China In Eurasia

Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoev is in Beijing to meet with Chinese leader Xi Jinping for a high-profile state visit intended to lay the groundwork for strong ties between the two countries.

In an article signed by Mirziyoev that appeared in Chinese state media ahead of the trip, the Uzbek leader praised China’s model of economic development and said relations between the two countries are experiencing “new historical heights” that will allow him to use the January 23-25 trip to “develop a new long-term agenda” for the two countries that will last for “decades.”

"Every time I visit China, I sincerely admire the scale of the reforms taking place here, the accomplishments, creative strength, diligence, and talent of the Chinese people who are confidently pursuing the path of modernization to realize their centuries-old dream,” the article said.

The state visit comes following the first in-person China-Central Asia leaders’ summit in May where China inked several agreements to deepen its economic and security links with the region. In Beijing, Mirziyoev is looking to build upon those deals as well as a comprehensive strategic-partnership agreement signed in 2022.

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While meeting with Xi and other top-level Chinese officials, the Uzbek delegation will look to court investment and agree with their counterparts on how to bring many previously signed deals to fruition, from developing green energy projects to cooperation in science and boosting tourism between China and Uzbekistan.

“This is less about concrete outcomes and more about setting a road map for the future,” Niva Yau, a fellow at the Atlantic Council's Global China Hub, told RFE/RL. “China has committed to investments and projects and this high-level visit is [about] how to achieve them and to search for new areas to cooperate together.”

Evolving Ties

The visit takes place against the backdrop of several major developments that have changed the political environment at home and abroad for Uzbekistan’s relationship with China.

Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine has boosted China’s standing as a reliable political and economic force for the countries of Central Asia as Moscow -- the region’s traditional dominant partner -- has grappled with financial and geopolitical fallout from the conflict.

After a decade of infrastructure investments around the globe through Beijing’s multibillion-dollar Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China wants to use the project to invest in new sectors and become a more strategic lender after facing criticism for a lack of transparency in BRI loans as it now grapples with a slowing domestic economy.

Facing such headwinds, China is looking to make the BRI smaller and greener through more risk-averse loans and investments in renewables, and Yau said this could factor into the results from Mirziyoev’s visit.

China, she notes, has been investing heavily in environmental and scientific research and monitoring, with several notable investments in Central Asia.

Tajikistan, which neighbors Uzbekistan to the southeast and shares a border with China, opened a Chinese observation station on Lake Sarez in 2021, reportedly for environmental research and “international disaster reduction and prevention,” according to the Chinese Academy of Sciences.

In July 2023, Chinese researchers also unveiled a new “super” observation post for climate and environmental monitoring in Shahritus, near the meeting point of China's borders with Uzbekistan and Afghanistan.

The stations have scientific and technological applications, but observers note the installations are part of a broad network of similar stations across BRI countries in South and Central Asia that could have dual applications for security and surveillance.

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Beijing has also looked to expand the list of countries cooperating with its space program, reaching an agreement with Turkmenistan in 2023.

While traditional Chinese investments in Central Asia are still in play, such as a proposed natural gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to China and a railway connecting China to Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, their futures are uncertain.

Yau said Beijing is looking to bring these new areas of investment and industry that it has expanded elsewhere in the world to Central Asia, and Uzbekistan, with a population of some 35 million, is an attractive partner.

One particular sector of interest is renewable energy and opening up new markets for Chinese electric vehicles.

China has been positioning itself as a market leader around the world for years and, in December, China’s Henan Suda signed a deal with the Uzbek Energy Ministry to build some 50,000 charging stations for electric vehicles around the country by 2033.

“These are areas where China is becoming a global leader and it wants to bring them to Central Asia,” Yau said.

New President, New Era

While events like the war in Ukraine have affected the relative appeal of Beijing and Moscow as partners for Central Asia, Mirziyoev’s high-profile visit is the product of years of warming ties between China and Uzbekistan, says Temur Umarov, a fellow at the Carnegie Russia-Eurasia Center in Berlin.

“This direction towards China has been Mirziyoev’s priority from the beginning,” he told RFE/RL. “Mirziyoev is very interested in China and often quotes [former Chinese leader] Deng Xiaoping in his speeches; and he clearly sees the country as an example for how to develop economically.”

