Wider Europe

Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods. To subscribe, click here.

I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I'm drilling down on two major issues: Ukraine's latest proposal on how to counter Russian disinformation and the reasons why EU sanctions against Belarus are on hold.

Brief #1: Ukraine Has Big Plans To Fight Russian Disinformation

What You Need To Know: The Ukraine Defense Contact Group met for the first time in April 2022 at the Ramstein U.S military base in Germany. The purpose of the group -- which has more than 40 countries as members, including all 30 NATO allies -- was to coordinate arms deliveries to Ukraine to stave off the Russian invasion.

The group, which has met on a regular basis since then and is now simply referred to as the "Ramstein Group" or the "Ramstein Format," has been a rather successful joint effort of like-minded countries sending Kyiv military supplies. This has also spawned other "Ramstein" initiatives -- for example the "Energy Ramstein," which has been crucial in securing and sending generators to Ukraine during the winter months; or the "Economic Ramstein," which came into being to sketch out plans for the reconstruction of the country after the fighting is over.

Not all the various "Ramsteins" have the same members, but it is perhaps the informality of the format -- not bound by the rules and regulations of an official EU or UN meeting -- that has contributed to its success. Regarding weapons, the Ramstein countries quickly went through their stocks and sent what was available and needed by Ukraine -- often in high quantities and including artillery and air-defense systems. Now, Kyiv wants to repeat the trick by starting an "Information Ramstein" to combat Russian disinformation on a larger scale.

Deep Background: In a letter written by Ukrainian Culture Minister Oleksandr Tkachenko and addressed to the European commissioner responsible for transparency and values, Vera Jourova, he notes that "Ukraine is up against Russia's vast and centralized information warfare and international influence machine, which includes assets from troll farms to state media, energy companies to corruption networks. Though it cannot compete in terms of scale, Ukraine does have one huge advantage: It can ally with its international partners to create coordinated, targeted, joint-influence operations."

Dated February 18 and seen by RFE/RL, the document goes on to explain that Ukraine needs to work "concertedly with its key allies to map the most significant areas of vulnerability in Europe, identifying which combination of Ukraine and its allies is best placed to achieve the effect."

Tkachenko also adds that there is a need to "identify leverage points within its network to bring 'rogue' and potential 'rogue' actors in line and transform soft European partners into strong European allies, who can in turn become ambassadors of influence."

Drilling Down

• Tkachenko's letter also contains a proposal to create a working group that will start preparing what he calls an "Information Ramstein." This meeting, he says, should have two main goals: "Discuss the lessons learned of Ukrainian resistance to Russian information warfare and develop a 'joint operations' road map for counteroffensive in Russia's information war."
• The working group should consist of what he calls "European media experts," and he names several Ukrainian officials, including the influential adviser to President Volodymyr Zelenskiy, Mykhaylo Podolyak. Also mentioned are officials from the EU's East StratCom Task Force, a section of the European External Action Service that was set up a year after Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014 to challenge the Kremlin's disinformation campaigns, and personnel from the NATO Strategic Communications Center of Excellence, as well as from the U.K.'s Foreign, Commonwealth, and Development Office.
• Accompanying the letter is also a concept note titled the "International Conference on Creating a Coalition of Western States to Counter Russian Information Warfare," which outlines seven prospective panels, with names such as "From Information Defense to Information Offensive," "Russian and Pro-Russian Information War Channels Vs. the West," and "Russian Media: Mass Media or Information Weapon of the Kremlin?"
• While plenty of meetings have taken place on the subject of Russian disinformation that have brought together experts and various EU, NATO, and national officials, nothing of this scale has ever been attempted. The big question, though, is how much enthusiasm there will be for this Kyiv-driven initiative. According to EU officials familiar with the concept note who are not authorized to speak on the record, European Commissioner Jourova has not yet answered the letter and has asked EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell to come up with a response instead.
• There is also a certain apprehension about whether Kyiv can and should be in the driving seat for such an initiative. While there is an understanding that Ukraine has a right to defend itself from Russia, including in the information space, by removing, for example, all Russian TV channels from its cable TV network or banning Russian social networks such as Odnoklassniki, there is a sense that this may not be replicated across the EU.
• After initially being reluctant to target Russian media in any way, in recent sanctions packages against Russia the EU has suspended the broadcasting activities and licenses of several Kremlin-backed media outlets such as Sputnik, RT, and Rossia-1. The ban, which targets outlets that disseminate disinformation, includes all means of transmission and distribution in or directed at EU member states.
• Brussels, however, has made clear that this still doesn't prevent those media outlets from carrying out activities in the EU other than broadcasting, such as interviews or research. And while there have been calls to be even tougher, including slapping more sanctions on individuals believed to be spreading pro-Kremlin propaganda, there is currently no consensus to go any further.

