turmoil.

"Between the economy, elections, and always-present tensions with India that could grow, Pakistan simply can't afford another front," Basit said.

Islamabad and Tehran are now pushing to cool down the situation, though Basit adds that the situation remains tense. "There is peace and calm now, but the animosity is ongoing," he said.

How Much Leverage Does China Have?

Following a week of tensions, China has leverage to push for a diplomatic settlement to the dispute, although experts say Beijing may be reluctant to intervene too publicly.

"China looks to be quite measured here in its response and that raises some questions about where China stands in using its influence," Basit said. "China knows it can influence the situation, but Beijing also usually shies away from situations like this because they worry that if they try and fail, then the West will look at it differently."

Beijing raised expectations in March 2023 it would play a larger political role in the Middle East when it brokered a historic deal between regional rivals Iran and Saudi Arabia.

Wang Yi holds up a March 2023 deal in Beijing with Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Shamkhani (right) and Saudi State Minister Musaad bin Muhammad al-Aiban (left).
Wang Yi holds up a March 2023 deal in Beijing with Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Shamkhani (right) and Saudi State Minister Musaad bin Muhammad al-Aiban (left).

Michael Kugelman, the director of the Wilson Center's South Asia Institute, says China's willingness to be a mediator shouldn't be underplayed. "It looks like the Pakistanis and the Iranians had enough in their relationship to ease tensions themselves," he told RFE/RL. "But China was willing to do the Iran-Saudi deal, which is a more fraught relationship to get involved in. So, they might be relieved now, but that doesn't mean they won't step up if needed."

China also holds other cards if it needs to calm the situation between Iran and Pakistan.

As China's "iron brother," Islamabad has a close partnership with Beijing, with cooperation ranging from economic investment to defense. Pakistan is the largest buyer of Chinese weapons and is also home to the multibillion-dollar China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a flagship series of infrastructure projects within China's Belt and Road Initiative.

CPEC is part of Beijing's efforts to connect itself to the Arabian Sea and build stronger trade networks with the Middle East.

A centerpiece of the venture is developing the port of Gwadar in Balochistan, which would strengthen shipping lanes to the region, particularly for energy shipments from Iran.

For Tehran, China is a top buyer of sanctioned Iranian oil, and Beijing signed a sprawling 25-year economic and security agreement with Iran in 2021.

Arho Havren says that given both Iran and Pakistan's economic dependence on China, Beijing will do all it can, should tensions rise, but will likely do so behind the scenes. "China [is unlikely] to take a stronger public stake in the conflict, but will instead use its back-channels," Arho Havren said.

What Comes Next?

While the situation between Iran and Pakistan is moving towards de-escalation, the recent tensions highlight the often tenuous footing of regional rivalries that China's ambitions to lead the Global South rest upon.

Both Pakistan and Iran are members of the Beijing-led Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which also includes India, Russia, and Central Asia (minus Turkmenistan). The SCO has been an important part of Beijing's bid for leadership across parts of Asia and the Middle East while looking to bring together countries to work together on economic and security issues.

China has invested in growing the bloc and is in discussion to add more countries, such as Saudi Arabia and Belarus, but further conflict between its members could derail those moves and damage the SCO's credibility.

Arho Havren says Beijing will still have to grapple with the lack of trust between Islamabad and Tehran and is facing similar issues elsewhere in the Middle East as it walks a tightrope between simultaneously raising its international influence and limiting any diplomatic exposure that could hurt its reputation.

"Cooperation may be easy, but the relations between the countries in the region are complex, and China's journey [in the Middle East] is still in its beginning," she said.

Chinese Ambassador and UN Security Council President Zhang Jun speaks during a vote on a draft resolution calling for urgent humanitarian aid for Gaza, at UN headquarters in New York on November 15.
Chinese Ambassador and UN Security Council President Zhang Jun speaks during a vote on a draft resolution calling for urgent humanitarian aid for Gaza, at UN headquarters in New York on November 15.

Welcome back to the China In Eurasia Briefing, an RFE/RL newsletter tracking China's resurgent influence from Eastern Europe to Central Asia.

I'm RFE/RL correspondent Reid Standish and here's what I'm following right now.

Listen to the Talking China In Eurasia podcast

Apple Podcasts | Spotify | Google | YouTube

Beijing Adapts To A New Middle East

Recent months of compounding crises in the Middle East have exposed China's limited commitment and ability to play a leading role in the region, and as I explained here, Beijing isn't necessarily well-positioned to benefit from the newfound chaos.