China’s experience combating top-level corruption under Xi and its efforts to lift millions out of poverty, Umarov says, have been a particular focus for the Uzbek leader since he came to power in 2016 following the death of Islam Karimov, the country’s first ruler after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.

“China has become a source of knowledge in a way for Mirziyoev,” Umarov said. “Given that Uzbekistan is a personalistic regime, how he sees China matters a lot.”

Uzbekistan followed a far more isolationist foreign policy under Karimov that was suspicious of outside influence.

China was still an important partner, with Chinese leader Hu Jintao inviting Karimov to Beijing for a visit in 2005 less than two weeks after the bloody crackdown against protesters in the northeastern Uzbek city of Andijon, though the relationship was limited. Under the hard-line Karimov regime, Chinese companies and capital in many sectors of the economy were restricted.

That changed following Karimov’s death, which brought Mirziyoev to power.

As the new Uzbek president has opened up his country’s economy, China has been both a reliable source of investment and a valuable ally that has helped Mirziyoev build his legitimacy at home and abroad.

As Umarov notes, China’s own model of opening its economy while retaining tight political control is one that looks increasingly appealing to Mirziyoev.

“This is very relevant to him as he tries to build his own political regime based on Karimov's heritage,” Umarov said. “He knows that he needs to adapt to the world and learn from similar regimes about how to navigate the complex realities of today.”

Air strikes and diplomatic sparring between Iran and Pakistan have raised difficult questions for China and its influence in the region amid growing fears the upheaval sweeping across the Middle East could spread.

Since the tit-for-tat strikes on January 16 and 18 against militant and separatist groups, Islamabad and Tehran have signaled they want to de-escalate the situation and that their foreign ministers will hold talks in Pakistan on January 29.

But the attacks have exposed the fine line between peace and conflict in the region and put the spotlight on China, a close partner of both countries, to see if it can use its sway to ramp down tensions and avoid a conflict that would jeopardize Beijing's economic and geopolitical interests in the region.

"For China, the stakes are high and they really can't afford for things to get any worse between Iran and Pakistan," Abdul Basit, an associate research fellow at Singapore's S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, told RFE/RL.

China has tens of billions of dollars of investments in Iran and Pakistan and both countries are high-level partners that benefit from Chinese political and economic support.

Following the missile-strike exchange, China's Foreign Ministry called for calm and said it would "play a constructive role in cooling down the situation," without giving details.

Beijing is now expected to step up its engagement to head off another crisis in the region, in what analysts say is yet another test for China's influence after recently hitting its limit with the war in Gaza, shipping attacks in the Red Sea by Iranian-backed Huthi militants, and the growing instability across the Middle East these events have caused.

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"We're yet to see anything really concrete where China has stepped in to solve an international crisis," Sari Arho Havren, an associate fellow at London's Royal United Services Institute, told RFE/RL. "[But] China has a reputational image at stake where it's presenting itself as the alternative to the United States, even though assumptions about how powerful it really is in the Middle East are now being scrutinized."

What's Going On Between Iran And Pakistan?

The Iranian strikes in Pakistan were part of a series of similar attacks launched by Iran that also hit targets in Iraq and Syria.

In Pakistan, Tehran said it was targeting the Sunni separatist group Jaish al-Adl with drones and missiles in Pakistan's southwestern Balochistan Province. Jaish al-Adl operates mostly in Iran's southeastern Sistan-Baluchistan Province but is also suspected to be in neighboring Pakistan. The group claimed responsibility for a December 15 attack on a police station in southeastern Iran that killed 11 officers.

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In response, Islamabad said its military conducted air strikes in Sistan-Baluchistan targeting the Baloch Liberation Front and the Baloch Liberation Army, two separatist groups believed to be hiding in Iran.

The exchange of strikes was followed by Pakistan recalling its ambassador from Iran and blocking Tehran's ambassador to Islamabad from returning to his post.

On January 21, the Counterterrorism Department in Pakistan's southwestern Sindh Province announced it had arrested a suspect in a 2019 assassination attempt on a top Pakistani cleric who is a member of the Zainebiyoun Brigade, a militant group allegedly backed by Iran.