Brief #2: Why Have EU Sanctions On Belarus Stalled?

What You Need To Know: In late January, the European Commission proposed a new sanctions package on Belarus, the first one directed at the regime in Minsk since 2022, for its support of Russia's attack on Ukraine. The proposed measures on Belarus were largely set to copy -- and align with -- restrictive measures already imposed by the bloc on Moscow -- for example, an EU ban on providing IT and polling services, consulting, and luxury goods to the country, and a prohibition on the import of Belarusian gold and steel. It was initially believed that the 27 EU member states would quickly approve the package, as it wasn't seen as particularly far-reaching or controversial.

Yet, more than two months down the line, the proposal remains unadopted, with EU ambassadors representing the member states haggling over one item in the 23-page draft legislation seen by RFE/RL: a sanctions derogation regarding Belarusian fertilizers, with the text noting that this is "in order to further address food security concerns in third countries."

As with the EU sanctions against Russia -- where a similar derogation was introduced just before Christmas last year -- the proposal notes the possible exception concerns individuals who play "a significant role in international trade in agricultural and food products, including wheat and fertilizers" and thus potentially can have their assets unfrozen by Brussels.

Deep Background: The derogation has pitted two groups of countries against each other. On one side are the sanctions hawks -- consisting of the three Baltic states, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, together with Poland -- who want the derogation dropped before they approve the sanctions. On the other side are a collection of Western European countries, including Germany, Italy, Spain, and Portugal, that all insist the derogation should remain.

According to several EU officials, the spats about the derogation have been fairly "nasty," with Lithuania and Portugal in particular not seeing eye to eye. For Vilnius, the issue could have internal political consequences as the government has made it a central political pillar to be extra tough on the next-door regime of Belarusian ruler Alyaksandr Lukashenka, especially after the 2021 forced landing in Minsk of a Ryanair flight heading to Vilnius, plus Minsk's attempt to force third-country migrants across the Belarusian-Lithuanian border later that same year.

If the derogation goes through, it could mean unfrozen assets for the Belarusian tycoon Ivan Halavaty and Russian billionaire Mikhail Gutseriyev, who have both been supportive of Lukashenka, and Belaruskali, one of the biggest fertilizer producers in the world and the single largest taxpayer in Belarus.

For Portugal, it is a question of the bloc's commitment to the so-called Global South, in this case meaning countries in Latin America, Asia, and Africa that are playing an increasingly important role in world politics due to their steady economic growth. The EU has been adamant that these countries are supportive of Ukraine, notably in the United Nations, but is at the same time weary about Russian claims, without evidence, that EU sanctions on various Russian and Belarusian items are causing global food scarcity.

