Wider Europe

Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods.

I'm RFE/RL's Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I'm drilling down on two issues: Moldova's EU accession challenges and this year's Forum 2000 conference in Prague.

Brief #1: Maia Sandu And Moldova's EU Aspirations

What You Need To Know: Last week, I interviewed Moldovan President Maia Sandu during her state visit to the Czech Republic, which took place nearly seven years to the day after I sat down with her for the first time. Back in 2016, she visited Brussels to meet with various EU officials ahead of a presidential election later that year, which she contested on a pro-Western, anti-corruption ticket.

She was relatively unknown in the EU capital back then, having enjoyed a three-year stint as education minister in a government beset by internal quarrels and tainted by a bank fraud scandal that cost Moldova more than $1 billion -- around one-eighth of the country's GDP. And while she eventually -- and narrowly -- lost the election to the Moscow-friendly Igor Dodon, people in Brussels told me to keep an eye on Sandu as she seemed to have impressed people in town and was solidly backed by the center-right European People's Party (EPP) -- the epicenter of EU politics and home to influential politicians such as the European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and several of the bloc's prime ministers and presidents.

In 2020, she became president after defeating Dodon, and next year she is seeking reelection. She is doing so having secured EU candidate status for Moldova last year, shortly after the start of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine -- a watershed moment in European history that suddenly opened the EU door to former Soviet republics. Now widely recognized by several EU politicians and diplomats as the driving force behind Chisinau's EU push, she is eyeing membership in the exclusive club in record time.

Deep Background: All indications I have from sources familiar with the topic but who can't speak on the record is that the European Commission, when presenting the annual EU enlargement reports on November 8, will recommend that Moldova and Ukraine start EU accession talks.

Chisinau has fulfilled most of the nine recommendations that the commission set out for the country a year ago. There also is enlargement momentum in the bloc that will most likely result in the 27 EU member states unanimously endorsing the commission's recommendations when Europe ministers meet in Brussels on December 12 and rubber-stamping them two days later at summit of EU heads of state and government.

This means that the start of EU accession negotiations can happen by the end of this year or in early 2024. Now the question is how long these negotiations will last. Charles Michel, the current president of the European Council, recently said that the EU could be ready for a new enlargement by 2030, if necessary institutional reform is done on the EU side and candidate countries do their homework. Sandu confidently told me that "Moldova will be ready earlier than 2030" and that she hoped "that the EU will be ready to accept Moldova in the next few years."

That is very optimistic. Firstly, because the accession process is usually a hard slog. Take the two current "front-runners" in the accession process -- Montenegro and Serbia -- which in 10 years of negotiations have just "closed" talks in three and two policy chapters, respectively. But secondly, it also has to do with two very specific issues concerning Moldova: the breakaway Transdniester region and its relations with Ukraine.