Finding Perspective: Since the beginning of Israel's ongoing war in Gaza, China has gradually taken a backseat toward the conflict.

Beijing has used the large-scale humanitarian crisis and mounting civilian casualties in Gaza as an opportunity to blame the hostilities on the United States's Middle East policies at global forums like the UN and through official statements and state-led media.

But while Chinese diplomats have toured various Middle East capitals and hosted officials from the region in China, Beijing has little to show from such efforts and may have even seen its stock dip in the region.

Beijing frames itself as a "responsible major power" and has looked to play a role as a peace broker, recently calling for a peace conference and a timetable to implement a two-state solution for Israel and Palestine on January 14.

But this positioning has also brought more scrutiny for China to act and deliver solutions, especially from countries across the Global South, and Beijing has so far not met those expectations.

This can also be seen in China's reaction to the Huthi attacks meant to deter commercial shipping in the Red Sea and Suez Canal.

Beijing has decried the attacks, and even though Chinese-flagged vessels have been targeted, it has not been part of the effort to bring the attacks to an end.

This could also grow further against China's interests, with the attacks frustrating Chinese investors who have committed billions to projects around the Suez Canal and stand to profit from safe passage through the waterway.

Protracted conflict in the region could continue to grow and further threaten Chinese personnel across North Africa and the Middle East and the investments that state-owned corporations have been making there for the past decade.

Why It Matters: This is all a dramatic reversal from how things looked less than a year ago.

In March 2023, China brokered a historic deal between regional rivals Iran and Saudi Arabia and sidelined the United States in the process.

As peace talks spread across the region -- from Qatar to Turkey to Syria -- China's top diplomat Wang Yi declared that a "wave of reconciliation" was sweeping the Middle East in August, with Beijing's alternative vision for a global order taking shape.

But the war in Gaza and the expanding list of crises has undone that narrative. Now, as China faces a very different political and security landscape in the Middle East, it must adapt on the fly.

This opens up lots of questions moving forward.

How will China maintain its official "neutrality" in the region and balance between its longtime partner in Iran and the more economically appealing Sunni Gulf countries like Saudi Arabia? Is China willing to spend its political capital on Israel-Palestine diplomacy? And how can China continue to shape events in the Middle East as the regional conversation shifts more toward security concerns?

Three More Stories From Eurasia

1. Reactions To Taiwan's Election

Taiwan elected a new president on January 13, choosing current Vice President Lai Ching-te (William) and granting his China-skeptic Democratic Progress Party (DPP) a historic third consecutive term in power.

In the wake of the victory, attention has now shifted to how Beijing will react and how Lai's election will be met by countries around the world.

The Details: Lai won a close three-way race with 40 percent of the vote and moved to quell any fears across the Taiwan Strait in China by saying he doesn't support Taiwanese independence.

During his acceptance speech Lai said he supports dialogue and cooperation with Beijing, and during the campaign he was quick to note he is an advocate for continuing Taiwan's self-governing status quo.

Still, Beijing is unlikely to see this as an assurance.

In a January 15 article published in the Communist Party magazine Qiushi, Chinese leader Xi Jinping said a greater effort is needed to win over the Taiwanese: "The patriotic, unifying forces in Taiwan should be developed and empowered. Separatist acts for Taiwan independence should be rejected. The full reunification of the motherland should move forward."

Shortly after Lai's election, David Adeang, president of the Pacific island nation of Nauru, also announced his country would no longer recognize Taiwan as a country and that it now viewed the island "as an inalienable part of China's territory."

The decision is an important move and a signal from Beijing to Taipei as the DPP prepares for a third term in power.

Attention now shifts to whether Beijing will turn to military or economic means to show its displeasure with Lai before he is sworn into office in May.

2. The Georgia Angle To Taiwan's Election

Georgia -- the small Caucasian country of some 4 million people -- follows one of the strictest policies of isolation toward Taiwan in the world, with Tbilisi refusing entry to the island's citizens.

Ahead of the recent vote, my colleague Luka Pertaia from RFE/RL's Georgia Service visited Taipei to report on Georgia's complicated relationship with Taiwan.