Drilling Down

• It is worth noting here that the EU hasn't imposed any sanctions on food products from Belarus and Russia, even though the targeting of Belaruskali, for example, has deprived some countries of the potash needed in agricultural production. That is especially true for Brazil, a former Portuguese colony, which imported 20 percent of its fertilizers from Belarus before the EU's ban on Belarusian fertilizers that entered into force in June 2022.
• That figure in Brazil is now down to 9 percent -- with imports going via Chinese and Russian ports instead of EU ones. (Brazil has made up some of that shortfall by buying more Canadian potash.) There is speculation in Brussels that the reason Lisbon is so keen on securing the sanctions derogation is that it would benefit Portuguese shipping companies, even though there is no concrete evidence of this.
• It is also worth noting a key difference between the Russian sanction derogation, which has been in force now for three months, and the proposed Belarusian derogation. In the former, only individuals in the fertilizer business are sanctioned, whereas in the latter both individuals and companies involved with fertilizers are under restrictive measures -- and there is a specific EU import ban on Belarusian potash.
• While a compromise doesn't seem likely in the near future, there is some hope that countries will find alternatives to Belarusian fertilizers. Canada, already the largest potash producer worldwide, has indicated that it is capable of producing 6 million additional tons a year. Thirty million tons of fertilizer is also being produced in Africa, notably in Nigeria and Algeria. That figure is twice as much as the whole of the African continent consumes annually.
• Another issue that could potentially end the stalemate is the recent announcement by both Minsk and Moscow that Russia will deploy tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus, as well as the building of a nuclear weapons storage facility there. There have been hints among EU officials I have spoken to that this will prompt fresh sanctions proposals by Brussels targeting the Lukashenka regime, even though nothing yet has been put on the table. Expect this to rumble on for a few more weeks.

Looking Ahead

NATO foreign ministers are meeting in Brussels on April 4-5. During the first day, there will be a session of the NATO-Ukraine Commission (NUC) with Ukraine's foreign minister. NUC is the official body responsible for developing the relationship between the military alliance and Kyiv. No big decisions are expected for this meeting, but it is still a significant gathering as it is the first NUC since 2017.

The reason for the hiatus has been objections from Hungary, which says that Ukraine has been discriminating against the ethnic Hungarian minority in the country. Despite Hungary's protests, though, NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg has now decided to convene the commission. There should be a lot of talk about security guarantees for Ukraine and its prospects of one day joining the alliance -- plus some Hungarian grumbling that the unity of NATO has been challenged.

On April 4, the chief negotiators for Serbia and Kosovo are meeting in Brussels for the first time since their respective leaders agreed on a deal on March 18 to further normalize relations. The idea is that they will iron out details regarding the implementation of the agreement. EU officials, however, don't expect that much concrete will come out of these talks as neither Pristina nor Belgrade have indicated that they are willing to move yet.

That's all for this week. Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on Twitter @RikardJozwiak or on e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.

Note: Due to the Easter holidays, the Wider Europe newsletter will next appear on April 17.

Until next time,

Rikard Jozwiak

If you enjoyed this briefing and don't want to miss the next edition, subscribe here.

Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods. To subscribe, click here.

I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I'm drilling down on two major issues: the deal struck between Serbia and Kosovo, and how the EU is stepping up nonlethal military support for Georgia and Moldova.

Brief #1: Will The Serbia-Kosovo Deal Really Be Implemented?

What You Need To Know: Late on March 18, EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell announced a deal had been struck between Serbia and Kosovo after a full day of talks in Ohrid, North Macedonia. What the two parties in fact had agreed on was an annex, which was meant to spell out the sequences and timetables of the implementation of an agreement struck between Belgrade and Pristina on February 27.

While the February deal did not entail Serbian recognition of Kosovo as an independent state, it did suggest ways of tackling some of the many obstacles that have dogged relations between Kosovo and Serbia ever since the former's declaration of independence in 2008.

In particular, the February deal calls for the mutual recognition of documents and national symbols, such passports, diplomas, license plates, and customs stamps. The two parties would also exchange permanent missions, not block each other's path to the EU, and Belgrade pledged not to object to Kosovo's membership in any international organization. In exchange for this, the branch of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Kosovo would have its status formalized.

The February deal also gives backing to the creation of a Serb-majority association of municipalities in Kosovo without mentioning this association by name. Instead, the text just noted the setting up of "an appropriate level of self-management for the Serbian community in Kosovo and ability for service provision in specific areas, including the possibility for financial support by Serbia and a direct communication channel for the Serbian community to the Government of Kosovo."