Drilling Down

• So far, the European Commission and member states have decided that Moldova and Ukraine are "coupled." The thinking is that it's better to treat some countries as "a package" considering that they have similar challenges and that a group of countries seeking membership has a greater chance of getting attention and succeeding in joining. Think of the eight Central and Eastern European countries becoming EU members back in 2004 or Bulgaria and Romania three years later.
• In the current enlargement process, Albania and North Macedonia are, so far, also proceeding toward Brussels together. But herein also lies the disadvantage of such an approach. Due to North Macedonia's bilateral problems with Bulgaria, it looks like there will be a holdup on their EU accession path, and, out of fairness to Tirana, EU member states are currently thinking of "de-coupling" them.
• Would Moldova consider the same, taking into account that, for example, Ukraine's pace of reforms could be affected by the ongoing war? Sandu told me that "we do hope to go together. It is important for us that the EU include also Ukraine. And I do believe that it is important for Ukraine that Moldova is also part of the EU." But then she added, rather tellingly: "In the end, it's a merit-based approach, and we are going to work hard, and we do hope that the same is going to happen in Ukraine."
• But Moldova, of course, also has its own territorial problem: the Moscow-supported Transdniester region, a sliver of land stretching from the left bank of the Dniester River to neighboring Ukraine. I asked Sandu if she would consider a so-called "Cyprus solution" for Moldova -- meaning that the entire island of Cyprus was admitted to the bloc back in 2004, but de facto EU rules and laws only apply to its southern part.
• Interestingly, she didn't rule it out. Diplomatically, she noted, "Of course, we would like to become an EU member state as a reintegrated country." And then she hinted that a Ukrainian victory against Russia might pave the way for a solution in Transdniester as well: "There might be a geopolitical opportunity in the next several years because things depend on what's going to happen in the region, and we are ready to use this geopolitical opportunity."
• Of course, she cautioned that Chisinau wouldn't use any force to achieve this goal, stressing "that the peaceful solution is the only acceptable solution." But then came the really interesting bit: "On the other hand, if this first scenario does not happen, I do believe that we should consider integrating Moldova into the EU into two steps. First, the right bank of the Dniester and then the left bank of the Dniester." When I pressed if this, then, would be a "Cyprus solution," the cryptic answer was, "We should discuss this."
• Now, EU diplomats tell me that this isn't an issue right now as Moldova is still far from joining. But it will be intriguing to see how Brussels will deal with this in the accession talks. Serbia has, for example, an extra negotiating chapter compared to Montenegro -- No. 35 -- called "relations with Kosovo." That means that this bilateral issue must be solved before Serbia can become an EU member.
• Another interesting aspect is the much-debated paper written by French and German think-tankers on enlargement and EU reform published in September in which they stated that "the accession of countries with disputed territories with a country outside the EU will have to include a clause that those territories will only be able to join the EU if their inhabitants are willing to do so."
• This was just a discussion paper and not the official line of Berlin or Paris, but this sort of scenario would mean that some sort of referendum or vote would have to take place in Transdniester, where inhabitants, at least so far, have shown very little inclination of wanting to reintegrate with the right bank -- let alone joining the EU.

Brief #2: Forum 2000 Grapples With 'Ukraine Fatigue'

What You Need To Know: Prague hosted the annual Forum 2000 conference on October 16-17. A brainchild of the late Czech President Vaclav Havel, the forum has become the city's premier think-tank event, bringing together politicians, officials, academics, and journalists to debate and dissect the latest in current affairs.

Given the Czech Republic's prominent role since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine over 600 days ago -- hosting half a million Ukrainian refugees and pushing for more sanctions on Russia and quicker Ukrainian integration into the EU and NATO -- I went there to find out one thing: Has the "Ukraine fatigue" that I hear so much about in conversations with various people now finally set in?

The concept of this "fatigue" truly gathered pace, at least in my observations, after the NATO Vilnius summit in July. The big talking point then, apart from Ukraine's crushing disappointment in not getting a clear pathway to membership, was the caustic remark by Ben Wallace, the British defense minister at the time, about not being an Amazon delivery service for Ukrainians and the need for Kyiv to show more gratitude toward the West for the support it is providing.

With Wallace being one of Ukraine's biggest supporters, this opened the floodgates of complaints. Suddenly, I heard a variation of the same message from my sources, sounding something like, "I know that it sounds horrible to say with Ukrainians dying every day while we sit here and sip cappuccino, but there is a real fatigue on this topic both among the general public and policymakers."

Deep Background: In a sense, this has do with two things: Firstly, that there isn't enough bandwidth -- politically or in wider society -- to give this war priority anymore after 18 months of fighting. Concerns over increased migration and the growing conflict in the Middle East now get most of the attention.

Former Croatian Foreign Minister Vesna Pusic, speaking at the closing session of the forum, put it rather succinctly: "[Russian President Vladimir] Putin has got his second front in Gaza that he always wished for." And it certainly has tied Brussels up in knots in recent weeks. First, a very public fight between European commissioners about whether aid to the Palestinians should be cut or not and then ire among several EU member states that European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, who rushed to Israel to express support for the country, did not emphasize the need for the country to show restraint and respect international law in its response to the terrorist attacks by Hamas.

