Wider Europe

Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods.

I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I'm drilling down on two major issues: the question of whether the EU should further sanction Belarus, and what to expect when European diplomats descend on Kyiv for a summit in early February.

Brief #1: How Far Will EU Sanctions On Belarus Go?

What You Need To Know: In early January, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced that the EU would soon come up with a new package of sanctions on Belarus to punish the country for supporting Russia's war in Ukraine. No new proposals have yet to be introduced, even though the first talks among EU member states -- known as "confessionals" -- started over the weekend.

The working assumption among Brussels diplomats is that the new measures on Belarus will be part of the bloc's 10th sanctions package on the Kremlin. It could be ready for approval around the first anniversary of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24.

Belarus has long been targeted by various restrictive measures by the EU, starting with five separate sanctions packages slapped on Minsk after the crackdown on people protesting the fraudulent presidential election in August 2020 and, a year later, the forced landing of a Ryanair flight in Minsk to arrest a journalist, Raman Pratasevich, and his partner, Sofia Sapega.

The restrictive measures were further tightened after what the EU claimed to be the Belarusian authorities' active participation in organizing illegal border crossings through Belarus to the EU of nationals from the Middle East and North Africa in late 2021.

These sanctions mainly included asset freezes and visa bans on up to 200 individuals, including the country's authoritarian ruler, Alyaksandr Lukashenka, and his inner circle. There have also been other measures, such as a ban on Belarusian airlines flying over EU airspace and landing at EU airports.

Deep Background: When Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, Brussels quickly acknowledged Minsk's role and included Belarus in some of the first rounds of sanctions targeting the Kremlin -- even though those measures were always tougher on Moscow. The EU moved to impose trade restrictions in industries such as wood, cement, iron and steel products, and rubber. Potash, one of Belarus's main exports to Europe, was also targeted with the sanctioning of its biggest potash producer, Belaruskali.

On top of that, several Belarusian banks were hit, including the country's central bank. It also became illegal in the EU to accept deposits exceeding 100,000 euros ($109,000) from Belarusian nationals or residents.

Yet, the last sanctions imposed by the EU on Belarus were in June 2022 and, since then, the bloc has enacted numerous other measures on Russia, including three additional rounds of sanctions. This despite calls from hawkish EU member states such as Lithuania and Poland that the measures against Moscow should be "mirrored" on Minsk.

Drilling Down

• According to several diplomats familiar with the matter but who are not authorized to speak publicly, one of the reasons Belarus hasn't been hit by sanctions in recent months is that Ukraine has asked Brussels not to target Minsk.
• While Kyiv has officially dismissed this theory, the logic is that Kyiv is wary of Belarus becoming more involved in the war and concerned about pushing Minsk further into Moscow's corner. The desire not to antagonize Minsk, so the logic goes, also explains the reluctance of Ukrainian leaders to meet with Belarusian opposition figures.
• With that in mind, it is likely that the next round of EU sanctions on Belarus will be weak. More listings are certain, as is plugging certain holes in the current legislation. For example, while wood imports are now banned, wooden furniture is not. Synthetic rubber and various glass products have still not been targeted. There is also an extensive EU ban on member states exporting various items used for tobacco production in Belarus, even though some cigarette filters can still be sent from the EU.
• There are other potentially harder-hitting measures under consideration, including a ban on exporting luxury goods to Belarus and a prohibition on EU firms offering services such as accounting, auditing, tax consulting, and public relations. Broadcasters such as Belarus 24, RTR Belarus, and NTV Belarus could also be targeted and face similar measures to Russia's RT and Sputnik: banning them from broadcasting within the EU and making their websites inaccessible.
• And if the EU really decided to crack down, the bloc could target Belarus's telecommunications, computer, and IT sectors, which are some of Minsk's main exports, worth an estimated $3 billion in 2021.

Brief #2: Looking Ahead To The EU-Ukraine Summit In Kyiv

What You Need To Know: In early February, many of the EU's key players will descend on Kyiv.

Firstly, on February 2, von der Leyen will take the majority of her 26 commissioners to the Ukrainian capital to meet with the Ukrainian government. The next day is the annual EU-Ukraine summit, in which European Council President Charles Michel will accompany von der Leyen and EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell -- along with an enormous security detail.