Deep Background: In many ways, the agreement and the accompanying annex, if implemented fully, could form an important building block toward full normalization of relations between Belgrade and Pristina, providing in effect de facto recognition of Kosovo, if not de jure, and push both countries closer toward their stated goals of EU membership.

There are, however, three broad issues here:

Firstly, neither the annex nor the agreement is signed, which cast doubts about its real validity. Secondly, there isn't much of a sequencing spelled out in the annex beyond the need for Kosovo to start working on the Serb-majority association of municipalities "immediately." And thirdly, there isn't much of a threat for either side if things remain unimplemented. As one diplomat dryly remarked to me after the announcement that a deal had been made: "The carrots aren't particularly tasty, and the sticks aren't hard enough."

Drilling Down

• The issue of whether a signature is needed or not will continue to dog this process. Serbian President Alexander Vucic clearly spelled out that he won't sign any documents and dashed the hopes that initially did exist in Brussels that the deal would be signed at last week's EU summit with all EU leaders in attendance.
• The initial Brussels agreement, the first one struck by the parties back in 2013, was also not signed but at least it was initialed by both sides. Speaking to RFE/RL after the meeting, the EU's chief negotiator, Miroslav Lajcak, said that any speculation about whether the deal is or isn't valid is "meaningless" and claimed that the document is official and binding through the announcement made by Borrell in Ohrid.
• Lajcak also admitted that it was only possible to agree on 12 points in the annex but that there were a further six that they couldn't reach consensus on. As mentioned above, it is stated that Pristina should start working on the creation of the Serbian association of municipalities immediately, but there is nothing concrete on when, for example, the mutual recognition of passports or exchanges of missions should happen.
• Will Pristina really jump first without any guarantees that Belgrade will take any reciprocal steps? Kosovar Prime Minister Albin Kurti can credit his rise to the pinnacle of Kosovar politics for having been against the creation of any entities based on ethnicity within the country, often citing the need to avoid political blockages similar to those seen in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
• The chief negotiators of both sides are due in Brussels for talks starting on April 3. This should offer the first indication if the deal is, indeed, workable. All eyes will also be on how Serbia behaves internationally in the coming months. The agreement notes that Belgrade pledges not to object to Kosovo's membership in any international organizations. The first likely test of this will be the run-up to the Council of Europe summit in Iceland in mid-May -- an organization that Kosovo for a long time has sought membership in and that Serbia so far has resisted.
• The main issue will, however, remain how to cajole the two sides to start implementation. The annex calls for the creation of a joint monitoring committee, chaired by the EU, within 30 days. But there is nothing about what power this committee will have or who will sit on it. The annex also notes that "any failure to honor their obligations from the agreement, this annex, or the past dialogue agreements may have direct negative consequences for their respective EU accession processes and the financial aid they receive from the EU."
• This may sound tough, but it isn't. Kosovo is not even recognized as an independent state by the EU and probably won't be anytime soon. It is behind every single European country wanting to join the club. Serbia's EU accession talks have ground to a halt due to its failure to align with Brussels politically over the war in Ukraine. So, neither of them is poised to join the club in the upcoming years, and the EU has so far also proved to be reluctant in cutting EU cash to the countries of the Western Balkans for fear of losing out to China and Russia in the region.

Brief #2: EU Stepping Up Military Aid To Georgia And Moldova

What You Need To Know: While the EU has been busy providing Ukraine with weapons to the tune of 3 billion euros ($3.2 billion) -- a sum that will increase by a further 2 billion euros in the coming months -- the bloc is also quietly preparing to aid Moldova and Georgia militarily, even though the sums, compared to what is given to Ukraine, are rather modest and the aid to both so far is of the nonlethal variety.

According to diplomats familiar with the discussion who aren't authorized to speak on the record, the proposed assistance measures for both Tbilisi and Chisinau come amid worries within the bloc of Russia's destabilizing efforts against both countries. They also insist that the attempt by the EU to get more involved is natural, as both countries applied to join the bloc last year, with Moldova becoming an EU candidate country together with Ukraine in June and Georgia a potential candidate.

Finally, it is also noted that while not competing with NATO -- which the EU still regards as the main security supplier on the continent -- the bloc is trying to become more of a player in terms of security throughout the European continent.

