Accessibility links

Breaking News

China In Eurasia

Trains loaded with containers at the Altynkol railway in Kazakhstan along its border with China, near Khorgos.  (file photo)
Trains loaded with containers at the Altynkol railway in Kazakhstan along its border with China, near Khorgos.  (file photo)

Moving shipping containers from China through Russia to the European Union became a vital part of Beijing's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), but Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine and the Western sanctions that followed have forced China to search for alternatives.

Faced with the economic fallout of trade disruptions after five months of war, many freight forwarders that move Chinese goods are looking further south to move rail-cargo across Central Asia, the Caucasus, and Turkey to Europe despite long-standing logistical problems with the route.

“In order to survive, the BRI has no alternative but to adapt to the new circumstances.” Andreea Brinza, vice president of the Romanian Institute for the Study of the Asia-Pacific, told RFE/RL.

The main alternative is the roughly 6,500-kilometer network of roads, railroads, and ports stretching across Kazakhstan, the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey, and into Europe known as the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR).

It's also known as the Middle Corridor of the BRI -- the globe-spanning infrastructure and investment project championed by Chinese President Xi Jinping.

The route has received billions of dollars in Chinese investment in infrastructure over the last decade but received a smaller share of shipments due to cost and predictability concerns. As a result, Russian trains -- which brought goods directly to Europe by rail or port, or entered via Belarus -- became the main path for Chinese-EU overland trade, making up 68 percent of westbound traffic and 82 percent of eastbound traffic in 2021.

But that changed sharply following the Kremlin’s February invasion of Ukraine.

According to the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route Association, cargo shipments across Central Asia and the Caucasus are expected to reach 3.2 million metric tons in 2022, a sixfold increase over the previous year. The route also received a boost in April when Maersk, one of the world’s largest shipping corporations, canceled new bookings through Russia and started a train service along the Middle Corridor, which was joined by the Finnish company Nurminen Logistics in May.

Since then, multiple governments along the route -- from Turkey to Romania to Azerbaijan to Georgia to Kazakhstan -- have met to discuss further investment and deepening cooperation, including a state visit to Ankara in May by Kazakh President Qasym-Zhomart Toqaev, where he discussed the future of the route with his Turkish counterpart, Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

The refocus on shipments away from the Russian route also received the backing of many Chinese logistics companies, which had previously neglected the Middle Corridor as being unprofitable and vaguely defined.

“The combination of the preexisting interest [from governments along the route] and China’s limited options because of the war made the Middle Corridor possible,” Brinza said. “But [the] main driver of this route was China.”

Searching For Alternatives

The change marks a substantial and quick reversal of fortune for the TITR and opened up new possibilities for countries in Central Asia and the Caucasus.

The northern rail network through Russia was increasingly boosted by both Chinese and Russian officials as they deepened their ties, and it won over freight forwarders and cargo companies during the COVID-19 pandemic as an alternative to ocean transport because ports around the world closed or curtailed operations to try to stop the spread of the virus.

In 2018, Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered the state monopoly Russian Railways to substantially grow container traffic and -- prior to its invasion of Ukraine -- Moscow said it expected container flows to increase to 3.6 million boxes by 2035.

During that span, Beijing worked hard to subsidize, promote, and make profitable those railway lines and the efforts led to a 50 percent increase in cargo transported in 2020, a marked improvement from only a few years previously when trains mostly ran empty on the eastward route back to China.

As transit across Eurasia grew, the northern shipping route through Russia was boasted about as a BRI success story, with Chinese officials saying that it “provided continental supply chain stability.”

Containers and cargo vessels at the Qingdao port in China’s Shandong Province in May.
Containers and cargo vessels at the Qingdao port in China’s Shandong Province in May.

But with many large companies and shipping firms unable or unwilling to rely on transport through Russia, a substantial hole has been created and many governments are trying to capitalize by filling it.

Kazakhstan has announced plans to invest more into its ports along the Caspian Sea and its state-run railway operator Kazakhstan Temir Zholy reported that terminals along its western coast have already doubled their shipping volume.

