Wider Europe

Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods. To subscribe, click here.

I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I'm drilling down on two major issues: the EU's new sanctions package on Russia and a meeting of the OSCE's Parliamentary Assembly that looks set to welcome sanctioned Russian State Duma members to Vienna.

Brief #1: A New Sanctions Package On The Anniversary Of Russia's Invasion Of Ukraine

What You Need To Know: The European Union is preparing another sanctions package on Russia to coincide with the anniversary of the invasion of Ukraine on February 24. EU ambassadors had a first discussion on the measures prepared by the European Commission last week and, according to diplomats familiar with the discussion who are not authorized to speak on the record, there is every chance that the 27 member states will reach the necessary unanimous agreement on the sanctions package soon.

That agreement is likely because, just as in the previous round of sanctions agreed in December 2022, this one isn't very hard-hitting. To increase the chances of swift endorsement, a raft of potentially controversial items is being left out, such as a ban on Russian diamond imports (which Belgium would likely veto) and energy-related sanctions on, for example, the Russian nuclear sector (which both Hungary and Bulgaria have previously indicated they would nix).

Deep Background: The centerpiece of this sanctions package, seen by RFE/RL, is export bans on EU goods worth 11.3 billion euros ($12 billion), using EU-Russia trade volumes from 2021. A whole list of products, stretching to nearly 70 pages, will be banned from going to Russia. This focuses mainly on things used by the Russian military in Ukraine, such as sensors and lasers, marine and diesel engines, tractors, devices used in semiconductors such as microchips, but also rare earth metals and various types of cameras. There is also an import ban on some Russian goods, mostly various types of rubber and asphalt, coming into the EU, to the tune of 1 billion euros.

As always, there are also listings of individuals and companies on which visa bans and asset freezes will be imposed. The list, which currently consists of 1,386 individuals and 171 companies and organizations, will likely see the addition of 63 more people and up to 30 entities. In the first category, there are no new oligarchs included but rather Moscow-appointed politicians in senior positions in the Ukrainian territories partially controlled by Russia, State Duma members, ministers, military leaders, and officials the EU believes are responsible for the illegal deportation of Ukrainian children to various Russian regions.

The entities this time are arguably more interesting with the inclusion of Russian banks such as Alfa-Bank, Rosbank, and Tinkoff Bank, as well as the Russian National Wealth Fund. Several companies involved in making military equipment and machinery are also included, as is the Russian state-owned media group Rossiya Segodnya, which runs both the RIA Novosti news agency and the Sputnik media agency.

Drilling Down

• Another aspect of this package is that Iranian companies are also sanctioned for supplying the Russian war machine, including drone-making companies such as Qods and Shahed Aviation and the aerospace force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps.
• It has also been suggested that some loopholes in previous sanctions rounds be closed. While it is already prohibited to both export and import so-called dual-use goods, meaning items that can have both military and civilian uses, the transit through Russia of such items will now be banned as well.
• According to the proposed package, Russian citizens will no longer be able to hold any positions in governing bodies of companies owning critical infrastructure in the EU, such as electricity generation, water supply, and telecommunications. Similarly, it will no longer be possible to provide gas storage for Russian nationals and companies.
• The EU is also stepping up its efforts to locate and map out all the Russian frozen assets in the bloc. As part of the sanctions proposal, the European Commission is demanding very detailed figures from capitals and is even proposing fining member states if they don't comply. While confiscating Russian assets to pay for the reconstruction of Ukraine is still a long way off, this could be considered a first step in that direction.
• As always, there are new derogations and new loopholes. One is that the exemption to allow Russian fertilizers to be exported to the EU and worldwide, agreed in the previous December sanctions package, should also include assets tied to this industry that are held in sanctioned Russian banks.
• Another is that the wind-down period of joint ventures with sanctioned Russian state-owned entities has been prolonged from June to December of this year. That also applies to additional professional services associated with the decoupling, such as accounting and legal advice.

Brief #2: Controversy In Vienna As Russia's OSCE Delegation Might Be Coming To Town

What You Need To Know: One of the most controversial meetings of the year so far will take place in Vienna in the coming days: the winter session of the OSCE's Parliamentary Assembly (PA).

Normally this event, which brings together some 323 parliamentarians from the organization's 57 member states with the stated goal of fostering inter-parliamentary dialogue, doesn't get much media coverage. It will this year, for two reasons.

First, visas will be issued for members of the Russian delegation, which includes several individuals who are on the EU sanctions list imposed on Moscow after its full-scale invasion of Ukraine last year. And second, this meeting takes place exactly on the first anniversary of that invasion, on February 24.