The aim is for Brussels to show its support and solidarity with Ukraine, as the country is facing increased Russian attacks in the east, and to encourage Kyiv to continue the reforms needed for eventual membership in the EU.

Deep Background: The EU will bring to Kyiv some "deliverables," even though many of them already will be announced by the time of the summit. The first tranche of 3 billion euros in macro-financial assistance to Ukraine was disbursed recently, with an additional 15 billion euros due in the course of 2023.

With stories about countries sending heavy weaponry dominating the news, the EU will also announce another 500 million euros of military support to Kyiv, bringing the total since the war began to 3.6 billion euros. In the grand scheme of things, it is not a huge amount, especially when compared to the United States' spending of $27.5 billion. But considering that the EU money comes from the common coffers and that the union has never before directly armed a third country, it is significant, nonetheless.

Brussels also hopes that, by then, it can announce that 3,000 Ukrainian soldiers have been trained on EU territory since it launched a training program last fall across the bloc. Then there's the EU's assistance for the estimated 8 million Ukrainians who have fled the country over the past year and are now living in the bloc. The Temporary Protection Directive -- which allows them to stay and work in the EU -- was recently extended to March 2024.

Drilling Down

• Much of the run-up to the summit has already been dominated by EU officials haggling over the summit declaration. A draft of it, seen by RFE/RL, outlines a few more potential outcomes from the meeting. It notes, among other things, that the European Union and Ukraine will sign a memorandum of understanding on a strategic partnership on renewable gases, even though, as of now, no concrete details are provided.
• Another paragraph in the text advocates for Ukraine to join the EU's roaming-free zone by noting that "Ukraine welcomed the EU's ongoing determination and efforts to include Ukraine in the European roaming area as soon as possible. The EU acknowledged the efforts that Ukraine has made in aligning its telecommunications sector with European provisions and encouraged the country to continue on this path."
• According to sources familiar with the discussions but who aren't allowed to speak on the record, the biggest fight among diplomats, regarding the draft summit declaration, has been about Ukraine's EU membership perspective, with the three Baltic states and Poland pushing for language that would indicate to Kyiv that its membership application can be sped up.
• In the end, the vast majority of EU member states have pushed back against that fast track and would prefer to stick with the already agreed upon "choreography" -- meaning that the European Commission will provide everyone with an update on how Ukraine is doing, in terms of fulfilling the seven requirements that Brussels set in order to start EU accession talks. And then, in October, the assessment and further recommendations would be published.
• It is, of course, impossible to predict if the commission will recommend that accession talks start soon and if EU member states will, by the end of 2023, unanimously endorse such a recommendation. Speaking to EU officials familiar with the matter, they believe that the best-case scenario for Ukraine would be to start EU accession talks in late 2024 or even early 2025.
• The officials note that Ukraine has made good progress in enacting a new media law and pushing forward with key nominations on the country's Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office. More needs to be done, though, in other judicial areas, with the draft declaration stating that "reform of the Constitutional Court and the selection procedure of politically independent and qualified constitutional judges, remains vital for strengthening Ukraine's resilience."

Looking Ahead

EU foreign ministers gather in Brussels on January 23, and one of the decisions they are set to take will be to green-light a new civilian EU mission to Armenia. The EU employed 40 observers in Armenia between October and December 2022, but the idea now is to have a larger mission (around 100 people) ready to start in February that will cover the whole (de facto) territory of Armenia for two years. According to an EU document seen by RFE/RL, the mission should play "a significant role in supporting efforts toward the normalization of relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan."

And last but not least, there's likely to be plenty of talk this week about price caps. Firstly, the EU and countries such as Australia, Canada, Japan, and the United States will review the price cap on Russian crude oil that was set at $60 per barrel in early December. Considering that the current market price is lower than $50, there might be a push to lower that cap. From February 5, there will also be a new price cap introduced -- with the price still to be set -- on other Russian petroleum products such as diesel and kerosene.

That's all for this week. Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on Twitter @RikardJozwiak or on e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.

Until next time,

Rikard Jozwiak

If you enjoyed this briefing and don't want to miss the next edition, subscribe here. It will be sent to your inbox every Monday.

And you can always reach us at newsletters@rferl.org.

Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods.