But there is also another explanation. Western institutions have for now run out of headline-grabbing initiatives for Kyiv. Ivanna Klympush-Tsintsadze, former vice prime minister for European and Euro-Atlantic integration and current opposition MP, summed it up by noting that "we are in the plateau of support for Ukraine now."

Drilling Down

• To illustrate this, look at the draft conclusions for this week's EU summit (October 26-27) in Brussels seen by RFE/RL. The text on Ukraine is more or less ready already and it offers precious little that is new. There is the usual support for Ukraine's Peace Formula "with a view to holding a Global Peace Summit" and repeated calls for "the work to continue" to establish a tribunal for the prosecution of war crimes and on more restrictive measures on the Kremlin. It also simply states that "Russia's ability to wage its war of aggression must be further weakened, including through sanctions." Old phrases, no initiatives.
• At Forum 2000, the many discussions on Ukraine reflected this clash between Ukrainian hopes and Western reality -- notably on two particular fields: Ukraine's EU and NATO integration and efforts related to the reconstruction of the country.
• Alyona Getmanchuk, the director of the Ukrainian think tank New Europe Center and one of her country's most prominent voices for Euro-Atlantic integration, argued forcefully that the issue of Ukraine's NATO membership must be on the agenda again when NATO leaders assemble in Washington in July 2024.
• She noted that it gives Russian President Vladimir Putin "great motivation to continue the war" if the military organization insists that Ukraine can't join NATO until the fighting is over and that the fastest way to the negotiating table is to create a threat for Putin to lose Crimea or the war in general. She also expressed dismay about the stories that I also have heard from well-placed European officials that the United States is still considering a future status of Ukraine as a neutral, non-NATO country to be a useful bargaining chip with the Kremlin in future talks.
• Countering that, Michael Zantovsky, one of the Czech Republic's most recognized diplomats, pointed out that "while the direction of travel is clear for Ukraine and NATO, the pace is not," and cautioned about membership while the war is ongoing since the core of NATO is Article 5, the mutual defense clause, and that this clause must remain credible -- something Moscow would test if Ukraine joined the military alliance under current circumstances.
• When it comes to the EU, it was a similar story: All agreed that it is likely that Ukraine will soon start accession talks, but the pace of that process will depend on a lot of things, including the EU's internal reform process and the fact that more Central and Eastern EU member states will have to chip in. Martin Dvorak, the Czech minister for European affairs, acknowledged this problem by noting that he "wants the Czech Republic to be a net payer to the EU budget and would be proud of it," but admitted that it would be complicated to sell because for a large part of the Czech public, the EU is a cash pot.
• On reconstruction of Ukraine, the mood was similarly downbeat. The World Bank estimated over the summer that Ukraine would need over $400 billion for reconstruction in the next decade, a number that is growing with each day of the war. And while many at the conference hoped that some of this reconstruction could be paid from seizing frozen Russian assets in the EU, which are estimated to be worth some 200 billion euros, it has proven impossible so far due to legal hurdles involving state property.
• Even a possible enactment of a levy on extra profits of the frozen assets has proven elusive in the EU as the European Central Bank (ECB) has warned that this could undermine the euro as a global currency if no other big currencies mirrored these steps as well.
• Getting European private companies to invest in Ukraine is also proving difficult. Alexander McWhorter, the chairman of the management board at Citibank Ukraine, noted that firms, especially in Central and Eastern European countries, have shown interest in the Ukrainian market but wanted to be sure of the security situation before committing. Mariia Ionova, a Ukrainian MP, summed it up nicely: "A New Ukraine, yes, but for that we need people to return and for that we need security." EU and NATO membership could solve that, but judging from the mood at the forum, that doesn't appear too close.

