Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods.
I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and, this week, I'm looking at the big decisions the EU will (and won't) be taking before the winter break.
Note to Readers: You can now listen to my briefings by clicking on the audio link below. We're actually using an AI version of my voice and would love to know what you think -- and, of course, what we can improve.
The Briefing: Clearing The Decks Before The Winter Break
Normally, the week leading up to the winter holiday in the European Union is the busiest, with thorny decisions to be made before the year ends. Just look at last year, when EU leaders eventually gave Moldova and Ukraine the green light to start accession talks, granted Georgia candidate status, and approved a rather wide-ranging sanctions package on Russia. They also agreed to channel some previously frozen funds for Hungary while controversially failing to get Budapest's thumbs up for a 50 billion euro ($53 billion) package for Ukraine. (That package was eventually approved by Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban in February).
This year's pre-holidays agenda looks rather uneventful in comparison. A new, puny sanctions package on Moscow was agreed to by EU ambassadors already on December 11, but it was more significant for the derogations -- EU speak for the various exemptions -- that came with it.
On Ukraine, It's Business As Usual
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy will attend the EU summit on December 19, but there is no big decision to be made on Kyiv. Compare the jubilant scenes in Tbilisi a year ago when Georgia received candidate status to what's happening now when the Georgian authorities are cracking down on people protesting the government's decision to halt EU talks. In fact, the way Brussels reacts to the increasingly hard-line leadership in Georgia will be one of the few things to look out for this week.
For Ukraine, the latest draft EU summit conclusions, seen by RFE/RL, "reconfirms the European Union's unwavering commitment to providing continued political, financial, economic, humanitarian, military, and diplomatic support to Ukraine and its people for as long as it takes and as intensely as needed. Russia must not prevail."
This is the line the bloc has stuck to for the entire year, and while there has been talk of negotiations with Moscow in the new year, the EU seems to be sticking to its "business as usual" approach to Kyiv. While there was plenty of Hungarian intransigence on financially supporting Kyiv last time around, everything is already set for 2025, as Budapest agreed in November to the G7-EU initiative of leveraging frozen Russian assets in the West to channel a 45 billion euro ($47 billion) loan to Kyiv. On top of that, another 12.5 billion euros will be coming directly from the EU's budget.
My understanding is that, during the summit, Zelenskiy will also push EU member states to ramp up defense production, preferably in direct cooperation with Ukraine's defense industry, and to provide Kyiv with air defense systems and drone interception capabilities.
On sanctions, the summit conclusions draft simply notes that "the European Union remains ready to step up pressure on Russia, including by adopting further sanctions." Early next year, the European Commission will most likely come up with a proposal for a new package, the 16th since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. This will come as Poland assumes the rotating six-month presidency of the Council of the EU on January 1, and Warsaw has signaled its intention to prioritize more restrictive measures against Moscow.
By looking at the most recently approved 15th package, the signs are not particularly encouraging.
No new sectors of the Russian economy were targeted; instead, Slovakia got a derogation to continue to import Russian oil via the Druzhba pipeline for another six months.
The biggest fight around this package was Latvia and Lithuania pushing France, Germany, and Italy to disinvest quicker from the Russian market. However, nothing was agreed on this and there is only a reference in the latest sanctions package that it is risky doing business in Russia and that it's time to wind down EU companies working there.
For Albania And Montenegro, The Race Is On...
The special EU-Western Balkans summit in Brussels on December 18 -- between the leaders of Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia and their EU counterparts -- isn't likely to be particularly eventful.
The draft declaration, seen by RFE/RL, contains no new elements, with EU officials telling me that the main "deliverable" is largely symbolic, simply consisting of the fact that the region's leaders are meeting EU officials ahead of the regular EU summit.
The "Balkan Six" already had dinner with the new president of the European Council, Antonio Costa, and the freshly appointed EU foreign policy chief, Kaja Kallas, earlier in December. That the pair had only just started their new roles is an indication of the high priority that has been given to the region in Brussels.
The key day, for at least some of the Western Balkan countries, will instead be a few days before the summit. On December 17, the EU member states' Europe ministers will approve the annual EU enlargement conclusions and participate in a couple of Intergovernmental Conferences (IGCs).
Albania will participate in one of those meetings, during which it will open two EU accession chapters related to foreign policy. Tirana already opened negotiations on five chapters in October and has real momentum behind its membership bid.
The other IGC, which took place on December 16, was for Montenegro.
Montenegro has already opened negotiations on all 33 policy chapters, but, for the first time since 2017, Podgorica closed three chapters -- on information society, industrial policy, and intellectual property.
This means that EU laws in these spheres have now been transposed into Montenegrin law. Given that, in 12 years of negotiations with Brussels, Montenegro has only managed to close three other chapters, this step is rather significant. EU diplomats have been hinting recently that Montenegro could potentially join the bloc this decade.