I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I'm drilling down on two major issues: How Brussels will deal with Kosovo's EU application and how lobbying in Brussels will change for EU hopefuls in the wake of Qatar-gate.

Brief #1: Kosovo's EU Membership Application Is A First For Brussels

What You Need To Know: Kosovo officially applied to join the European Union on December 15. Pristina has long sought eventual membership in Western organizations, but the move was sped up by Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February last year and the subsequent renewed impetus of the EU enlargement process with Bosnia-Herzegovina, Moldova, and Ukraine. Those three countries have all become official EU candidates in recent months.

With even Georgia applying for membership last year and getting potential candidate status, Kosovo was suddenly the only country left in Europe that had previously expressed hopes of one day joining the bloc but that still hadn't formally applied to do so.

Deep Background: Kosovo's application is a real head-scratcher in Brussels. Normally, when a country applies for membership, EU member states in the European Council simply send over the request to the European Commission, usually with minimal fuss, so that it can prepare an opinion. That process can sometimes take years. Not so in Kosovo's case.

That is because this is the first time ever that a country that isn't recognized by all EU member states is formally asking to become a part of the club. It is, in other words, a legal sui generis that Brussels must grapple with.

And it is not only the five non-recognizers of Kosovo -- Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia, and Spain -- that will have potential issues. Because of the naysaying quintet, the European Union, as an international organization, also does not regard Kosovo as a sovereign state. The bloc simply refers to the country as "Kosovo," with an asterisked footnote containing text agreed in the ongoing EU-facilitated dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina that reads: "This designation is without prejudice to the position of status and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence."

Drilling Down

• Sweden, which currently chairs the rotating six-month European Council presidency, officially briefed EU ambassadors in Brussels on the issue for the first time on January 11. It was a very short discussion in which only the Swedish ambassador spoke, informing his colleagues that all member states will be consulted in the upcoming two weeks and that they will reconvene toward the end of the month for a more thorough discussion and to potentially decide on a course of action.
• It is already clear that it will be very tricky to move forward. Not only will the five non-recognizers be reluctant to change their minds, Hungary recently signaled that it is against any moves that would indicate future EU membership for Kosovo, as Budapest claims it would jeopardize the chances of Kosovo and Serbia reaching a deal. Belgrade and Pristina have been locked in talks about normalizing mutual relations since 2011.
• There is, however, pressure for Sweden to do something with this issue before the end of its presidency, which concludes on July 1. Firstly, it is Spain, perhaps the most militant non-recognizer, that takes over the EU presidency next. And Madrid, with plenty of its own separatist quandaries, will almost certainly not want to deal with this question. Secondly, there is a serious risk that the issue will be buried next year. In 2024, Brussels will be consumed by a "changing of the guard," with European Parliament elections and the selection of new presidents for the European Council and European Commission.
• To just sit on the issue, though, would damage the EU's credibility. It could be solved in the European Council using Qualified Majority Voting (QVM). Instead of unanimity, in QVM only 55 percent of member states (representing at least 65 percent of the total EU population) need to vote in favor for a motion to pass -- meaning Kosovo would pass the muster. But there is a reluctance to use QVM, with a preference for reaching some kind of consensus among the 27 member states.
• The answer might be found in semantics, in particular the difference between "unanimity" and "consensus." The former means that everyone actively says yes -- in a vote or otherwise. The latter means that no one opposes. This offers the opportunity for countries like Spain to "look the other way" and to agree without being seen as endorsing the view that Kosovo is a sovereign state.
• It would also help if Serbia and Kosovo struck some sort of deal this spring. A draft proposal is on the table, and even if that wouldn't result in Serbian recognition of Kosovo's statehood, it could mean mutual recognition of national symbols such as passports, and that alone could go a long way in allaying the fears of the non-recognizers.

Brief #2: What Qatar-Gate Means For Lobbying

What You Need To Know: Brussels was rocked in December with the arrest of European Parliament Vice President Eva Kaili; her partner; a former Italian member of the European Parliament (MEP); and the boss of an NGO, perhaps ironically named Fight Impunity. They are now facing preliminary charges of corruption, money laundering, and participation in a criminal organization that could be related to an alleged bribery campaign organized by Qatar.