Deep Background: Last week, representatives of the 27 EU member states started discussing the concept notes produced by the EU's diplomatic corps, the European External Action Service (EEAS), on how the bloc can assist the two countries. The idea is to give a green light in the coming weeks and that the projects envisaged in both papers will be implemented within the next three years.

Seen by RFE/RL, both concept notes state that the purpose of the aid is to enhance Georgia and Moldova's "operational effectiveness, accelerate compliance with EU standards and interoperability, and thereby better protect civilians in crises and emergencies."

The money should come from the European Peace Facility (EPF), the same off-EU budget vehicle that Brussels now is using to supply arms to Ukraine and that doesn't require unanimity, as member states are allowed to "constructively abstain" -- meaning that they can wave a proposal through but not actively vote for it. Both Georgia and Moldova received funds from the EPF before Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine last year, but in much smaller quantities meant to finance smaller projects.

Drilling Down

• The proposal for Moldova is worth up to 40 million euros, with the biggest focus on getting the country ground-based mobile long-range surveillance radar, which will be provided by the Estonian Center for Defense Investments (ECDI). The radar purchase is significant as Russia in recent months has fired missiles through Moldovan airspace to hit targets in Ukraine.
• Other items that the EU pledges to provide include communication equipment, IT hardware and software, buses, forklifts, and pickup trucks. While clearly not providing lethal equipment that might be desired by Chisinau, EU officials I have spoken to believe that the investment will boost the Moldovan military, which last year had a budget of 85 million euros.
• In the Georgian plan, worth 30 million euros, modern trailers and trucks are also on the agenda -- just as with Moldova -- but here there is an increased emphasis on heavy equipment transporters and cranes. The EU will also provide vehicles that will support the mobility of the Georgian defense forces' field artillery communication systems.
• Other investments include a medical treatment facility (MTF) with updated equipment, which will complement the already existing couple of MTFs that the EU so far has funded, as well as equipment for Georgia's new Cyber Security Bureau.
• Unlike Moldova, which is military neutral, Georgia is a NATO aspirant country, meaning that the military alliance has indicated as far back as 2008 that the country one day can join the alliance. While no indication that a NATO invite is forthcoming for Tbilisi anytime soon, NATO and its member states have invested heavily in the country's military in recent years.
• Starting in 2014 and enhanced last year at NATO's Madrid Summit, the main instrument of military support for the South Caucasus republic remains the Substantial NATO-Georgia Package (SNGP) to which up to 20 countries, including the United States, have contributed with know-how, equipment, and cash in 13 various areas, including air defense, maritime security, strategic communications, cyberdefense, and intelligence-sharing, often via the NATO-Georgia Joint Training and Evaluation Center that was established in 2015 to improve the capacity of the country's army.

Looking Ahead

On March 27, the Hungarian parliament will finally vote in favor of Finland's NATO accession protocol after several delays in recent months. The Turkish parliament also had an initial discussion about ratifying Helsinki's bid last week, and it is now expected that they, too, will ratify before the Turkish presidential and parliamentary elections slated for May 14. This also means that Finland in all likelihood will join the alliance before Sweden, as neither Hungary nor Turkey has signaled that they are ready to green light Stockholm's bid yet. It is, however, expected that Sweden could join the club in the run-up to or at NATO's summit in Vilnius in July.

On March 28, the EU's energy ministers meet in Brussels. One of the decisions they will take is to prolong the voluntary goal to reduce gas usage in the bloc by 15 percent until March 2024. The current proposal ends at the end of the month and was enacted last summer as the EU faced soaring energy prices due to Russia cutting most westward gas flows. Despite being criticized at the time for not being binding, gas consumption in the 27 EU member states fell by nearly 20 percent between August 2022 and January 2023 due to the mild winter and various energy-saving measures. The goal of the EU is to have gas storages filled to 90 percent by November to get through the next winter.

That's all for this week. Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on Twitter @RikardJozwiak or on e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.

Until next time,

Rikard Jozwiak

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