...While Serbia Is Blocked
There was a big push to have a third IGC this week and to open a number of negotiation chapters with Serbia as well. This push came mainly from Budapest, big EU member states such as France and Italy, as well as the European Commission, which has suggested that Belgrade is ready to proceed with its EU integration ever since its annual enlargement report in October.
However, the three Baltic states, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, blocked the process due to Belgrade's continued nonalignment with the EU's sanctions policy on Russia. Additionally, the Netherlands withheld approval, citing Serbia's failure to meet benchmarks on some of the chapters they were supposed to open.
The issue of Serbia's progress is likely to resurface in the first half of 2025, and, by then, it might very well be linked to the opening of negotiating chapters with Ukraine and Moldova. Kyiv and Chisinau are expected to officially start the EU accession process under the Polish presidency, even though Hungary has indicated that it may not give its consent to Ukraine, arguing that the ethnic Hungarian minority in the country is still being discriminated against. Don't be surprised to see a grand bargain in 2025 where both Serbia and Ukraine get the green light.
Addressing The Crisis In Georgia
The situation in Georgia will feature prominently this week. The draft EU summit conclusions on the South Caucasus republic are rather weak, simply noting that the European Council "reiterates its serious concerns regarding the course of action taken by the Georgian government, which runs counter to the values and principles upon which the European Union is founded."
The commission also "regrets" the Georgian government's decision to suspend the country's EU accession process until 2028. There is also strong condemnation of the recent violence against Georgians protesting the government's decision to put EU accession on ice, with the text making clear that "the Georgian authorities must respect the right of freedom of assembly and of expression and refrain from using force. All acts of violence must be investigated and those responsible held accountable."
The text isn't harsher due to both Hungary and Slovakia not wanting to take a hard line against the leadership of Georgia, who both countries see as their ally.
This support for the ruling Georgian Dream party also suggests that any EU sanctions against the Georgian leadership -- including against Bidzina Ivanishvili, the party chairman and deeply influential billionaire -- are likely to be ruled out, following the measures taken by Estonia and Lithuania earlier in December Don't rule out, though, that more individual EU member states will follow Estonia and Lithuania and take their own measures.
There has been some discussion in Brussels about the possibility of suspending visa liberalization for some Georgian passport holders -- notably those holding diplomatic passports. That would be largely a symbolic move, as most officials have "normal" passports as well.
But the proposal is being considered for two reasons.
Firstly, you don't need unanimity to impose this measure. Instead, a qualified majority of 55 percent of the EU member states, representing 65 percent of the bloc's total population, is all that's required.
Secondly, such a proposal is seen as much "fairer" than going for a general visa liberalization suspension, which would impact the entire Georgian population.
The issue of suspending visas for Georgian diplomats was discussed at length back when the bloc's foreign ministers met in Brussels on October 16. No real decision was made, but the European Commission, which would initiate the whole suspension process, received political guidance from member states to look into the matter more closely and come back with a proposal -- something that can happen later this week.
The European Commission has actually already opened up the pathway for visa suspension, when, on December 6, it published its annual report on the visa suspension mechanism.
This report covers what the countries enjoying visa liberalization in the Western Balkans, as well as Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine, are doing in the area of justice, home affairs, and fundamental rights in order to maintain their status. And it is fair to say that Georgia received the worst review of all countries assessed this year.
The report notes that "there are ongoing reflections on the possible activation of the visa suspension mechanism in relation to certain categories of persons" and adds that "[Georgia] needs to take further urgent action to address the Commission's recommendations, particularly in the area of the protection of fundamental rights."
The report refers especially to Georgia's controversial "foreign agent" law and anti-LGBT measures, stating that they both "infringe upon human rights and fundamental freedoms, in particular the rights to freedom of association, expression, and privacy."
But that is far from the only complaint, even though it is the most serious one.
The report also says that Georgia made no progress on visa policy alignment with the EU, instead agreeing to a visa-waiver agreement with China earlier in 2024. It also bemoans the lack of a national anti-corruption strategy or action plan and Georgia's failure to set up an asset recovery office.
Looking Ahead
There is an interesting ruling coming up in an EU court on December 18. The Moldovan fugitive oligarch Ilan Shor and his colleague Marina Tauber are challenging the bloc's sanctions imposed on them in 2023 for undermining the sovereignty and political stability of Moldova.
The case is worth watching because the court in October ruled against the same type of sanctions that were targeting Vlad Plahotniuc, another Moldovan oligarch. (Plahotniuc does, however, remain sanctioned by the bloc, as the ruling concerned an older sanctions period, and the EU prolonged the restrictive measures before the court ruling.) But a win for Shor and Tauber would make another Moldova sanctions rollover in 2025 more complicated.
That's all for this year! I wish you all the best for the holiday season, and thank you very much for all your support and feedback throughout 2024!
Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on Twitter @RikardJozwiak, or on e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.
All the best,
Rikard Jozwiak
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