Looking Ahead

On October 23, EU foreign ministers will gather for their monthly meeting, this time in Luxembourg. There is now hope that they can sign off on another tranche worth 500 million euros ($540 million) of military aid to Ukraine, but for that to happen Hungary would need to lift its veto, which has been in place since early summer. Budapest has so far refused to give the green light, citing the need for Kyiv to remove the Hungarian bank OTP from a blacklist produced by Ukraine's National Agency on Corruption Prevention that labels it as an "international sponsor of war" as it continues to do business in Russia.

Three days later, EU leaders will meet in Brussels for a two-day summit. Migration will continue to be one of the hot-button issues the heads of state and government will grapple with. Expect them to discuss the escalating conflict between Israel and Hamas at length as well. It is also possible that some will confront Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban over his meeting and handshake with Putin in Beijing last week.

That's all for this week. Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on Twitter @RikardJozwiak, or on e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.

Until next time,

Rikard Jozwiak

If you enjoyed this briefing and don't want to miss the next edition, subscribe here.

Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods.

I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I'm drilling down on two issues: In light of Azerbaijan's lightning takeover of Nagorno-Karabakh, what can the EU do for Armenia now? Plus, is Brussels capable of slapping more sanctions on Moscow?

Also, last week, I sat down with the European Commission's vice president for values and transparency, Vera Jourova. In the interview, she said that to unblock EU funding, Hungary must meet set conditions on reforming its judiciary and ensuring the protection of fundamental rights.

Brief #1: What Now For EU-Armenia Relations?

What You Need To Know: On October 18, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinian will address the full plenary of the European Parliament. It comes just a month after Azerbaijan's military carried out an offensive that overwhelmed breakaway ethnic Armenian forces in Nagorno-Karabakh. Baku now controls territory that has been under ethnic Armenian rule for decades, forcing up to 100,000 ethnic Armenians to flee Karabakh for Armenia.

It also comes at a time when the European Union is getting increasingly engaged in a diplomatic settlement between Baku and Yerevan -- while pondering what its relations with Armenia might look like in the future. In the coming weeks, European Council President Charles Michel is expected to host Pashinian and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev in Brussels for talks.

For Brussels, it is important to get this peace process started, after the failure of the trio to meet in the Spanish city of Granada on October 5, along with French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz. Aliyev backed out, reportedly after his request that Turkey participate in the talks to counter France's supposed pro-Armenian bias was denied. The Turkish president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, stayed away from Spain altogether, focusing on the congress of his Justice and Development Party that took place a couple of days later. Despite the snag, Michel remains an acceptable interlocutor to both sides and, for the EU and the United States, the ultimate goal would be to have some sort of peace treaty, preferably by the end of the year.

Deep Background: EU leaders, officials, and diplomats are now wondering what to with Armenia, especially as Pashinian made it clear that he wants closer ties with Brussels. In a statement issued after the Granada meeting on behalf of the Armenian leader, Macron, Michel, and Scholz, they "expressed their support to the strengthening of EU-Armenia relations, in all its dimensions, based on the needs of the Republic of Armenia."

EU officials have told me on background that the European Commission, the bloc's top executive body, now has an "internal reflection exercise" ahead of it on how to best help Armenia. Brussels has already provided 10.5 million euros ($11 million) in immediate humanitarian support and will soon provide another 15 million euros to help support the Armenian government.

There has also been talk among EU officials of setting up some sort of macro-financial assistance to Yerevan with regular payment cycles, similar to what Brussels has done to aid Moldova and Ukraine. But what Armenia also needs is security, with Yerevan fearing that Azerbaijan might make more military advances in the future. Earlier this year, the EU began an unarmed monitoring mission in Armenia, along parts of the border with Azerbaijan, and while more people could be added to boost the mission capacity from today's 150 people, they will remain unarmed. Armenia might also explore options of getting money from the European Peace Facility (EPF), the same pot the EU is using to purchase arms and other military gear for Ukraine.