Chinese officials have also moved to simplify transport, with Wang Lingjun, deputy minister of China’s General Administration of Customs, saying on May 25 that Beijing is improving its customs procedures at the Alashankou and Khorgos land ports on its border with Kazakhstan that would lead to increased volumes of goods being sent by rail.

Adapting To The Future

While the Middle Corridor is experiencing a boom because of the war in Ukraine, its future viability is far from guaranteed, says Emil Avdaliani, the director of Middle East studies at the Georgian think tank Geocase and a professor at the European University in Tbilisi.

Concerns largely stem from higher costs and more complicated logistics on the southerly route. While critical infrastructure is in place, some of which is the result of BRI projects, the geography of the Middle Corridor -- which consists of sea and land lines -- is more complex.

“The Middle Corridor also lacks infrastructure in the Caspian Sea for easier transit from Central Asian ports to Azerbaijan. Similar troubles beset the Georgian side of the Black Sea, especially since there is no deep-sea port,” Avdaliani said.

People walk by a display board showcasing China's construction projects at the media center of the Belt and Road Initiative in Beijing. (file photo)
People walk by a display board showcasing China's construction projects at the media center of the Belt and Road Initiative in Beijing. (file photo)

The construction of a deep-water port in Anaklia was embroiled in Georgia’s tumultuous domestic politics and the project was canceled by the government over concerns about financing. But Georgian Deputy Prime Minister Levan Davitashvili said in April that the venture has received new investor interest, even though its construction would still take years.

Avdaliani says domestic political concerns in many of the countries along the Middle Corridor are part of what propelled the Russian line to take on the majority of the overland freight shipments and that Beijing is unlikely to be satisfied relying on one route again. He says China may instead be looking to diversify and build up as many alternative lines as possible in the aftermath of the war in Ukraine.

A renewed push from Tashkent and Bishkek has led to progress on the long-delayed China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway project and all three parties said they hoped for construction to begin next year, which could help provide more alternatives and even be linked to countries further south, such as Turkmenistan and Iran.

“We often tend to portray the BRI as a static initiative, but [like] all trade routes throughout history, the BRI is fluid and is adapting to [new] challenges and opportunities,” Avdaliani says. “Closed borders require finding new routes and this is what is happening at the moment.”

Chinese President Xi Jinping (center) hosts the 14th BRICS Summit via video link from Beijing on June 23, as Russian President Vladimir Putin (bottom left) looks on.
Chinese President Xi Jinping (center) hosts the 14th BRICS Summit via video link from Beijing on June 23, as Russian President Vladimir Putin (bottom left) looks on.

Welcome back to the China In Eurasia briefing, an RFE/RL newsletter tracking China's resurgent influence from Eastern Europe to Central Asia.

I'm RFE/RL correspondent Reid Standish and here's what I'm following right now.

The Contradictions In Beijing's Russia Ties

From oil deals to diplomatic cover in international institutions, there's no denying that Beijing has supported Moscow throughout its war with Ukraine, but to what extent remains an issue of contention and highlights the deep contradictions in the China-Russia relationship.

Finding Perspective: China's growing appetite for discounted Russian oil made headlines in late June as Beijing overtook Germany as the biggest single buyer of Russian energy. India, which also has historic and complicated ties to Moscow, has also bought up Russian oil.

Despite being sold at a steep discount, the purchases -- along with climbing oil prices -- have allowed Russian revenues to grow in the face of Western pressure and given Moscow a crucial financial lifeline to keep funding its war effort.

But as Maria Shagina, a fellow at Britain's International Institute for Strategic Studies, told me: "China's rhetoric and deeds diverge quite a lot and that has been clear since 2014."

"China is eager to capitalize on Russia's isolation, including purchasing Russian cheap crude oil," she added. "But when it comes to violating Western sanctions, the Chinese private sector is usually quite cautious."

A recent study by the Peterson Institute for International Economics found that Chinese exports to Russia have plummeted during five months of war.

The study, which relied on data until the end of April, coupled with another analysis by the institute of China-only data through the end of May, shows that China's exports to Russia remained well below prewar levels.