Deep Background: If the Russian delegation does show up in the Austrian capital this week, it will be the first time members of the Russian State Duma have been in the European Union in an official capacity since being sanctioned for supporting the war, notably by voting in favor of seizing the four Ukrainian territories of Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk, and Zaporizhzhya. The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly has met twice before since the invasion -- in July in Birmingham, England, and in the Polish capital, Warsaw, in November -- but both times the Russian delegation was denied visas.

That won't be the case this time, as the Austrian government has said it has to allow the Moscow delegation entry because Vienna has struck a so-called "headquarters agreement" with the OSCE, an international pact that Vienna says must be honored. The government did add, however, that the visas will only be valid for Austria -- and not for anywhere else in the EU -- and only for the duration of the parliamentary session.

The move has prompted both Ukraine and Lithuania to boycott the meeting. The head of the Ukrainian delegation, Mykyta Poturayev, recently wrote a letter, seen by RFE/RL, to OSCE Parliamentary Assembly President Margareta Cederfelt, saying that "we have no doubts that the Russian delegation will use the OSCE PA platform for justification of the aggression against my country, as well as for whitewashing numerous war crimes and crimes against humanity committed against the Ukrainian people. All this will undermine the integrity of the assembly and will compromise a clear and steadfast position the assembly has, so far, demonstrated with regard to the Russian aggression since 2014."

Drilling Down

• The big question is whether Austria was, in fact, right in granting visas to the Russian delegation. Being sanctioned by the EU means a visa suspension, but that can legally be lifted for a short period of time by an EU capital -- to attend international conferences, for example.
• It is, however, a political and legal gray area. Is an international obligation, such as the one struck between the OSCE and Austria, a more important obligation than that of upholding EU sanctions? And Austria has also previously denied visas to Russian officials wanting to come to Vienna for other OSCE-related meetings, showing that it can be done.
• Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the OSCE has also been very careful not to cut all ties with Russia. After Russia was expelled from the Council of Europe in March, the OSCE is the only larger pan-European political organization of which Moscow remains a member.
• Another concern is whether other countries will follow Ukraine and Lithuania's lead and boycott the meeting. Delegates from nearly a dozen countries also wrote to Cederfelt stating: "We believe the OSCE is a forum for dialogue but not an unconditional one. Russia has placed itself outside the bracket of nations committed to the principles of national law." There was also a push to postpone the meeting and potentially move it to another city.
• In a response to the delegates' letter, dated February 15 and seen by RFE/RL, Cederfelt wrote that, after a decision by her in consultation with the OSCE's senior leadership, the meeting in Vienna would go ahead as planned.
• In the letter, Cederfelt also added that "we invite you to make full use of this Winter Meeting to discuss how our Parliamentary Assembly can play its full part in the efforts to bring justice and help Ukraine restore its full independence and sovereignty within its internationally recognized borders."
• In another letter authored by Cederfelt and addressed to the speaker of Ukraine's parliament, Ruslan Stefanchuk, she said: "I would greatly appreciate the presence of the Delegation of Ukraine at our meeting in Vienna, sitting in the front row, where they will be able to hear overwhelming expressions of support from our Members."
• Probably nothing but certainly worth noting: The far-right Freedom Party of Austria, which has enjoyed close links with Moscow in recent years, is hosting its Academy Ball in another part of the grand Hofburg Palace where the OSCE assembly is taking place.

Looking Ahead

The main event of the week is U.S. President Joe Biden's trip to Poland on February 20-22. As well as meeting the Polish president, Biden will meet the leaders of the Bucharest Nine, an informal group of Central and Eastern European countries, which, along with the host Poland, includes Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, and Slovakia. There has been some speculation that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy will join the various meetings, or even that Biden could go to Ukraine. According to The New York Times, White House officials have "declined to say whether Mr. Biden planned to make a visit to Ukraine while he was in the area."

EU foreign ministers will meet in Brussels on February 20. In the meeting, the foreign ministers of both Ukraine and Moldova will address their colleagues and update them on recent developments in their countries. One of the issues the bloc's foreign ministers are expected to discuss is a proposal for EU member states to jointly purchase and provide 1 million rounds of artillery ammunition that Kyiv has said it desperately needs.

That's all for this week. Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on Twitter @RikardJozwiak or on e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.

Until next time,

Rikard Jozwiak

If you enjoyed this briefing and don't want to miss the next edition, subscribe here. It will be sent to your inbox every Monday.

And you can always reach us at newsletters@rferl.org.

Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods.

I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I'm drilling down on two major issues: the main takeaways from Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy's Brussels visit and the latest in Sweden's and Finland's increasingly frustrating bids to join NATO.