Drilling Down:

• There are, however, two considerable hurdles to pass: Firstly, the EU is wary of antagonizing Azerbaijan and handing over EPF cash could be seen as too much of a risk. And secondly, there is Armenia's relationship with Russia. Yerevan is still a member of the Moscow-dominated Eurasian Economic Area, as well as the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) military alliance. Yerevan's commitment to the latter probably makes EPF funding difficult.
• Many in Brussels think that Armenia is slowly pivoting away from Russia. Speaking on background as they are not permitted to speak on the record, a senior EU official recently told me, "It strikes me that Armenia has perhaps made a very accurate conclusion that the security guarantees that they have been given in the past by Russia are not worth the paper they are written on."
• An obvious indicator of that was Armenia's recent decision to ratify the International Criminal Court's Rome Statute, which could obligate the country's authorities to arrest Russian President Vladimir Putin if he were to visit the country.
• More long-term, Armenia could hope to upgrade its current Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (CEPA) with the EU to something more like the association agreements that Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine enjoy.
• An upgraded agreement could also pave the way for Armenian citizens to benefit from the current visa-facilitation agreement with the EU to full visa liberalization.
• Then there is the question of punishing Azerbaijan. A recent discussion paper, authored by the EU's diplomatic corps, EEAS, and seen by RFE/RL, noted it was possible to enact "sanctions in case serious human rights violations are committed."
• A European Parliament resolution, passed on October 5, called for the EU to impose sanctions on Azerbaijanis responsible for human rights violations in Nagorno-Karabakh and reconsider the "strategic partnership" with Azerbaijan in the field of energy.
• Despite the resolution garnering considerable media attention, it's worth noting that the resolution was nonbinding for member countries and EU institutions and the bloc is unlikely to take any significant punitive measures against Baku. Hungary has already indicated as much in public, and countries such as Austria, Bulgaria, Greece, Italy, and Romania -- interested in buying Azerbaijani gas or getting access to even more lucrative Turkmen gas through Azerbaijan -- would likely block such a measure.

Brief #2: Can The EU Muster Up More Sanctions Against Russia?

What You Need To Know: There was a time, not long ago, when a substantial amount of EU diplomats' time was devoted to designing and adopting sanctions against Russia. Immediately after the country's full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, the bloc imposed its first sanctions package and, to date, another 10 have followed. Those sanctions have targeted the Russian oil, mining, lumber, and coal industries; have closed EU airspace and ports for Russian-flagged flights and vessels; have cut Russian banks off from the international SWIFT bank-payment system; and have imposed asset freezes and visa bans on over 1,800 individuals and firms, including President Putin and many in his closest circle.

The period of frenzied sanctions work in Brussels is now over. And it is already slowing down. In 2023, only two rounds have been adopted, with the latest agreed at the end of June. Some diplomats are saying that there isn't that much left to target, whereas others are pointing to the increasing difficulty in getting all 27 member states to come to an agreement -- the most recent package only saw the light of the day after almost eight weeks of negotiations.

So, it comes as no surprise that, in her big "state of the European Union" address, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen didn't mention Russian sanctions at all. EU sources -- speaking on the condition of anonymity as they weren't authorized to speak on the record -- told me that only a handful of member states had mentioned more Russian sanctions.

Deep Background: The sands are shifting within the European Union. Migration has crept up to the top of the agenda again, with a 28 percent jump in asylum requests in the bloc this year, compared to the same time period in 2022, according to data from the European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA). With the populist leftist party Smer winning the most votes in Slovakia's recent parliamentary elections and now looking set to form the next government, Hungary could have a new ally in its fight against further Russian sanctions. On the campaign trail, Smer's leader, former Prime Minister Robert Fico, said no more weapons will be sent to Ukraine and praised Moscow.

Despite this reluctance, EU sanctions experts are holding preliminary talks and it's possible that a new package could be presented to member states, most likely some time in November. A lot will depend on what other priorities there are, vis-a-vis Ukraine, which need to be adopted before 2023 is rung in. For example, all the member states need to give the green light in order for Kyiv to start EU accession talks in December. Plus, there will be an EU drive to reach agreement on a 20 billion-euro ($21 billion) fund to pay for military aid for Ukraine over the coming years, and then another proposal of 50 billion euros to finance the country's reconstruction between 2024 and 2027. And on top of that, more sanctions. Not everything will get over the line in 2023.