What You Need To Know: Georgia's strict stance toward Taiwan has its roots in the status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, breakaway Georgian regions occupied by Russia that have declared independence.

As Sergi Kapanadze, Georgia's former deputy foreign minister, explained to Luka, the strategy has been that maintaining zero relations with Taiwan would placate China to provide some form of moderation and be a diplomatic bulwark against the Russian-backed areas receiving further recognition.

But Tbilisi's stance is seen in a new light as successive Georgian Dream-led governments have encouraged China to expand its footprint in the country and deepen bilateral ties.

This adds another wrinkle to Georgia's bid to join the EU -- Tbilisi received official candidate status in December -- and risks leaving it as an outlier amid growing concern in European capitals and the West over Taiwan's precarious position with China.

3. The Central Asian Angle On Taiwan's Election

In another sign of their strong ties with Beijing, Central Asia's foreign ministries reiterated that they view Taiwan as part of China, RFE/RL's Uzbek Service reported.

What It Means: Central Asia has been a priority region for China, and the countries do not engage with Taipei. Instead, the region is becoming increasingly tied economically to Beijing.

In a statement issued after Lai's election, the Uzbek Foreign Ministry said, "The government of the People's Republic of China is the only legitimate government of China, and Taiwan is an inalienable part of Chinese territory," adding that Tashkent "supports all the efforts of the PRC government to implement the reunification of China."

This was followed by similar statements from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan.

Dealing with Taiwanese elections is tricky even for Western officials.

U.S President Joe Biden offered a firm rejection of Taiwanese sovereignty, saying after the vote that Washington does "not support independence."

Meanwhile, most of the European Union refrained from referring to the election as a presidential one and did not mention Lai's name in their congratulatory messages.

This diplomatic dance highlights the complicated lengths that countries must go to -- even those nations supportive of Taiwan in the face of Chinese pressure.

In the case of Central Asia, the unambiguously pro-Beijing language highlights where the region sees its future.

Across The Supercontinent

Re-Export: Reviewing newly released customs data, RFE/RL's Kyrgyz Service reports that for the first time in history China has become the main supplier of cars to the country.

However, the data also shows most of the Chinese cars are then re-exported to Russia.

'Reasonable Skepticism': RFE/RL's Kyrgyz Service also reported the country's debt now sits at $6 billion, with $4 billion owed to China. Speaking to RFE/RL, former Kyrgyz Economy Minister Emil Umetaliev said Bishkek needed to show "reasonable skepticism" when taking out future Chinese loans.

"China is firmly defending its interests, and there are examples of smaller countries losing out," he said.

Telecoms In Tajikistan: In November, Tajikistan announced plans to link with China's telecommunications network in order to improve the mountainous, landlocked country's internet access.

Now, RFE/RL's Tajik Service reports that Huawei, the Chinese telecoms giant, will build 5G base stations across the country.

One Thing To Watch

During her short stint as U.K. prime minister, Liz Truss never shied away from criticizing Beijing, and she continued that stance after leaving office.

When she visited Taiwan in July, she called for an "economic NATO" to tackle Beijing's growing authoritarianism, and earlier this month she urged British Foreign Minister David Cameron to take "robust action" after two British citizens were named as co-conspirators in the controversial trial of Hong Kong pro-democracy activist Jimmy Lai.

But a recent Politico investigation shows she secretly lobbied the British government in August to "expedite" the sale of defense equipment to China.

That's all from me for now. Don't forget to send me any questions, comments, or tips that you might have.

Until next time,

Reid Standish

If you enjoyed this briefing and don't want to miss the next edition, subscribe here. It will be sent to your inbox every other Wednesday.

Load more

About The Newsletter

In recent years, it has become impossible to tell the biggest stories shaping Eurasia without considering China’s resurgent influence in local business, politics, security, and culture.

Subscribe to this weekly dispatch in which correspondent Reid Standish builds on the local reporting from RFE/RL’s journalists across Eurasia to give you unique insights into Beijing’s ambitions and challenges.

To subscribe, click here.

RFE/RL has been declared an "undesirable organization" by the Russian government.

If you are in Russia or the Russia-controlled parts of Ukraine and hold a Russian passport or are a stateless person residing permanently in Russia or the Russia-controlled parts of Ukraine, please note that you could face fines or imprisonment for sharing, liking, commenting on, or saving our content, or for contacting us.

To find out more, click here.

XS
SM
MD
LG