But since the strikes on each other's territory, Iran and Pakistan have cooled their rhetoric and signaled that they intend to de-escalate, echoing sentiment through official statements that the neighbors are "brotherly countries" that should pursue dialogue and cooperation.

Basit says this stems largely from the fact that the countries see themselves spread too thin in dealing with a host of pressing foreign and domestic issues.

Tehran has grappled with a series of attacks across the country, including a January 3 twin bombing that killed more than 90 people, and is engaged across the region directly or through groups that it backed such as Yemen's Huthis and Lebanon's Hizballah.

The tit-for-tat attacks, meanwhile, come as Pakistan is embroiled in an economic crisis and prepares to hold high-stakes elections on February 8, the first since former Prime Minister Imran Khan was removed in a vote of no confidence in April 2021, setting off years of escalating political turmoil.

"Between the economy, elections, and always-present tensions with India that could grow, Pakistan simply can't afford another front," Basit said.

Islamabad and Tehran are now pushing to cool down the situation, though Basit adds that the situation remains tense. "There is peace and calm now, but the animosity is ongoing," he said.

How Much Leverage Does China Have?

Following a week of tensions, China has leverage to push for a diplomatic settlement to the dispute, although experts say Beijing may be reluctant to intervene too publicly.

"China looks to be quite measured here in its response and that raises some questions about where China stands in using its influence," Basit said. "China knows it can influence the situation, but Beijing also usually shies away from situations like this because they worry that if they try and fail, then the West will look at it differently."

Beijing raised expectations in March 2023 it would play a larger political role in the Middle East when it brokered a historic deal between regional rivals Iran and Saudi Arabia.

Michael Kugelman, the director of the Wilson Center's South Asia Institute, says China's willingness to be a mediator shouldn't be underplayed. "It looks like the Pakistanis and the Iranians had enough in their relationship to ease tensions themselves," he told RFE/RL. "But China was willing to do the Iran-Saudi deal, which is a more fraught relationship to get involved in. So, they might be relieved now, but that doesn't mean they won't step up if needed."

China also holds other cards if it needs to calm the situation between Iran and Pakistan.

As China's "iron brother," Islamabad has a close partnership with Beijing, with cooperation ranging from economic investment to defense. Pakistan is the largest buyer of Chinese weapons and is also home to the multibillion-dollar China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a flagship series of infrastructure projects within China's Belt and Road Initiative.

CPEC is part of Beijing's efforts to connect itself to the Arabian Sea and build stronger trade networks with the Middle East.

A centerpiece of the venture is developing the port of Gwadar in Balochistan, which would strengthen shipping lanes to the region, particularly for energy shipments from Iran.

For Tehran, China is a top buyer of sanctioned Iranian oil, and Beijing signed a sprawling 25-year economic and security agreement with Iran in 2021.

Arho Havren says that given both Iran and Pakistan's economic dependence on China, Beijing will do all it can, should tensions rise, but will likely do so behind the scenes. "China [is unlikely] to take a stronger public stake in the conflict, but will instead use its back-channels," Arho Havren said.

What Comes Next?

While the situation between Iran and Pakistan is moving towards de-escalation, the recent tensions highlight the often tenuous footing of regional rivalries that China's ambitions to lead the Global South rest upon.

Both Pakistan and Iran are members of the Beijing-led Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which also includes India, Russia, and Central Asia (minus Turkmenistan). The SCO has been an important part of Beijing's bid for leadership across parts of Asia and the Middle East while looking to bring together countries to work together on economic and security issues.

China has invested in growing the bloc and is in discussion to add more countries, such as Saudi Arabia and Belarus, but further conflict between its members could derail those moves and damage the SCO's credibility.

Arho Havren says Beijing will still have to grapple with the lack of trust between Islamabad and Tehran and is facing similar issues elsewhere in the Middle East as it walks a tightrope between simultaneously raising its international influence and limiting any diplomatic exposure that could hurt its reputation.

"Cooperation may be easy, but the relations between the countries in the region are complex, and China's journey [in the Middle East] is still in its beginning," she said.