Drilling Down:

• If there is a new sanctions proposal, what will it contain? The best bet is to look at two sanctions discussion papers, seen by RFE/RL, recently produced by perhaps the two biggest Russian sanctions hawks, Lithuania and Poland. Their proposals are likely the maximum the bloc would go.
• Perhaps the four most obvious areas for new measures, which are mentioned in both papers, would be liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), liquefied natural gas (LNG), steel, and diamonds.
• The last sector is perhaps the most realistic to target. Raw diamond exports from Russia in 2021 were worth $4.5 billion and amounted to 1 percent of all Russia's total exports. Belgium, home to the European "diamond capital," Antwerp, has long been opposed to clamping down on Russia's diamond business, arguing that it would hurt itself more than Russia. EU action also hinges on whether the Group of Seven (G7) leading economies can find a global solution to the issue.
• Even if such measures were implicated, there still might be too many loopholes, as Russian diamonds could be rerouted from Antwerp directly to Dubai and the Indian city of Surat. Governments in the United Arab Emirates and India would be unlikely to align with such sanctions.
• Poland remains the main EU importer of LPG from Russia, followed by the Netherlands. So even if Warsaw has indicated that it is ready to cease LPG imports, the question remains as to whether other countries will be willing. As winter is approaching and energy prices remain high, there doesn't seem to be much appetite within the EU to target LPG and LNG. Russian imports of the latter into the bloc even increased this year compared to 2022, with Belgian, French, and Spanish ports reportedly seeing more trade.
• Lithuania is pushing for harsher EU measures against the Russian nuclear sector, which would prohibit EU companies from signing contracts with Russian nuclear giant Rosatom, investing in the Russian civil nuclear energy sector, and from importing enriched uranium from Russia. While some member states might be persuaded on halting business with Rosatom or staying out of the Russian nuclear business, stopping uranium imports from Russia would likely be a bridge too far. In the first four months of 2023, the bloc's two biggest member states, France and Germany, imported Russian-enriched uranium worth 134.5 million euros and 12.3 million euros, respectively.
• And what about steel products? Sanctions were introduced in October 2022, but both Belgium and Italy pushed for wind-down periods lasting two years, something that is unlikely to change. There is some wiggle room, with the possibility that different types of iron products could be added to the sanctions list to tighten existing loopholes, such as with steel sheets and pig iron.
• So, what might fly? There could be some new sanctions against the Russian laser industry and a widening of the EU ban to provide Russia with IT consultancy services, which for now largely concerns the installation of computer hardware and software. The sale to Russia of European cloud-computing technologies, for example, is not covered by any sanctions.
• Then there is a whole list of components made in the EU that can be used in Russian military hardware. These parts -- for example, small drones, electric motors, generators, and sensors -- might not often make the headlines, but experts say blocking their export could make it harder for the Russian military to function.

Looking Ahead

On October 20, European Commission President von der Leyen and European Council President Michel will travel to Washington to meet U.S. President Joe Biden for the first EU-U.S. summit in nearly two years. The wars in Ukraine and Israel will feature prominently on the agenda, although China is likely to grab the headlines, as Brussels is set to announce anti-subsidy investigations against Chinese steelmakers.

Also, look out for the Berlin Process summit in Albania's capital, Tirana, on October 16. The Berlin Process was an initiative of yearly summits first launched in 2014 to improve cooperation between various EU member states and the six Western Balkans EU hopefuls (Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia). This is, however, the first time the summit is being held in one of the six Western Balkan countries. No big announcements are likely, but there could be an increased push from countries such as Albania and North Macedonia to speed up their EU accession paths.

That's all for this week. Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on Twitter @RikardJozwiak, or on e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.

Until next time,

Rikard Jozwiak

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