Why It Matters: China has denounced sanctions and proclaimed that it will maintain normal economic relations with Russia, but Chinese exporters don't appear willing to risk violating export controls and sanctions.

At the end of June, the United States also placed five Chinese companies on an export blacklist for violating sanctions by allegedly providing support to Russia's military and defense companies before and during the invasion of Ukraine.

It wasn't specified what kind of support was provided, but a White House official clarified that they "have not seen China provide Russia with military equipment or systematic evasion of sanctions."

The Washington Post also reported that Russian officials are growing frustrated with Beijing pushing back against their calls for deeper economic support.

Another area that the Russians are hoping to get more Chinese support on is with advanced electronics and semiconductors, something that Russian officials have been outspoken about recently, including Deputy Prime Minister Yury Borisov.

"Of course, we are counting on help from colleagues in China, who received technological sovereignty 10 years ago," Borisov said on June 29.

Read More

● As Beijing has turned to cheap Russian oil, Iran -- another major supplier that relies on China -- is being forced to discount its already cheap oil even more to stay competitive on the Chinese market, Bloomberg reports.

● Whether the current state of close relations between China and Russia can last is a top question on many minds at the moment. Foreign Affairs surveyed a group of leading experts to see where they think things are headed.

Expert Corner: Kyrgyzstan's China Debt

Readers asked: "Kyrgyzstan has raised the alarm about its large debt owed to China and what could happen if it doesn't meet its payments. How likely is it that Bishkek won't be able to pay and what cards does the government have to play as it deals with payments owed to Beijing?"

To find out more, I asked Kubat Kasymbekov, a journalist with RFE/RL's Kyrgyz Service:

"Kyrgyzstan's debt to China's Exim Bank has increased by almost 12 times since 2010, reaching $1.8 billion. Now it makes up 42 percent of the country's total foreign debt. The foreign-debt-repayment volume is rising year by year. If $200 million were enough to settle the debt payment owed in 2020, the country will need to find at least twice that by 2024.

"This means that risks are high, as the government has warned, China might take control of some strategic Kyrgyz facilities where it invested, if payments are not met. Some experts believe extending China's involvement in Kyrgyzstan's mining sector could be one of the options to relieve the debt. Repeated warnings about 'the worst-case scenarios' could also galvanize public support for these previously unpopular government proposals.

"Despite growing debt pressure, the authorities seem to have a plan and an urgency to make their payment to China, with President Sadyr Japarov promising not to delay foreign debt repayment even for ‘one hour.'"

Do you have a question about China's growing footprint in Eurasia? Send it to me at StandishR@rferl.org or reply directly to this e-mail and I'll get it answered by leading experts and policymakers.

Three More Stories From Eurasia

1. Watching South Asia

Citing Pakistani government sources, Nikkei Asian Review reported that China wants its own security companies to guard its citizens and assets in Pakistan after a series of attacks on Chinese interests over the last year.

The Details: According to the report, Islamabad denied the request, but Beijing is likely to push again as it faces a new era of security threats in Pakistan and across South Asia more broadly. (The Chinese Foreign Ministry denied that it had made such requests).

Pakistan is home to the $60 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, a massive bundle of infrastructure and investment deals that is part of Beijing's Belt and Road Initiative.

But while China's economic footprint has grown and more Chinese workers have come to Pakistan, they've also increasingly been targeted.

Frustrated with this situation, Beijing is clearly not satisfied with the status quo when it comes to security in the region. Things also remain volatile in neighboring Afghanistan and despite warming ties with the Taliban and lots of rhetoric coming from Beijing, China is still treading cautiously in its engagement with the country.

That's tough news for Kabul and Islamabad, who see their economic futures relying heavily on Chinese investment, something Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif said recently.

2. A Footprint In Bosnia

Despite lacking the necessary legal permits and facing growing pushback from local activists, a Chinese company is moving forward with plans to build a hydroelectric plant in southeastern Bosnia-Herzegovina, my colleague Goran Katic from RFE/RL's Balkan Service reported.

What It Means: The proposed plant is located close to the town of Foca within the Bosnian Serb entity of Republika Srpska, some 25 kilometers from the Bosnian-Montenegrin border.