Kaili, who before the scandal was a rising star in both Greek and European politics, was immediately stripped of her immunity and vice president title, with the Belgian prosecutor reportedly finding 150,000 euros ($163,000) in cash at her Brussels apartment -- money she claimed she learned about on the day of her partner's arrest.

For now, the scandal is mostly confined to the European Parliament, with two more MEPs set to have their immunities revoked when the European Parliament plenary reconvenes on January 16.

Deep Background: The European Parliament is now busy coming up with new rules and regulations to prevent another Qatar-gate. On January 12, the house's powerful Conference of Presidents, which consists of the European Parliament president and the leaders of the chamber's political groupings, discussed a number of measures that they will now start to implement.

The measures will likely have an impact on how countries in the Western Balkans and the EU's Eastern Neighborhood lobby the chamber in the future. Brussels has always been something of a lobbyists' paradise, with thousands of politicians, officials, and diplomats in the same place with very lenient rules. But that might be about to change soon.

Drilling Down

• Under proposed new reforms, whistle-blowers will be better protected, even though details still have to be worked out and will take time to implement. One suggestion is a new, independent ethics commission that would oversee all EU institutions and have punitive power to fine or even suspend EU officials. It's ambitious and well-meaning, but also unlikely to get off the ground.
• Other ideas include a "cooling off period" for former MEPs who wish to work as lobbyists; a requirement that those who want to appear at European Parliament events be listed in the EU's transparency register; and a rule making it mandatory for MEPs to make public all scheduled meetings with third parties related to a report or resolution the European Parliament is working on.
• While EU candidate countries such as Ukraine and North Macedonia enjoy widespread support in the chamber, and the European Parliament is the EU institution keenest on rapid membership for these countries (even though they only have a limited say in this and other foreign policy fields), lobbying is still taking place, especially around the various reports and resolutions that concern these aspiring candidates.
• European Parliament resolutions might be nonbinding and have little bearing on EU policy in general, but countries affected tend to get rattled by them, and they garner a fair bit of media attention. The European Parliament's recent call to the Georgian authorities to release former Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili from jail and to impose sanctions on oligarch and political kingpin Bidzina Ivanishvili certainly didn't go unnoticed in Tbilisi. The chamber's resolution to classify Russia as a "terrorist state" in November made quite the media splash and apparently triggered a Kremlin-linked cyberattack on the parliament.
• There are other ideas being proposed that directly concern the Western Balkans and the bloc's Eastern partners. One is the banning of any unofficial groupings of MEPs, such as so-called Friendship Groups with third countries. Another idea is that countries' official interactions with the European Parliament would only be allowed through the Committee on Foreign Affairs, official parliamentary delegations to the country or region, or the European Parliament president.
• Another proposal likely to fly is that resolutions tabled with urgency, usually dealing with current human rights issues, must first be approved by the parliament's Committee on Foreign Affairs. That's because there have been complaints that previous urgent resolutions were the target of improper influence.

Looking Ahead

There have been quite a few announcements recently about more Western weapons deliveries to Ukraine. Expect more this week as the Ukraine Defense Contact Group will convene on January 20. The group, usually referred to as "the Ramstein Format" after the U.S military base in Germany where its first meeting was held last April, is a U.S.-led group of more than 40 countries. It includes all 30 NATO allies, the two NATO invitees, Finland and Sweden, and also other non-NATO countries such as Australia, Israel, Japan, Morocco, Qatar, and New Zealand.

Before the next meeting in Ramstein, the defense chiefs of all 30 NATO allies will convene in Brussels on January 18-19 for a meeting of the Military Committee, NATO's highest military authority. The war in Ukraine is expected to dominate proceedings there, as well.

The European Parliament will hold its first plenary of the year in Strasbourg this week. Ukraine will, of course, feature prominently throughout the four-day session. Perhaps the most interesting debate is taking place on January 17: "the establishment of a tribunal on the crime of aggression against Ukraine." While no such tribunal is expected under the auspices of the United Nations -- Security Council member Russia could just veto it -- the EU is looking into ways to establish such a body.

That's all for this week. Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on Twitter @RikardJozwiak or on e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.

Until next time,

Rikard Jozwiak

If you enjoyed this briefing and don't want to miss the next edition, subscribe here. It will be sent to your inbox every Monday.

And you can always reach us at newsletters@rferl.org.