Brief #1: The Main Takeaways From Zelenskiy's Visit To Brussels

What You Need To Know: Just a week after European Council President Charles Michel and a large part of the European Commission visited Kyiv, it was Zelenskiy's turn to visit Brussels on February 9 -- his first stop in the EU capital since the Russian invasion almost one year ago.

The visit came after a brief stopover in London and a meeting in Paris with both French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz.

Zelenskiy's first foreign trip since the beginning of Russia's full-scale invasion on February 24, 2022, came in late December last year when he made a sudden appearance in Washington, D.C. to try to secure U.S. approval for Patriot missile deliveries to Ukraine.

On his way back from the United States, he also briefly met with Polish President Andrzej Duda in Rzeszow, Poland.

The fact that he visited the United States, Poland, the United Kingdom, and France all before visiting Brussels raised some hackles among a few EU officials. Yet his choice of itinerary reflects one clear reality: Ukraine needs more weapons, especially amid reports of an impending Russian military offensive.

In this respect, Brussels isn't the priority.

In London, Zelenskiy secured long-range missiles and the training of Ukrainian pilots on NATO-standard fighter jets. In Paris, Macron was very much open to the idea of sending Mirage planes. In Brussels, Zelenskiy addressed all 27 EU leaders, first in a plenary session and then in smaller groups, with the aim of securing deliveries of fighter jets as soon as possible. (Since the invasion began, the Ukrainian president has attended nearly every EU summit via video link.)

Deep Background: Zelenskiy's Brussels trip was more notable for the various photo ops than any concrete deliverables. Known as "leak city," his Brussels visit was reported by the press three days in advance, while his journeys to London and Paris were kept tightly under wraps.

Before he even landed, EU institutions were vying for who would host him first. In the end, there was something of a classic "Brussels fudge," in which Michel and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen greeted him at the airport, while his first proper appearance was at the European Parliament.

It was the parliament that first pushed for Ukraine's EU membership and its president, Roberta Metsola, was the first leader of an EU institution to go to Kyiv after the breakout of the war.

Drilling Down:

• On the question of Ukraine's EU membership, Zelenskiy pushed for the opening of EU accession talks in 2023. The EU summit conclusions, hammered out among EU leaders and issued after he left, stated that: "The European Union acknowledges Ukraine's determination to meet the necessary requirements in order to start accession negotiations as soon as possible." That is seen as the clearest sign yet from Brussels that negotiations can indeed be opened this year.
• The Ukrainian president also asked for more EU sanctions, in particular for more measures against Russian drones, missiles, and IT services. He also called for the sanctioning of Rosatom, Russia's state-owned nuclear energy firm.
• Talks with EU ambassadors on the EU's 10th sanctions package on Russia started over the weekend with a view to have them adopted by the first anniversary of Russia's invasion on February 24. It will likely consist of many of the things Zelenskiy was asking for, including a ban on European companies exporting various technologies to Russia, exports that are worth some 10 billion euros ($10.7 billion).
• More energy sanctions, for instance those targeting the Russian nuclear sector, are likely to be off the table as Hungary has made clear that it won't green-light such moves. Much was made of footage from the summit where Zelenskiy was applauded by EU leaders, with the exception of Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban. The Hungarian leader later noted that Budapest belongs to the "peace camp" and was pushing for an immediate cease-fire.
• Orban was not the only one giving slightly mixed messages. Bulgarian President Rumen Radev said before the meeting that he was against sending more weapons to Ukraine and that Brussels should look to "all diplomatic efforts" to peacefully end the war.
• Perhaps the most striking revelation of the day was when Zelenskiy told EU leaders that Ukraine had intercepted a Russian plan to destroy Moldova, noting that it contained "who, when, and how" and that he had informed Moldovan President Maia Sandu of the alleged plot. The Moldovan intelligence service later confirmed Moscow was trying to destabilize the country.

Brief #2: Sweden And Finland Hit A Roadblock In Their NATO Bid

What You Need To Know: In the fall of 2022, it looked like Finland and Sweden would join NATO, either by the end of the year or at the start of this one, in what would have been the quickest accession ever to the military alliance.

The Nordic pair applied to join in May 2022 as a direct result of Russia's attack on Ukraine. By June 2022, at a NATO summit in Madrid, the 30 members of the alliance gave their go-ahead. By late October 2022, 28 members had already ratified the Nordic pair's accession protocols.

Nearly four months down the line, not much progress has been made. Worse, it's probably fair to say things have unraveled.