The entire project is worth some $107 million and is the result of an agreement signed in Beijing in 2019 between Republika Srpska Prime Minister Radovan Viskovic and the state-owned China National Aero-technology International Engineering Corporation (AVIC).

But activists have sounded the alarm over the project, noting that it still does not have the necessary environmental permits to begin construction and is lacking an environmental-impact study on how the plant will affect the nearby Bistrica River.

Despite these lingering concerns, ground was broken on the hydroelectric complex in December 2021 at a ceremony attended by Republika Srpska officials and representatives from the Chinese Embassy in Sarajevo.

Boris Mrkela from the investment-monitoring group Just Finance International says that such cases are becoming more common in the Balkans.

"According to our research, the constant among all Chinese investors in the Western Balkans is the readiness to start work on projects that lack significant permits," he said.

3. Unrest In Central Asia

At least 18 people were killed and 243 wounded during unrest in Uzbekistan's autonomous province of Karakalpakstan that began on July 1, RFE/RL's Uzbek Service reported.

What You Need To Know: Security forces detained hundreds during the protests that erupted over plans to curtail Karakalpakstan's autonomy. Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoev dropped plans to amend articles of the constitution concerning Karakalpakstan's sovereignty and also declared a monthlong state of emergency.

Beijing has been comparatively silent on the protests, but Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhao Lijian said on July 4 that China supported the Uzbek government in maintaining national stability and believes in Mirziyoev's leadership.

China already watched unrest overtake Kazakhstan back in January and the prospect of deeper unrest spreading to another Chinese partner in Central Asia is worrying.

Across The Supercontinent

NATO and Asia: Following its summit in Madrid, NATO adopted a new strategic concept for the next decade, where it formally defined China for the first time as "a challenge." My colleague Rikard Jozwiac was in Madrid covering the summit and broke down the key takeaways here.

Beijing Responds: This didn't go unnoticed in China, which was already growing critical of NATO due to its growing ties with Asian countries. With an eye on NATO as it's set to expand, Beijing called on the Shanghai Cooperation Organization to oppose what it called "hegemonic bullying" by the military alliance.

The Springboard: A new study by the Digital Forensic Center finds that more than half of the investments or loans from Chinese companies in Europe have gone into the Balkans, RFE/RL's Balkan Service reported.

An Extra "I": Iran applied to join the BRICS group of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa that both Beijing and Moscow portray as an emerging-market alternative to the West.

One Thing To Watch

TikTok, the prolific social-media app that is owned by Beijing-based ByteDance, is under scrutiny after a series of investigations and lawsuits pertaining to the Chinese government being able to access the data of users collected through the platform.

The Trump administration launched an all-out war on TikTok, attempting to have the app shut down in the United States unless it fully spun off from ByteDance. His administration announced an ownership deal that would have moved TikTok's headquarters to the United States, but the deal was ultimately scuttled.

While the Biden administration has not followed its predecessor's scorched-earth approach, the White House has continued national-security negotiations with the company to make sure the data of Americans is safe and new measures could be on the way.

That's all from me for now. Don't forget to send me any questions, comments, or tips that you might have.

Until next time,

Reid Standish

If you enjoyed this briefing and don't want to miss the next edition, subscribe here. It will be sent to your in-box on the first and third Wednesdays of each month.

Load more

About The Newsletter

In recent years, it has become impossible to tell the biggest stories shaping Eurasia without considering China’s resurgent influence in local business, politics, security, and culture.

Subscribe to this weekly dispatch in which correspondent Reid Standish builds on the local reporting from RFE/RL’s journalists across Eurasia to give you unique insights into Beijing’s ambitions and challenges.

To subscribe, click here.

RFE/RL has been declared an "undesirable organization" by the Russian government.

If you are in Russia or the Russia-controlled parts of Ukraine and hold a Russian passport or are a stateless person residing permanently in Russia or the Russia-controlled parts of Ukraine, please note that you could face fines or imprisonment for sharing, liking, commenting on, or saving our content, or for contacting us.

To find out more, click here.

XS
SM
MD
LG