While Hungary has indicated that its parliament might ratify the accession protocol when its plenary spring session commences on February 27, things are looking bleak regarding the ratification of Turkey.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has blocked the Swedish path to NATO for the foreseeable future, with Ankara saying Stockholm hasn't lived up to the obligations of the memorandum agreed in Madrid in June 2022 between Finland, Sweden, and Turkey. (Ankara wants to see progress from Finland, and notably Sweden, in the areas of fighting terrorism, the lifting of arms embargoes on Turkey, and fulfilling Turkish extradition requests.)

What especially annoyed Turkey were two protests held in Sweden in January. One was organized by a pro-Kurdish group and ended with an Erdogan effigy hanging upside down near Stockholm's city hall. At the other, a few days later, a Swedish-Danish far-right politician and provocateur set fire to a copy of the Koran outside the Turkish Embassy in the Swedish capital.

Deep Background: The fallout from those January protests has been brutal. Swedish ministerial visits to Turkey have been canceled; the Swedish Embassy in Ankara had to temporarily close due to demonstrations, with more threats against Swedish consulates across the country.

Swedish and NATO officials I have spoken to on the condition of anonymity now concede that little progress will be made before the Turkish parliamentary and presidential elections slated for May 14.

The NATO summit in Vilnius on July 11-12 is probably the earliest Sweden and Finland can become members -- either because Erdogan is no longer focused on the elections or because the country's long-time leader is no longer in power.

Drilling Down:

• What is clear is that the spat with Sweden has boosted the Turkish president's ratings in opinion polls. For the first time since he came to power in 2002, his Justice and Development Party (AKP) is facing a real electoral challenge with galloping inflation and six opposition parties forming a credible coalition.
• After last week's devastating earthquakes in Turkey, Sweden was quick to offer and mobilize help to Ankara, which could lead to better relations. There is a precedent for that: The last time such a large earthquake hit the country, back in 1999, Greek help paved the way for a thaw in Athens-Ankara relations, with Greece green-lighting Turkey's EU candidate status a few years later.
• Regarding Finland, Turkey has indicated it is ready to decouple the ratification process and just give Helsinki the green light. In January, Finnish Foreign Minister Pekka Haavisto noted that his country would look at other options if the situation remained the same. That stance was later softened, with the Finnish president and prime minister both reiterating that they wanted to join together with Sweden.
• Still, a recent poll showed that the majority of Finns would happily go it alone, if necessary. Last week, one of the biggest Finnish newspapers published a story, based on anonymous sources in the country's security apparatus, that claimed that Finland is ready to fly solo, largely because it feels vulnerable given its 1,300-kilometer border with Russia.
• In the meantime, Sweden is trying to implement as much as possible from the Madrid memorandum. An arms embargo against Turkey has been lifted and a new anti-terror law will enter into force in June. But the new law will not ban the waving of flags, such as that of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), which previously has enraged Turkey.
• Sweden will also not ban the burning of the Koran, something that Erdogan has asked for, citing both freedom of speech and the fact that blasphemy isn't a crime in the country. However, a recent request for another demonstration in which the Koran would be burned was turned down, with the authorities citing threats to public security.
• The latest spat is also causing political strains in Stockholm. The new right-wing government, which came to power in October 2022, thought it would have an easier time dealing with Ankara as the previous ruling Social Democrats enjoyed widespread support from Sweden's Kurdish community. But this new government relies on support from the nationalist and populist Sweden Democrats, whose party leader, Jimmie Akesson, recently called Erdogan "an Islamic dictator."
• Stockholm will also have problems extraditing people, with Erdogan now insisting that 130 people -- Kurds and opposition figures -- be handed over. While a handful have been extradited over the past few months, the Swedish government and Supreme Court have blocked the deportation of five people.

Looking Ahead

The European Parliament will meet for four days, starting on February 13, in Strasbourg for its February plenary. It is expected to pass two resolutions calling for the immediate release of former Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili and Russian opposition leader Aleksei Navalny.

While both resolutions are nonbinding, they will likely cause a stir in both Tbilisi and Moscow. Both are serving prison terms on charges their supporters say are politically motivated.

NATO defense ministers will meet in Brussels on February 14-15. The question of sending more arms to Ukraine will dominate the agenda, but it is also worth looking out for the possible adoption of the military alliance's so-called political guidance, which spells out what priorities, in terms of military capabilities, NATO should have over the next five years.

There will also be a discussion on how to address the alliance's depleting arms stockpiles, including by green-lighting new weapons procurement. NATO will also look at the construction of more storage facilities.

That's all for this week. Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on Twitter @RikardJozwiak or on e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.

Until next time,

Rikard Jozwiak

If you enjoyed this briefing and don't want to miss the next edition, subscribe here. It will be sent to your inbox every Monday.

And you can always reach us at newsletters@rferl.org.